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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION Re: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS 
Case No: 95-44-02034 DA 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Petitioner, CRAIG JACK HARRIS, by and through counsel, Martin & Nelson, PC, files 
this MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION Re: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as follows: 
ISSUES 
Respondent stands in defiance of the Orders of this Court. Respondent has taken and 
concealed substantial personal property in violation of the Court's Order. Respondent provided 
false information to the Court, resulting in her acquisition of more than $25,000.00 over and above 
that granted in the Court's Order. Respondent has refused to return any property wrongfully 
acquired or taken and has refused to recognize Craig's rights. Bonnie stands in open defiance of 
the Orders of this Court. 
i 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bonnie's unlawful taking of property in violation of Court's Order— 
1. At Bonnie's request the parties executed a STIPULATION AS TO ACCOUNTING 
AND DETERMINATION OF VALUES, dated February 9, 1998. A copy of that Stipulation is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit A." 
2. Pursuant to that Stipulation the Court issued its February 23, 1998 ORDER Re: 
THE ACCOUNTING AND DETERMINATION OF VALUES. A copy of that Order is attached 
hereto as "Exhibit B." That Order states that: 
All questions and disputes related to accounting and determination of all property, 
both real and personal, [and] values shall be submitted to the firm of Norman-
Loebbecke Associates. 
Each of the parties shall provide Norman-Loebbecke Associates with the facts 
which each believes is material to the identification of property, [and] the 
underlying facts claimed as to such property. Both parties shall fully cooperate in 
providing Norman-Loebbecke Associates with access to any and all information 
which said firm shall request. 
Should there be any dispute as to any such matters the question may be brought 
before the Court by way of motion for an appropriate order. 
3. Trial of the matter was held in 1999 on August 16-17, September 23, and on 
October 12. 
4. Appearing before the Court at trial was Brad Townsend, CPA, with the firm of 
Norman/Loebbecke. Based upon all information received from both parties, Mr. Townsend 
testified and the Court admitted into evidence a document from Mr. Townsend titled "Harris v. 
Harris, Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution." The Court accepted that document as a 
listing of all assets, incorporating that document into its Findings of Fact. A copy of that document 
is attached hereto as "Exhibit C." 
5. Subsequent to the trial, the Court issued a number of Orders: 
? 
a) The Supplementary Decree of Divorce, filed November 29, 1999 (attached 
hereto as "Exhibit D"); 
b) The Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed 
April 4, 2000 (attached hereto as "Exhibit E"); and 
c) The Court's Orders divided all property listed in Mr. Townsend's Report. 
("Exhibit C") 
6. The Orders of the Court directed that Bonnie shall retain her personal property and 
that Craig shall retain all his personal property. 
7. Paragraph 9 of the SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE, filed November 
29, 1999, ("Exhibit D") provided that: 
The Respondent [Bonnie] is awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed 
in Schedule A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman/Loebbecke Associates, 
with the exception of the Signetics retirement which is to be divided under 
Woodward as set forth above. [Emphasis added.] 
8. Real property listed in the Townsend Report included a large, three bay, double 
garage-door, commercial sized storage building on a lot located only yards from the Harris home in 
Pleasant Grove. Photographs of that lot and building are included herein as part of "Exhibit F." 
9. Craig, Bonnie and other family members all used the building for many years. 
Boats and vehicles were stored therein along with personal property of Bonnie and of Craig, his 
brother, his mother, Craig's two sons and others. That building was used by all as a large, 
covered, secure storage and work space. The building also contained heavy commercial steel 
shelving that had been purchased by AID Equipment, Inc. Mr. Townsend's report listed both the 
building and some large, high value items of personal property stored therein as marital assets.1 
1
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10. The storage building and all its contents have always been accessible to Bonnie. 
Bonnie was awarded the building and some of its specific contents that she listed as marital assets 
she wanted. The court awarded Bonnie all her personal property. Bonnie has had the storage 
building in her possession and control. Yet, never, until long after the trial did she make her claim 
against any of the unlisted personal property in that storage building.2 
11. In discussions prior to trial it had been decided that as to the storage building Craig 
would keep his property and Bonnie would keep hers. They had lived there for many years and 
both knew which property was theirs and which was not. That had all be discussed with the CPA. 
12. The last day of trial was October 12, 1999. 
13. Bonnie only first raised her claim against the entire contents of the storage building 
in March of 2000. Yet, the fact that she had taken substantial amounts of personal property, 
including property that she knew or must have known belonged to persons other than Craig, from 
the building was admitted in a letter dated March 27, 2000. A copy of that letter is attached hereto 
as "Exhibit G." 
14. On December 28, 1999, Craig had filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS. A copy of that document is attached hereto as "Exhibit H." 
Hearing on that Motion came before this court on March 1, 2000. At that hearing the Court 
received a stipulation as to the division of Craig's and Bonnie's personal property. 
15. During the hearing on March 1, 2000 the Court ordered that:3 (See "Exhibit I.") 
I'm going to recess and direct the parties to meet together with Mr. 
Townsend for the next forty-five minutes and attempt to identify the 
ambiguities that you see in the Order and attempt to come up with 
stipulated resolutions of those ambiguities. And I'm going to order you to 
both be in good faith in trying to resolve this. 
2
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 2, paragraph 7. 
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16. During the recess, the parties agreed to the manner of division of the personal 
property items in Craig's possession and items of personal property located in the storage building. 
See Affidavit of Craig Harris, 10/17/00, attached hereto as "Exhibit J." During the recess, 
discussion occurred as follows: 
a) Mr. Townsend said he had never received, nor had Bonnie ever provided, any 
inventory or description of any miscellaneous personal property items located in 
the storage building. 
b) Bonnie had not previously made any claim against that property. She had never 
made any claim that any of that property was marital property and had not 
previously provided any list or inventory of the miscellaneous personal property 
items to Mr. Townsend. 
c) The Court Order was that Craig was to pay Bonnie five thousand dollars and 
retain his personal property. The Court's Order stated that Craig and Bonnie 
were to retain all of their own items of personal property. 
d) Craig pointed out that he, his sons, his mother, his brother and Bonnie all had 
miscellaneous items of personal property then located in the storage building. 
e) Bonnie affirmed her claim that the Court Order was that she was given "all 
remaining assets" not specifically awarded to Craig. 
f) Bonnie said that she had previously told Craig that she would sell him his 
personal property (bed, clothing, washer, dryer, personal items, etc.) that he 
presently had in his apartment for five-thousand dollars ($5,000.00). 
g) Bonnie also said that she had previously told Craig that she would sell him his 
personal property that was located "in the bullet room" of the storage building 
3
 Transcript of Hearing, "Exhibit I," March 1, 2000, page 2, lines 6-11. 
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for five hundred dollars. Bonnie then said that she recently had a person come 
over and look at the stuff in the storage building. Bonnie then emphatically said 
that Craig was "getting a real deal" if she let him have the stuff only in the 
"bullet room" for five times five-hundred dollars, 
h) Craig argued that the Court Order had awarded Bonnie forty thousand dollars 
(purchase price) of personal property, furniture, fixtures, and furnishings in the 
home for a value of only eight thousand dollars, 
i) Bonnie said that what she needed from the storage building was some tools that 
she required to take care of the yard, including the house and the storage 
building that had been awarded to her. 
j) Finally it was agreed that Bonnie could take what tools she might need to take 
care of the yard. She could take those items from the storage building and then 
Craig would remove everything else to clean up the building for Bonnie's use 
since the storage building had been awarded to her. 
17. The Judge came back to the bench and the following was read into the record:4 
COURT: Please, be seated. We're back on record in the Harris v. Harris 
matter we have had a break here to allow parties to see what they can 
stipulate to in terms of resolution of any perceived ambiguities. Mr. 
Moody, has there been any resolution? 
MOODY: I think so. On the personal property (aside to Mr. Martin) - is that 
agreeable then? On the personal property, Mrs. Harris will take 
what personal tools that she would like to have out of the shop by 
the 15th of March. And then the Petitioner will have until that 
weekend, I believe its the 19th of March, to remove the rest of the 
possessions out of the shop. [Emphasis added.] 
COURT: Ok, and that will resolve the personal property? 
4
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MOODY: Yes. And then he will agree to pay her $5,000.00 for the personal 
property and he retains possession of all the personal property. 
18. The Court asked Mr. Moody to prepare the Order, which is attached as "Exhibit 
K."5 The Order was signed by the Court and filed on April 4, 2000. Paragraph two of the Order 
provided that, 
The parties have agreed that the Respondent shall have until March 15, 2000 to 
select and remove what personal property [personal tools] she desires to have from 
the building located on the Pleasant Grove lot. The Petitioner shall remove the 
remaining personal property he desires out of the building on or before March 30, 
2000. Any personal property left in the building after March 30, 2000 shall be the 
property of the Respondent. The Petitioner shall pay $5,000.00 to the Respondent 
on or before April 4. 2000, for the personal property located in his personal 
possession and from the personal property received from the building located on the 
Pleasant Grove lot. The Respondent shall provide access to the building at the lot 
to the Petitioner from March 16, through March 30, 2000 upon the Petitioner giving 
Respondent 24 hour notice of the times in which he intends on removing the 
property. [Emphasis added.] 
19. Only three days later, Bonnie took action in defiance of the Court's Order. On 
March 4, 2000, Bonnie called the Pleasant Grove Police Department, claiming that the storage 
building had been forcibly entered—burglarized some time between February 16th at 9:00 p.m. and 
March 4th at 2:00 p.m. Bonnie reported Craig's son, Scott Harris, as the most likely suspect. A 
copy of the Pleasant Grove Police Department Report, 03-04-00, case number 269335.A46, is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit L." The investigating officer's report was that: 
On the afternoon of 3-4-00 I responded to 692 Juniper for a report of a 
burglary. I met with Bonnie Harris who owns a storage building at 725 Orchard. 
She stated that someone had broken into her garage by pushing the garage door in, 
breaking it off the track. [Emphasis added.] 
20. When Craig, acting under the Court's Order, went to the storage building between 
March 15 and March 30 he discovered that the building had been completely cleaned out. With the 
7 
exception of one fishing tackle box and contents, large heavy gun safe, Scott Harris' Jeep and 
other Utah registered and serial numbered items, Bonnie had removed everything except 
miscellaneous trash.6 
21. A series of photographs of both the exterior and interior of the building as 
discovered by Craig are attached hereto as "Exhibit F." The photographs depict the condition and 
contents of the storage building.7 
22. It being noted that the garage doors bore the label of Martin Door Manufacturing in 
Salt Lake City, the chief engineer for that company was contacted and agreed to inspect the site. 
The photographs set out in "Exhibit F" were taken coincident with that inspection. From that 
inspection, certain conclusions were made. See "Exhibit F." The expert opinion was: 
That someone manually removed the interior lag screw with a wrench for the 
apparent purpose of making it appear that the door had been breached. What I 
observed appears to have been done by someone with access to the inside of the 
building by keyed entry. I observed no evidence of forced entry. The observed 
"breach" of the door could have only been done from inside the storage building. 
23. On March 20, Craig's counsel was informed that property had been removed in 
violation of the Order of the Court. A telephone call was immediately placed to Bonnie's legal 
counsel. A letter confirmed that telephone call. A copy of that letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit 
M." 
24. Bonnie's legal counsel responded by letter dated March 27, 2000. A copy of that 
letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit G." That letter stated that: 
a) Bonnie had changed the locks on the storage building in November of 1999; 
b) "Bonnie had not been in the shed since December, 1999, from the time she put 
the padlock on the building until after the hearing on March 1, 2000; 
5
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c) Bonnie claimed now that the building had been burglarized some time after she 
had changed the locks, listing twenty-seven (27) items Bonnie "noticed" were 
"missing from the shed;" 
d) Contrary to the Court's Order, Bonnie's counsel's claimed that all the items of 
personal property in the storage building had been "awarded" to Bonnie; 
e) Bonnie would only return part of the property she took from the storage 
building only upon certain demands being met; and that 
f) Bonnie would only return items belonging to third parties if they specifically 
identified each item and writing and provided documents of ownership as 
Bonnie may require. 
25. In accordance with the Court's Order, Craig went to the storage building with his 
son, Scott, one afternoon following March 15th to remove the personal property that belonged to 
him, Aid Equipment, Craig's mother, his brother and his two sons, Troy and Scott. When Craig 
opened the door, he was stunned to see that everything had been removed. Not knowing what had 
happened, Craig called the Pleasant Grove Police. After the police arrived, then Bonnie came over 
from the house. Bonnie admitted that she had taken all the stuff. In fact, during the discussion 
that followed Scott asked Bonnie why she had also taken everything she knew belonged to him. 
Bonnie responded, saying "that there were so many people helping her take things that she didn't 
know everything that was taken but that she had told them to just take everything."8 
26. An estimate of the value of personal property taken by Bonnie is now impossible to 
compile because no prior inventory was made. Actual value of loss may double the estimates. 
There were twenty-seven items of substantial value, estimated at $23,000.00, that Bonnie just 
6
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 5, paragraph 16. 
7
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 5, paragraph 17. 
8
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Q 
simply claimed were "missing".9 Craig had personally observed and he recalled that eighteen of 
the "missing" items had been there just a few months earlier. In any event, in addition to the 
missing items, from memory only, it is conservatively estimated that Bonnie took personal 
property belonging to the following:10 
a) Craig—valued at more than $4,600.00; 
b) AID Equipment valued at $2,925.00; 
c) Dick (Craig's Brother) valued at $3,734.00; and 
d) Troy and Scott (Craig's Sons) valued at more than $8,500.00. 
A copy of the memory inventories and estimated values provided by Craig are attached to Craig's 
Affidavit, "Exhibit J." 
Bonnie's took additional IRA money in violation of the Decree of Divorce— 
27. The SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE, "Exhibit D" attached hereto, 
reflects that the Court Findings were that Craig held interests in two retirement accounts: 
a) The Dean Witter 124-100296 IRA Standard, of value equal to or greater than 
$36,923.00, net, after costs of sale and tax penalties ($65,000.00, gross market 
value); and 
b) The Prudential Securities UQ-R62840 Simple IRA, of value equal to or greater 
than $2,666.00, net, after costs of sale and tax penalties ($4,500.00, gross 
market value). 
28. The valuation date was January 29, 1999.11 
9
 Letter from Bonnie's legal counsel, dated March 27, 2000, "Exhibit I," page 5. 
10
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 6, paragraph 20. 
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29. The Order of the Court directed that Bonnie would keep her own IRA with Dean 
Witter, valued at $48,918.00. The Court then awarded Bonnie both of Craig's IRA's, valued at a 
combined total of $39,589.00.12 
30. During November of 1999, Craig spoke with Bonnie about the transfer of his 
IRA's as Ordered. To Craig's surprise, Bonnie told him that her attorney was at that moment 
working on papers to transfer $73,800.00 from Craig's two IRA accounts, "as ordered by the 
court." At that time, Craig reminded Bonnie that the market value of Craig's IRA accounts on the 
date Ordered by the Court was $39,589.00, net. Bonnie said that her attorney had told her that she 
could get the $73,800.00. Bonnie said, "and that's what I'm going to get." The Prudential IRA 
account Craig set up after the divorce was Account Number UQ-100296. That account was set up 
after the divorce and was funded from Craig's separate funds he acquired and deposited after the 
date of divorce.13 
31. AMENDED SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW were entered until April 4, 2000. That final Order again recognized January 26, 1999 as 
the valuation date of property.14 
32. During that interim time, Craig's automatic IRA retirement deposits had continued 
to be made to his first Prudential account. To maintain a proper accounting for the separate funds 
deposited after January 26, 1999, Craig opened an additional account at Prudential, Account 
Number UQ-R82581, into which his separate personal funds earned after the divorce were 
deposited.15 
33. Subsequently, in compliance with the Court's final Order, Craig instructed 
Prudential to transfer Account Number UQ-R62840, the original IRA account, plus all accrued 
12
 Supplementary Decree of Divorce, "Exhibit D." 
13
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 7, paragraph 26. 
14
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earnings from January 26, 1999. By that time the original IRA account had increased in value to 
$4,885.00. That was the value that went to Bonnie when that account was transferred by 
Prudential to Bonnie.16 
34. Bonnie had known that Craig had continued to make deposits to an ERA after the 
Divorce. From what Bonnie said and how she acted, Craig continued to believe that there may be 
some reconciliation. Craig told Bonnie about both IRA accounts and the money still being 
deposited.17 
35. At a subsequent evidentiary hearing held on May 31, 2000, Mr. Charles A. 
Schultz, Bonnie's counsel, misled the Court when he accused Craig of fraudulently manipulating 
and attempting to conceal the Prudential IRA accounts. Craig has flatly denied any such 
allegations. Mr. Schultz and Bonnie knew or must have known from their inquiry to Prudential 
that Craig has established a second account after the divorce and that the second account contained 
Craig's separate funds acquired after the divorce. Yet, based upon Schultz's allegations and intent 
to mislead the Judge, the Court directed Mr. Schultz to prepare an ORDER ON CONTEMPT 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, which is attached as "Exhibit N." Paragraph 8 of that Order ordered 
that, 
The Prudential IRA, listed on Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, 
account # UQ-R62840, shall be provided and transferred to the Respondent, with 
the money taken out and transferred to account # UQ-R2581 returned or 
redeposited into account # UQ-R62840. 
36. The Court Order gave Craig twenty-one days to fully comply, setting a jail 
sentencing day of June 21, 2000 at 10:30 a.m.18 
15
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," pages 7-8, paragraph 28. 
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37. Craig immediately took action to transfer all Prudential IRA accounts to Bonnie, 
understanding that he may be permitted to bring a proper accounting before the Court at a later date 
should Bonnie or her counsel wish to pursue the litigation yet even further.19 
38. Both prior to this final Order and after, Bonnie and her counsel refused to cooperate 
in or assist any court ordered transfer. Bonnie told Craig that she and her counsel were taking the 
position that he had been Ordered to transfer all property and funds and that she had not been 
ordered to help. In fact, Bonnie and her counsel refused to cooperate in any manner to facilitate the 
transfer. As an example, under IRS regulations, transfer of qualified retirement funds must be 
made to a qualified account that Bonnie had previously established. But Bonnie refused to even 
call Prudential to identify her own IRA account and ask that the money be transferred. She would 
not assist Craig in completing transfer of property as ordered by the court. She just kept saying 
that Craig had been ordered to do everything without her.20 
39. Craig even got a letter from Prudential that specifically stated that a request must be 
made by "the receiving firm, accompanied by a Divorce Decree and appropriate signatures." 
Bonnie just refused to sign any papers or even request that the funds be transferred to her 
designated IRA account. A copy of that Prudential letter, dated April 28, 2000 is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit O." 
40. Finally, in a letter dated June 5, 2000, Bonnie made it clear that Craig was to 
complete all transfers totally by himself or go to jail on June 21. A copy of this letter is attached as 
"Exhibit P."21 
41. That refusal to cooperate stood in defiance of paragraph 18 of the Court's previous 
SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE, "Exhibit D," which directed that, 
19
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 8, paragraph 33. 
20
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 9, paragraph 37. 
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Each party is ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and delivering the 
necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and 
personal property division as ordered by the Court. 
42. Bonnie's refusal to cooperate was also evidenced throughout Craig's 
CERTMCATE OF COMPLIANCE, page 2, paragraph 10; a letter from MONY Life Insurance 
Company, dated June 14, 2000, and a letter dated June 8, 2000 from Bonnie's counsel. 
43. Those documents are part of Craig's Certificate of Compliance, dated June 14, 
2000. That Certificate of Compliance is attached hereto as "Exhibit Q." 
44. From Craig's IRA accounts Bonnie took much more than the $2,666.00 allocated 
to Bonnie by the Court. Bonnie actually took $4,885.00. Then by stratagem Bonnie manipulated 
the Order of the Court, making false claims after trial, obtaining an additional $16,292.39 over and 
above what the Court granted in the Supplementary Decree of Divorce. See accounting attached to 
Craig's Affidavit in "Exhibit J." 
Question of transfer of ownership of life insurance policy— 
45. The Findings of the Court were also that Craig's life insurance policy, MONY 
Whole Life 1347-24-19W, had a value of $16,042.00. The Court ordered that the policy be 
transferred to Bonnie.22 
46. Given the time between the Divorce Decree and the final Order of the Court, Craig 
had continued to pay premiums on that MONY life insurance policy as he had on the IRA.23 
47. Craig also continued to talk to Bonnie. Craig and Bonnie discussed the life 
insurance policy. Craig told Bonnie that he had paid more money on the policy.24 
48. The face amount of that life insurance policy was $150,000.00.25 
22
 Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, "Exhibit E," page 4, paragraph 9. 
23
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 10, paragraph 44. 
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49. Having all such facts in mind Bonnie pressed the Court for an Order that Craig 
transfer full present ownership to Bonnie.26 
50. Obtaining ownership of the policy, Bonnie told Craig that she had cashed in the 
policy, receiving over $21,000.00 in exchange, thereby obtaining more than $4,958.00 over and 
above the Court's order.27 
51. At the hearing on June 21, 2000, the Court accepted Craig's CERTIFICATE OF 
COMPLIANCE that reflected that Craig no longer had any obligation to Bonnie. Craig had fully 
complied and completed all required transfers. 
52. Over and above the additional funds that Craig had deposited to the IRA and life 
insurance Bonnie also demanded an additional interest on all accounts and values of those accounts 
from the Divorce date until the actual date of transfer.28 Bonnie's demand for such additional 
interest amounted to a claim of $3,787.61.29 
Question of transfer of ownership of other property— 
53. Through the Supplementary Decree of Divorce, included herewith as "Exhibit D" 
the Court Ordered that30: 
Each party is ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and delivering the 
necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and 
personal property division as ordered by the Court. 
IRA Accounts: 
54. Bonnie refused to cooperate to effectuate the transfer of property. Bonnie told 
Craig that the Court didn't require that she do anything to assist the transfer. Bonnie said that 
24
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 10. paragraph 45. 
25
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29
 Letter from Schultz, dated June 5, 2000, "Exhibit P," page 2, paragraph 8. 
IS 
Craig had been "ordered" to make the transfer, not her, and that Craig had to do exactly what the 
Court ordered without her help.31 
55. Craig personally provided all documents to Dean Witter and Prudential that he was 
told were required to have the funds transferred. Craig was informed that the funds had to be 
transferred to an account that Bonnie had created. Bonnie said that she told Dean Witter but proof 
of that was never made and all information from Dean Witter did not reflect any instructions from 
Bonnie.32 
Boat Transfer: 
56. Bonnie and Craig purchased the Sea Ray Motor Boat from Garth Thurgood more 
than eight (8) years ago in exchange for $17,500.00. Thurgood never asked for any more and 
never made any claim against the boat.33 
57. Craig obtained and completed the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles papers that 
only needed a police officer to drive out and check the boat and serial number. Bonnie refused to 
help in any way. She declined to permit a police officer to look at the boat.34 
58. Bonnie had the boat in her possession but said would not do anything to that she 
demanded a bill of sale not just from Craig but also from Thurgood. Bonnie is a personal friend of 
Thurgood's wife.35 
59. Craig contacted Thurgood. Indicating to Craig that he knew that Bonnie had 
required that Craig obtain a bill of sale from him, Thurgood said that he would only sign a bill of 
30
 Supplementary Decree of Divorce, November 22, 1999, page 5, paragraph 18. 
31
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, "Exhibit J," page 12, paragraph 52 
32
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 12, paragraph 53 
33
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 12, paragraph 54 
34
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 12, paragraph 56 
35
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 12, paragraph 57 
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sale in exchange for an additional $1,500.00. A copy of the Thurgood Affidavit is attached hereto 
as "Exhibit R."36 
Signetics Retirement — Bonnie's 
60. The Court's Order was that the Bonnie provide Craig with information required to 
prepare a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, transferring one half interest in the Signetics account 
to Craig.37 
61. As of the date of the divorce the Signetics account had a net value of $28,754.00.38 
Return of Attorney Fees Claimed to pursue Order to Show Cause against Craig 
62. Given her total lack of cooperation to effectuate transfer as ordered by the Court 
Craig received additional information from Bonnie that the attorney fees submitted by Mr. Schultz 
and awarded were excessive and should be reduced and refunded as to the Contempt allegation. 
Bonnie told Craig that Mr. Moody's legal fees for that matter was $1,900.00 but that Schultz had 
made a claim of $8,000.00, just padding the numbers. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
Bonnie's stratagem under the guise of Court Order sets forth evidence that she intentionally acted 
in disregard of and excess of the Court's Orders. 
The Court awarded Bonnie a list of specified property of substantial value. In addition to 
the property specifically mentioned, the Court awarded Bonnie,39 
All remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule A of Petitioner's 
Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman/Loeboecke Associates. [Emphasis added] 
Brad Townsend, CPA, of the firm of Norman/Loebbecke Associates, prepared that 
schedule A under direction of the Court's Order dated February 20, 1998.40. That Order directed 
36
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 12, paragraph 58 
37
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 13, paragraph 59 
38
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, page 13, paragraph 60 
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Bonnie to "provide Norman/Loebbecke Associates" with her identification of any property she may 
claim and facts underlying any such claim. 
Bonnie had almost two years to make any claim against the personal property located in the 
storage building. The storage building was within her control and under her custody. Bonnie also 
had some of her own stuff stored in that building. She was well acquainted with everything there. 
She had the key. She was a member of the family that used that building. She had been a member 
of that family for many years. It would be ludicrous for Bonnie to make any claim of surprise. It 
would be ludicrous for Bonnie to make any claim that she didn't know who ov/ned and used any 
item personal property. 
Bonnie made no claim to any of that personal property before trial. She made no claim 
during trial. She made no timely claim after trial or until March 1, 2000. 
Even at the hearing on March 1, 2000 Bonnie stipulated that she was making no claim to 
any of the personal property in the storage building with the exception that she needed some tools 
to maintain her house and yard. Craig was to retain all his personal property then in his possession 
and all his personal property located at that time in the storage building. 
Bonnie's counsel, Mr. Moody, read the stipulation into the Court record at the March 1, 
2000 hearing. Mr. Moody said "Mrs. Harris will take what personal tools that she would like to 
have out of the shop [the storage building] by the 15th of March."41 
But then Bonnie took everything. Then to the Pleasant Grove Police Department, Bonnie 
claimed that the building had been burglarized. Bonnie's malevolence is clearly demonstrated by 
the fact that she or someone else under her control removed a lag screw from the track of one 
garage door, trying to make it appear that an unlawful forced entry had been made. Bonnie was 
39
 "Exhibit E," page 4, paragraph 9. 
40
 "Exhibit B," Order appointing the firm of Norman/Loebbecke, dated 2/20/98 
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the only one who had the key. She had just previously changed all the locks. Bonnie's claim of 
forced entry was a lie. 
Note that the Pleasant Grove Police Department's Report states that, "it did not look like 
there was anything missing."42 Information supporting such a statement in the police report could 
only have come from Bonnie. It was she who reported the "crime." It must have been she who 
met the police. It was she who pointed the finger at Craig's son, Scott. 
Bottom Line—Bonnie knew exactly what she was doing. She knew she had never 
previously made any claim against Craig's or anybody else's property in the storage building. 
Bonnie had previously decided that she had no claim against Craig's personal property in the 
storage building. Bonnie had previously decided to not make any claim against Craig's personal 
property in the storage building. Bonnie knew that the Court ordered that any claim she wished to 
make against any marital property or property of Craig must be reported before the discovery cut-
off date prior to trial. Bonnie never made any claim then. Bonnie may not make any such claim 
now. 
For some reason she just got angry after the hearing and wanted more. In violation of the 
Order of the Court, she took property that was awarded to Craig and a number of other persons. 
Bonnie has flatly refused to return any of that property. Bonnie stands in defiance of the 
Order of this Court. She is in contempt of court and appropriate sanctions must be imposed. 
POINT 2 
Bonnie obtained transfer of funds in excess of the amount Ordered. 
Craig and Bonnie personally discussed the fact that the Court had ordered that she was to 
receive Craig's Prudential IRA account, then valued by the Court at $2,666.00. By the time that 
IRA account was transferred to Bonnie it contained $4,885.00. That's more than an 83% increase 
41
 Transcript of Hearing, "Exhibit I," page 5, lines 6-8. 
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in one year. Bonnie's claim that Craig wrongfully manipulated that account to her detriment has 
absolutely no merit. 
Apparently, not being satisfied with an 83%+ increase, Bonnie took both IRA accounts, 
netting her an additional $16,292.39 more than what the Court ordered. 
In addition to that Bonnie also levied an additional interest on all totals, demanding 
additional interest from the date of Divorce until the date paid of $3,787.61 that she claimed was 
interest due from January 26, 1999 to May 31, 2000. 
POINT 3 
Bonnie took more than $4.958.00, from Craig's life insurance over and above the Order of the 
Court. 
Bonnie claimed to the Court that she was entitled to all funds in the live insurance policy 
even money deposited to the account after the Decree of Divorce. The value at the date of divorce 
was $16,042.00. Craig had continued to pay his own life insurance policy after the decree of 
divorce, otherwise he is presently uninsurable. Knowing that the insurance policy had increased to 
a cash value had increased because of Craig's continued payments, Bonnie refused to accept the 
Court ordered value and demanded ownership of the policy, thereby obtaining to herself an 
additional $4,958.00 over what the Court had granted. Bonnie told Craig that she then 
immediately cashed the policy and took all the cash. 
When Bonnie obtained ownership of the life insurance on the life of Craig she did so in 
violation of Utah law and through misrepresentation to the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts establish that Bonnie stands in open defiance with little regard for the Orders of 
the Court. Remaining unpleased with the Orders of the Court, Bonnie has resorted to self-help. 
Pleasant Grove Police Department Report, "Exhibit L." 
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Bonnie's conduct requires that she be held in contempt of court and that appropriate sanctions be 
imposed to deter such further conduct. Bonnie and those who assisted must be held accountable. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court issue its order granting judgment in his 
favor against Bonnie as follows: 
A. $23,000.00 for items "missing" from the storage building; 
B. $4,600.00 for Craig's personal property taken from the storage building; 
C. $2,925.00 for AID Equipment property taken from the storage building; 
D. $3,734.00 for Dick Harris' property taken from the storage building; 
E. $8,600.00 for Troy and Scott Harris' property taken from the storage building; 
F. $16,292.39 for overage taken from Craig's Prudential IRA account; 
G. $4,958.00 for overage taken from Craig's MONY life account; 
H. $3,787.61 excess interest assessed from January 26, 1999; 
I. Since the total amount set forth above constitutes a value of $67,897.00 actual loss, 
Craig prays that a penalty of an additional amount of $67,897.00, double the 
amount unlawfully taken, be awarded to Craig for a total of $135,794.00 plus 
interest and that such judgment shall be augmented in the amount of reasonable 
costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said judgment by execution or 
otherwise as shall be established by affidavit; plus 
J. Return of such attorney fees and costs previously awarded to Bonnie and award of 
attorney fees and costs to Craig as the Court may determine; and 
K. Such additional and further relief as the Court may deem just. 
DATED December \CI , 2000. 
\-S 
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MARTIN & NELSON, PC 
CounseJ for Petitioner 
Ldpen D. Martin / 
Attorney at Law 
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LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C. 
Loren D. Martin (2101) 
Mail: PO Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590 
Street: 139 East on South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Defendant. 
: STIPULATION AS TO 
: ACCOUNTING AND 
: DETERMINATION OF VALUES 
Case No. 954402034 DA 
Judge: Anthony W. Schofield 
The parties hereby Stipulate that all questions and disputes related to 
accounting and determination of all property, both real and personal, values shall be 
submitted to the firm of Norman-Loebbecke Associates. 
Each of the parties shall provide Norman-Loebbecke Associates with the facts 
which each believes is material to the identification of property, the underlying facts 
claimed as to such property. Both parties shall fully cooperate in providing 
Norman-Loebbecke Associates with access to any and all information which said 
firm shall request. 
1 
Should there be any dispute as to any such matters the question may be 
brought before the Court by way of motion for an appropriate order. 
Plaintiff shall engage and pay the costs of the services of Norman-Loebbecke 
Associates. The cost of such services may be paid under the business account and 
shall be considered by the Court and assessed or allocated in whole or in part equally 
between both parties as the Court may determine appropriate in the final order or 
decree, considering how such costs relate to all other issues at that time. 
w h * m ^ _
 9g Dated: 
/Lorfen D. Martin / 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
Bonnie Harris .» .
 n r^> Dated:__J^Ql3Sl 
Margo Hiller-Polster 
Counsel for Defendant 
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LOREN D. MARTIN, P.C. 
Loren D. Martin (2101) 
Mail: PO Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590 
Street: 139 East on South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER Re: THE 
ACCOUNTING AND 
DETERMINATION OF VALUES 
Case No. 954402034 DA 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties and for good cause shown it is 
hereby ORDERED DECREED AND ADJUDGED: 
All questions and disputes related to accounting and determination of all 
property, both real and personal, values shall be submitted to the firm of Norman-
Loebbecke Associates. 
Each of the parties shall provide Norman-Loebbecke Associates with the facts 
which each believes is material to the identification of property, the underlying facts 
claimed as to such property. Both parties shall fully cooperate in providing 
Norman-Loebbecke Associates with access to any and all information which said 
firm shall request. 
Should there be any dispute as to any such matters the question may be 
brought before the Court by way of motion for an appropriate order. 
Plaintiff shall engage and pay the costs of the services of Norman-Loebbecke 
Associates. The cost of such services may be paid under the business account and 
shall be considered by the Court and assessed or allocated in whole or in part equally 
between both parties as the Court may determine appropriate in the final order or 
decree, considering how such costs relate to all other issues at that time. 
, 1998. DATED this day of. 
BY THE COURT: 
URT JUDGE 
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Harris v. Harris 
?:c'j<:$ca Marital Asset and Liability Distribution 
pe: Craig Harris 
Description 
Proposed 
Distribution 
Net 
Value Bonnie Craig 
Cash &. Cash Equivalents 
BafikOne.i250^ 
Northwest Credit Union7592.0:Sayihgs:::;;;:::;;;:; 
NoiSwest Credit^ 
Zion's Bank 560-30939-5 'Personal.Checking1;; 
Zioh's Bank:550-31378-5.Spe^alChec|wg:;;.;;; 
:li!:i.ii27s j;;;:":: 
1!ll[!-HUil::235:;iii:::r 
l i i : 5 5 4 - : ' : 
1 1 ^ ^ - 3 ; - - : 
Stocks and Bonds 
]Ser^st ;Medica[sto 
Retirement A ccounts 
• D ^ h W t ^ 
fteanWit^ 
:Pwdenfia!rSecur^ 
Signetics Retirement* 
Life Insurance 
poNlwhoteS 
Land/Residence 
House and Lot located at 692 S. Juniper St., Pleasant Grove, UT3 
iCommerc^^ 
Building and Lot located at 725 E. Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT 
Vacant Lot located at 721 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT 
Vernal, UT -10 Acres, Uintah County Property 
Businesses 
•IW&iEqyipm^ 
Vehicles " 
•iS94.FbrdTaum$;GUi!;ij^ 
I I S S ^ S ' K o m ^ 
1978 25' Sea Ray Motor Boat 
Furnhure/Furnishings/AppUances 
y^WejbY;:^ ;:;^  
Furniture and Personal Property - Bonnie 
Other Assets 
Gun reloading equipment 
!i3B;§23]: 
i : « £ l 8 ; l 
;|;;-2,666; 
28J54 
§OT42i ; 
p:16i042;; 
:!147:533! 
; 147,533-
;;;:;;;6,613: 
2,500 
12,213 
•:"'$'::"1:C90': 
554;;;;: 
- • 3 ' 
;::;;;;::-3,l61: •• 
I|ifl4|4'b9:::^--; 
WmAA^M 
-:: 554;::-
'^M--WM 
K .2.607: 
iiii4;«9:! 
,^M4,409:: 
|:H;ll| i i l : i ip5;923; : 
:F :^:^ :i!:iii::::^ :--::.2,655r 
28.754 
117,262 77,672 39,559 
I;iilll |-:i6';04'2'!; 
ilillllj!!!!!;:! 15.042: 
103,591 
!i425;;i96;i:i: 
.^.46,443;;;::: 
41,116 
28,053 
4,160 
hl;i;*:?^*„3!ii! 
4,160 
103,591 
i^?5,196 ; 
41,116 
28,053 
648,559 50,603 597,956 
;|i;!::iiiii;!;:347;533:| 
:147,533 
6,613:::::;:::!;:: 
"3.1 obi;:-":: 
2.500 
9.713 2,500 
ii^668!y!i!;id;nl!iHI=i:!ii:s;6be^ 
8,395 4,198 4,198 
15,595 
. 500 
6,398 9.-.5S 
: 500 
Debts and Liabilities 
' 5 0 0 -•-::-.. 5 D 0 
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J. Grant Moody, P.C. Bar No. 6282 
336 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-4181 
Facsimile: (801)756-3940 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
BONNIE HARRIS : 
Respondent. ] 
) SUPPLEMENTARY 
> DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) Civil No. 954402034DA 
) Judge: Ray Harding, Jr. 
This matter came on regularly for trial on August 16,17 and September 23,1999 
with a final hearing being held on October 12,1999, Petitioner, Craig Harris, was present and 
was represented by Loren D. Martin of Martin & Nelson. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was also 
present and was represented by J, Grant Moody of J. Grant Moody, P.C. Following closing 
arguments on September 23,1999 the Court made several rulings from the bench, including 
ruling on the valuation of the marital estate. The Court reserved ruling on the issues of the 
division of property, the Norman Loebbecke fees, and attorney* s fees until the October 12, 1999 
hearing date to allow the parties to present proposals for the division of property and fhrther 
argument on the fee issues. The Court subsequently issued a written ruling dated October 22, 
1999, The parties previously were granted a Decree of Divorce by the Court entered on January 
- Z -J . > 
a . 
TV" 
' V . *j ^ ; ~ , 
rJT. 
fccm 3 is :;;'•• 4 M 
26, 1999, The Court heard the evidence presented by the parties both verbally and througji 
documents offered and received at trial including each parties proposed property division 
presented to the Cowrt The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and the Court having reviewed the evidence and the record, and being fiilly advised in the 
premises, now enters the following: 
SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Property Division 
1. At the time of the parties marriage, the Petitioner's premarital assets were S141,800.00 
and that Respondent's premarital assets were $96,500.00. 
2. The property shall be valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered being 
January 26,1999. 
3. The following deductions shall be subtracted from the Respondents premarital assets: 
a. $14,602,00 for a post-separation credit card debt paid by the marital estate; 
b. $3,094.00 for draws on the line of credit for Respondent prior to January 26, 
1999. 
4. The Respondent's premarital assets are reduced to a total of $78,804.00. 
5. The total net divisible value of the estate at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered 
was $975,273.00 as stated in Petitioner's Exhibit 19 Schedule A. A copy of said Schedule A 
is attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein. 
6. Included in this total value is. Respondent's Signetics retirement account listed with a 
2 
value of $28,754.00- The Signetics retirement account is to be divided according to the formula 
stated in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). The parties shall enter a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order on the account if they so desire, 
7. Subtracting the value of the Signetics retirement leaves a total divisible net asset value 
of $946,519,00. Subtracting Petitioner's premarital assets of $141,800.00 and Respondent's 
premarital assets of $78,804.00 from the net marital asset value subject to equal division is thus 
$725,915,00. Dividing this value by two results in a net marital asset value distributable to each 
party of $362,957.50. The total value distributable to Petitioner is $362,957.50 plus his 
premarital assets of $141,800,00 for a total of 5504,757.50. The total asset value distributable to 
Respondent is $362,957.50 plus her premarital assets of $78,804.00 for a total of $441,761.50. 
8. After considering the parties' property proposals, the Court awards Petitioner the 
business, AID Equipment Company, Lie, and the Commercial building, house and lot located at 
172 West 9400 South in Sandy. Utah where the business is located. The value of the business is 
$147,533.00, and the value of the commercial building and lot is $425,196.00. Therefore, 
Petitioner is awarded property with a total value of $572,729.00. 
9. The Respondent is awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule 
A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the exception of the 
Signetics retirement which is to be divided under Woodward as set forth above. Therefore, 
Respondent is awarded property with a total value of $373,790.00. Because the total value 
distributable to Respondent is $441,761.50, Respondent is entitled to a credit of $67,971.50. 
ALIMONY 
3 
10. The Respondent is not entitled to receive alimony from the Petitioner. 
ATTQRflOT'SFEES 
11 • Each party should bear their own attorney's fees in this matter, with the exception of 
the Court's Order dated January 26,1999, wherein the Court awarded Petitioner a reasonable 
attorney's fee for bringing the October 19, 1998, Order to Show Cause. 
12. The Petitioner's counsel filed an affidavit of attorney's fees totaling $5,711.48, 
however, pursuant to the Court's Findings, only $2,564.16 of the fees set forth in counsel's 
affidavit were related to the Order to Show Cause and the Court thus awards the Petitioner 
$2,564.16 in attorney's foes for the October 19,1999 Order to Show Cause pursuant to its 
January 26,1999 Order. 
NQRMAN LQEBBfiCKJS FEE? 
13. Norman Loebbecke Associates' fees in this case total $22,443.17. 
14. Respondent is ordered to bear $1,744,00 of this total as her sole and separate 
obligation as required by the Court's Order of July 22,1999 in which the Court allowed 
Respondent an extension to submit information to Norman Loebbecke Associates* 
15. The Court orders that both parties shall equally bear the remaining fees of 
$20,699J 7, such that each party is required to pay $10,349.58. The Respondent is required to 
pay $12,093-59 of the Norman Loebbecke fees and Petitioner is required to pay $10,349.58. 
16. The Petitioner has already paid the majority of the Norman Loebbecke fees, the 
Court orders that the Petitioner be responsible to pay the entire $22,443.17 owing, and the 
Petitioner is entitled to an offset of Respondent's obligation of $12,093.59 against her credit for 
4 
the property division. 
17. The Respondent is awarded a credit of $67,971.50, offset by an award of $2,564.16 
to Petitioner for attorney's fees and offset by $12,093.59 for her share of the Norman Loebbeckc 
fees- The total credit for Respondent is $53,313.75. 
18. Each party is ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and delivering the 
necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and personal property 
division as ordered by the Court. 
19. The Court orders that execution of the judgment against the Petitioner be stayed sixty 
(60) days after the entry of this Order to allow the Petitioner time to secure ftmds to pay the 
judgment. ^ 
DATED tMs /^yjday of November, 1999. 
)URT: 
Hstrict Court Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
LorenD. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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Schedule A 
Harris v. Harris 
Proposed Marital Asset and Liability Distribution 
per Craig Harris 
Description 
Net 
Value 
1,050 
1,279 
235 
554 
3 
B 
$ 
Proposed 
Distr 
onnie 
554 
bution 
Craig 
S 1 090 
1.279 
235 
3 
Cash &. Cash Equivalents 
BankOne 1250-0221 Checking 
Northwest Credit Union 7592.0 Savings 
Northwest Credit Union 7592.1 Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-30939-5 Personal Checking 
Zion's Bank 560-31378-5 Special Checking 
Stocks and Bonds 
InterWest Medical stock 
Retirement A ccounts 
!;Peah;Wit!egi24-100296 IRA Standard 
p ^ a n W p t i 7 9 039509 IRA Standard 
iPrucfentialSecurities OUQ-R68840-41 Simple IRA 
Signetics Retirement* 
Life Insurance 
MONY Whole Life 1347-24-19W 
New York Life 42594539 Term Life 
Land/Residence 
House and Lot located at 692 S. Juniper St., Pleasant Grove, UT9 
:Sommerci^ 
;:Hdi^;artdf 
Building and Lot located at 725 E. Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT 
Vacant Lot located at 721 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT 
Vernal, UT -10 Acres, Uintah County Property 
Businesses 
•|^PiEquipimeW;Cqm 
Vehicles 
; : l994.FordTaums^^ 
:V§83:25; K i m ^ 
1978 25'Sea Ray Motor Boat 
Furniture/Furnishings/Appu'ances 
V
^^^'^3^^3^OT\Z\ Property-Craig 
;lJeWeljy:;;;;;;:;:;-;;;:;^';; 
Furniture and Personal Property - Eonnie 
Other Assets 
Gun reloading eouipment 
3,161 
14,409 
14,409 
554 
-
2.607 
14,409 
14,409, 
36,923 " 35,923:; 
48,918 :!;:^aiS::hi:!::l;=:;;=iPl!!i| 
2,666 •iii:^i!:!::ii;iiii^:P::-i!:2,65S;' 
28,754 28,754 
117,262 77,672 39,559 
16,042 16,042 
16,042 15.042 
103,591 
425;:196:ii:: 
a:46,443-:;i: 
41,116 
28,053 
4,160 
W*$MM 
4,160 
103,591 
1^25,196 
41,116 
28,053 
548,559 50,603 597,956 
MWlK WAfMy-
:-147,533l i:147.;533T 
i;:;::6,613 6,613 
*3M 
2,500 
12,213 9,713 
2.500 
2.500 
5,000 5.000' 
2,200 
8.395 
15,595 
. 500'' 
2,200 
4,198 
6,398 
4,196 
9,198 
• 500 
Debts and Liabilities 
500 - •• 500 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Petitioner has five 
(5) days from the date of service to file an objection to the foregoing Supplementary 
Decree of Divorce which on this 6 day of November, 1999, a true 
and correct copy was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Loren D. Martin 
P.O. Box 11590 
SaltLakeCity,UT84111 
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Deputy 
J. Grant Moody, P.C. Bar No. 6282 
336 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-4181 
Facsimile: (801)756-3940 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BONNIE HARRIS 
Respondent. 
AMENDED SUPPLEMENTARY 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 954402034DA 
Judge: Ray Harding, Jr. 
This matter came on regularly for trial on August 16, 17 and September 23,1999 
with a final hearing being held on October 12, 1999. Petitioner, Craig Harris, was present and 
was represented by Loren D. Martin of Martin & Nelson. Respondent, Bonnie Harris, was also 
present and was represented by J. Grant Moody of J. Grant Moody, P.C. Following closing 
arguments on September 23,1999 the Court made several rulings from the bench, including 
ruling on the valuation of the marital estate. The Court reserved ruling on the issues of the 
division of property, the Norman Loebbecke fees, and attorney's fees until the October 12,1999 
hearing date to allow the parties to present proposals for the division of property and further 
argument on the fee issues. The Court subsequently issued a written ruling dated October 22, 
1999. The parties previously were granted a Decree of Divorce by the Court entered on January 
26, 1999. The Court heard the evidence presented by the parties both verbally and through 
documents offered and received at trial including each parties proposed property division 
presented to the Court. In ruling on the remaining issues, the Court carefully considered and 
weighed the evidence relating to: (1) the amount and kind of property to be divided: (2) whether 
the property was acquired before or during the marriage; (3) the source of the property; (4) the 
health of the parties; (5) the parties' standard of living; (6) the parties' respective financial 
conditions, needs and earning capacity; (7) the duration of the marriage; (8) the children of the 
marriage; (9) the parties' ages at the time of the marriage and of the divorce; (10) what the parties 
gave up because of the marriage; and (11) the necessary relationship the property division has 
with the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded. Therefore, having carefully 
reviewed the evidence and the record in light of the above factors, and being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court now makes the following Supplementary Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in this matter: 
SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT 
Property Division 
1. At the time of the parties marriage, the Petitioner's premarital assets were $141,800.00 
and that Respondent's premarital assets were $96,500.00. 
2. The Court finds that it is fair and equitable and finds that the property should be 
valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered being January 26,1999. 
3. In a document entitled "Calculation of Division of Value per Bonnie Harris" 
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submitted at the October 12, 1999 hearing, Respondent acknowledged certain reductions in her 
premarital assets: 
a. $14,602.00 for a post-separation credit card debt paid by the marital estate; and 
b. $3,094.00 for draws on the line of credit for Respondent prior to January 26, 
1999. 
4. The Respondent's premarital assets are thus reduced to a total of $78,804.00. 
5. The Court finds that the total net divisible value of the estate at the time of the Decree 
of Divorce was $975,273.00 as stated in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Schedule A, prepared by Norman 
Loebbecke Associates. A copy of said Schedule A is attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein. 
6. Included in this total value is Respondent's Signetics retirement account listed with a 
value of $28,754.00. The Signetics retirement account should be divided according to the 
formula stated in Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). The parties should enter 
a Qualified Domestic Relations Order on the account if they so desire. 
7. Subtracting the value of the Signetics retirement leaves a total divisible net asset value 
of $946,519.00. Subtracting Petitioner's premarital assets of $141,800.00 and Respondent's 
premarital assets of $78,804.00 from the net marital asset value subject to equal division is thus 
$725,915.00. Dividing this value by two results in a net marital asset value distributable to each 
party of $362,957.50. The total value distributable to Petitioner is $362,957.50 plus his 
premarital assets of $141,800.00 for a total of $504,757.50. The total asset value distributable to 
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Respondent is $362,957.50 plus her premarital assets of $78,804.00 for a total of $441,761.50. 
8. After considering the parties' property proposals, the Court finds that the parties 
marital property is most equitably divided by awarding Petitioner the business, AID Equipment 
Company, Inc., and the Commercial building, house and lot located at 172 West 9400 South in 
Sandy, Utah where the business is located. The value of the business is $147,533.00, and the 
value of the commercial building and lot is $425,196.00. Therefore, Petitioner is awarded 
property with a total value of $572,729.00. 
9. The Respondent should be awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in 
Schedule A of Petitioner's Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the 
exception of the Signetics retirement which is to be divided pursuant to Woodward as set forth 
above. Therefore, Respondent should be awarded property with a total value of $373,790.00. 
Because the total value distributable to Respondent is $441,761.50, Respondent should be 
entitled to a credit of $67,971.50. 
ALIMONY 
10. In considering whether the Respondent is entitled to alimony, the Court considered 
the financial condition and needs of the Respondent; the Respondent's earning capacity or ability 
to produce income; the ability of the Petitioner to provide support; and the length of the marriage. 
Having considered these factors in light of the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds that the 
Respondent is not entitled to receive alimony from the Petitioner having duly considered the 
following factors as set forth below, weighing each factor as indicated: 
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(a) The Financial Condition and Needs of the Recipient Spouse: The Court finds 
that the parties' respective standards of living at the time of marriage were both significantly 
enhanced during the marriage. Due consideration has been given to attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standard of living. Viewing the facts most favorable to the Respondent; her 
premarital separate net assets were $78,804.00. Considering all factors, setoffs, and adjustments 
taken from the report of the CPA firm of Norman/Loebbecke Associates, Respondent is awarded 
assets with a net value of $441,761.50 in this matter. The substantial assets Respondent has 
received will contribute to and assist the Respondent with her ability to support herself. 
(b) The Recipient's Earning Capacity or Ability to Produce Income. The parties 
were separated in August 1995 and the divorce was filed in September 1995. Before and during 
the marriage and through 1992, the Respondent was employed at Signetics, a semi-conductor 
company in Quality Assurance/Quality Control. After her employment ended with Signetics, the 
Respondent attended college classes in business. The Respondent did not seek employment after 
her employment ended and stayed home to take care of a grandchild during which time she was 
receiving temporary support from the Petitioner. The Respondent testified that for the past 
several years, she had no physical or mental disability which prevented her from being gainfully 
employed. 
(c) The Ability of the Payor Spouse to Provide Support. The Petitioner's earning 
power is reflected in the valuation of the business. The value of that business is divided between 
the parties as reflected in the accounting report of Norman/Loebbecke Associates. 
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(d) The Length of the Marriage. The parties were married for over 16 years from 
the time of the marriage in 1992 until the parties divorce was final in January 1999. 
(e) Whether the Recipient Spouse Has Custody of Minor Children Requiring 
Support. No Children have been born in the marriage and none are expected. 
(f) Whether the Recipient Spouse Worked in the Business Owned or Operated 
by the Payor Spouse. During the marriage, the Respondent only worked for a short period of 
time at AID Equipment, Inc. 
(g) Whether the Recipient Spouse Directly Contributed to Anv Increase in the 
Pavor Spouse *s Skill by Paving for Education Received bv the Pavor Spouse or Allowing the 
Payor Spouse to Attend School During the Marriage. The Respondent did not directly contribute 
to any increase in the Petitioner's skills pay or pay for his education. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
11. The Court finds that each party should bear their own attorney's fees in this matter, 
with the exception of the Court's Order dated January 26,1999, wherein the Court awarded 
Petitioner a reasonable attorney's fee for bringing the October 19,1998, Order to Show Cause. 
12. The Petitioner's counsel filed an affidavit of attorney's fees totaling $5,711.48. 
Upon review of counsel's affidavit the court finds that many of the entries were not related to the 
Order to Show Cause but were for work done prior to drafting and preparing for the Order to 
Show Cause. The Court finds that only $2,564.16 of the fees set forth in counsel's affidavit were 
related to the Order to Show Cause and the Court awards Petitioner $2,564.16 in attorney's fees 
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for the October 19, 1999 Order to Show Cause pursuant to its January 26, 1999 Order. 
NORMAN LOEBBECKE FEES 
13. Norman Loebbecke Associates' fees in this case total $22,443.17. 
14. The Court finds that Respondent should bear $1,744.00 of this total as her sole and 
separate obligation as required by the Court's Order of July 22, 1999 in which the Court allowed 
Respondent an extension to submit information to Norman Loebbecke Associates. 
15. The Court finds that both parties should equally bear the remaining fees of 
$20,699.17, such that each party is required to pay $10,349.58. The Respondent is therefore 
required to pay $12,093.59 of the Norman Loebbecke fees and Petitioner is required to pay 
$10,349.58. 
16. The Petitioner has already paid the majority of the Norman Loebbecke fees, the 
Court finds that the Petitioner is responsible to pay the entire $22,443.17 owing, and the 
Petitioner is entitled to an offset of Respondent's obligation of $12,093.59 against her credit for 
the property division. 
17. As set forth above, Respondent is awarded a credit of $67,971.50, offset by an award 
of $2,564.16 to Petitioner for attorney's fees and $12,093.59 for her share of the Norman 
Loebbecke fees. The total credit for Respondent is $53,313.75. 
18. Each party should be ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and 
delivering the necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and 
personal property division as ordered by the Court. 
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19. The Court finds that it is proper that execution of the judgment against the Petitioner 
should be stayed sixty (60) days after the entry of the Order to allow the Petitioner time to secure 
funds to pay the judgment. 
The Court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, now enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each party is awarded the property both personal and real as set forth in the above 
Findings of Fact 
2. No alimony is awarded in this case. 
3. Except as set forth in the above Findings of Fact, each party shall pay their own 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
4. Except as set forth in the above Findings of Fact, the parties shall share equally in the 
costs for Norman/Loebbecke. 
5. The Respondent is awarded JUDGMENT against the Petitioner in the amount of 
$53,313.75. 
6. Execution on the judgement is stayed for sixty days following the entry of an Order on 
this Ruling to allow Petitioner time to secure funds to pay the judgment 
7. A Supplemental Decree of Divorce shall be entered accordingly. 
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DATED this / day of , 2000. 
OURT: 
ii M. HARDING 
District Court 
Approved as to Form: 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Harris v. Harris 
Prjircsec Marital Asset and Liability District::. 
per Craig Harris 
r rope sea 
Distribution 
Description Value aonme Craig 
Cash &. Cash Equivalents 
EankOne'i 2 5 0 ^ 2 2 1 ' C h e ^ 
Northwest Credit Unidn.7592.0'Sayihg^T;:;;:;i:: 
Northwest Credit'Union 7592.1Xhecking -W' 
Zion's Bank 560-30*939-5 persbnalCKecking;; 
Zion's Bank 550-31378-5 Special Checking^:: 
Stocks and Bonds 
: j^^estMedicaistdck;; 
Retirement A ccounts 
'D^hWitieM^ 
Pruden t ia fSecu^ 
Sicnetics Retirement* 
Life Insurance 
MONY Whole Life 1347-24-19W, 
New York Ufe 42594539 Term Ufe 
Land/Residence 
House and Lot located at 592 S. Juniper St., Pleasant Grove, UT3 
jCommerciafBIdg^a^ 
Building and Lot located at 725 E. Orchard Drfve, Pleasant Grove, l i t 
Vacant Lot located at 721 E Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, UT 
Vernal, UT -10 Acres, Uintah County Property 
Businesses 
^ D Equipment Company;;jnc^ 
Vehicles 
1SS4.FbrdTaums"GL;^ 
: 19S5'25V Komfort 5th;Whe 
1978 25'Sea Ray Motor Boat 
Furn ilu r e/'Furn ish ings*'App Uan ces 
:
.F|jfniiKjre^and:Pe 
Jewelry:;;:.: 'y'::::'—^^^r:}}^Wi'^:::;i;• :: '"::^?:r:nn^ W "^n^ Un:^ nnfN::;^ MMHr-':^^ H^ 
Furniture and Personal Property - Bonnie 
Other Assets 
Gun reloading equipment 
.:S;-;::1fCS0 $ 
::;!iy!;ii279':.::::" 
•;:i";;i-::":;235 7' 
L!H3B;*923 
;748;918 
7;!::2,5S5 
1B.042 
16,042 
;:;;6,613 
i7 :3,i :00: 
iil.s.ooo: 
-i2;20G 
'"8,395 
15.595 
500' 
• \ : -S 
54:W;\ 
i.eso: 
;::1.279:= 
::• 235, 
: : : : ; : : ; : ; i . : : - ' • 3 • \ 
l::;;;;!;:-3;161; •••: 
tl-ii4'i:409?'ii::.:; 
|:Mi-;;i;14.409 ;; i-
•
:
 •"• 5 5 4 - ! : . 
'^W-^rM 
.;::;:• ::-: 3^ 
:
 2.507.. 
:::;;-.j 4:409:: 
::H14,409:: 
:48,9.1s; 
28,754 28.754 
6,613:: 
3.10d" 
2,2001 
4.198 
5,393 
r35",923:: 
117,262 77,672 39.5S9 
16,042 
16.042 
103,591 
:425,'19Sj:-
£.•46,443 •:!;: 
41,115 
28,053 
4,160 
;;;;:^443ji;: 
4.160 
103,591 
•iB?.5,196; 
41,116 
28,053 
548,559 
:;!:iT:l47.;533::-
:::-: 147.533 '/• 
50,603 
-.
:}-'-l"\^\^ 
597,956 
:^:147.533:' 
•
::::147.533 : 
2,500 
12.213 9.713 
2.500 
2.500 
5,ooo:: 
4,198 
9 19S 
500-
Debts and Liabilities 
5 0 0 •-• ••• 5 0 0 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on t h e / £ ^ day of March, 2000, I faxed and mailed a copy by US 
Postal Service, postage prepaid, the foregoing Amended Supplementary Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law to: 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
P.O. Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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MARTIN & NELSON 
A Professional Corporation 
Loren D.Martin (2101) 
Mail: PO Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590 
Street: 139 East on South Temple, Suite 400 
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY MARTIN 
Case No: 95-44-02034 DA 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Larry Martin, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. That the information contained herein is of my own personal knowledge, I 
am competent to so testify and would so testify if called as a witness before the Court. 
2. I am Vice President of Martin Door Mfg. My duties include supervision of 
engineering, equipment, manufacturing and testing of all products. I have been 
associated with Martin Door Mfg. for more than 50 years, installing, designing, 
fabricating and engineering garage doors. 
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3. I have been primarily responsible for the writing of safety standards and 
specifications for the garage door industry in the United States under the request of the 
US Consumer Product Safety Division. I have previously testified before and/or 
provided evidence to several courts in Utah, California and the Consumer Product 
Safety Division in Washington, D.C. 
4. I personally supervised and performed scientific testing of Martin Door 
Mfg.'s products under the most rigid of safety and zoning compliance requirements. 
Such testing included measurement of the force required to breach the security of 
Martin Overhead Door products as required by the State of Florida building code to 
withstand and exceed the demand to meet and withstand hurricane storms and 
associated debris. 
5. On March 20, 2000 I personally examined the site of a Storage building 
located at 725 Orchard in Pleasant Grove. The building had three Martin Door Mfg. 
Garage doors that had been installed on the South side in addition to a walk-through 
secured door on the West. The photographs attached hereto give a true and correct 
representation of the building and specific items of interest. 
6. I was informed that the garage door that was alleged to have been 
breached was the door farthest to the East. Closely examining the door, I observed that 
the bottom lag screw used to secure the wheel track had been removed on one side. 
The removal of that lag screw would permit the twisting of the track in such a manner as 
to remove one bottom wheel from the track, allowing that bottom end of the door to be 
pushed open approximately one foot at the most. 
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7. The resultant opening would be too small to admit an adult person 
without bending and causing damage to the bottom panel or without also removing the 
next upper track "L" bracket to give more entry space. 
8. The "L" brackets are used to secure the wheel track to the doorjamb of the 
building. None of the "L" brackets had been bent, twisted or damaged. As can be seen 
from the photographs, the Door itself had not sustained any damage that in any manner 
appeared incident to or in any manner sufficient to cause any breach. 
9. Photographs were taken of both the inside and outside of the door. Of 
particular interest was the examination of the hole that remained in the doorjamb from 
which the bottom lag screw had been removed. 
10. It is my opinion, based upon experience in testing forces and observing 
the results of the force required to remove such lag screws, that the lag screw in 
question had not been forcibly removed from the outside. Someone had intentionally 
unscrewed the lag screw from the inside. The remaining hole in the doorjamb was 
consistent with having been physically unscrewed by some individual. Close up 
photographs were taken of the "L" bracket and remaining hole. Had that lag screw been 
removed by force from the outside, the remaining hole would have caused considerable 
damage to the wood. The "L" bracket would have been deformed and twisted, the track 
would have been twisted to some degree and the exterior of the door itself would have 
been warped and damaged. 
11. On the exterior of the door were some small marks that appeared to be 
abrasions. Close-up photographs were taken of the abrasions on the outside of the 
door in the vicinity of the purported breach and entry. Such marks are not consistent 
with a forced entry. 
12. My conclusion is that someone manually removed the interior lag screw 
with a wrench for the apparent purpose of making it appear that the door had been 
breached. Someone did what I observed with access to the inside of the building by 
keyed entry. I observed no evidence of forced entry. The observed "breach" of the 
door could have only been done from inside the Storage building. 
Dated December _T3_, 2000. 
Larry MaifKiTAffiant 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me on December / £ _ , 2000. 
y-^^^fr &S?/fet& 
_ ,.„-._ Notary Public' i
 x T \ 7T~7,. 
^
 x
 L0REN D. MARTIN , Notary Public 
&\ 139 East Soutn Tempte, Suite 4001 
Salt Lake City, UtaK-gfll 11 • 
Mv Commission Expires | 
^ . ^ ^..j. January 27, 2004 
*
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J. GRANT MOODY, P.C. 
A Professional Corporation 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
336 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
(801)756-4181 
Fax:(801)756-3940 
March 27, 2000 
Loren D. Martin 
MARTIN & NELSON 
P.O. Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590 
Re: Harris vs. Harris 
Dear Mr. Martin: 
The weekend of March 4, 2000, Bonnie had several people helping her remove the 
property from the storage building including the boat and the 5th wheel. Bonnie removed the boat 
and the 5th Wheel including ski's, knee board, ski rope and life vests that went with the boat and 
she took the stuff that went with the 5th >vheel. Bonnie purchased the skis at Granny's Auction in 
Provo in for $25.00 over 10 years ago. Bonnie is entitled to keep the items that went with the 
boat and trailer. 
2. Bonnie took items that she had been storing in the building. 
3. Bonnie took some shelving and various open end wrenches and sockets and some 
miscellaneous tools that were left in the building. Virtually anything of value had been removed 
by Craig or Scot or some other person between last November, 1999 and March 4, 2000. At the 
hearing on March 1, 2000, Bonnie thought that there would be some newer power tools that she 
could use that were in the shop in November, however, when she went into the building after the 
hearing the "good stuff' had been removed. Some of the power tools left in the shop were in 
disrepair and/or not working. After Bonnie changed the locks on the building, in November, 
1999, Scott admitted to her that he had gotten back into the building to get his stuff out of the 
building. 
4. Bonnie filed a police report on the weekend of March 4, 2000 when she discovered 
that someone had been breaking into the building by way of the East bay door in front of the 5th 
wheel. Apparently someone forced the door open by running a blue SUV type vehicle into the 
door which left blue marks on the door. Bonnie noticed the last three times she went into the 
shed last November that the kitchen light was on in the 5th wheel and each time she turned the 
light off. The 5th wheel was in front of the East bay door which was used to gain access. It is my 
understanding that neither Scot nor Craig have admitted that they were getting into the building 
Mr. Loren D. Martin 
March 24. 2000 
Page Two 
and have not done so (other than Scot in November) since Bonnie changed the locks in 
November and after the pad-lock was placed on the door in early December. Bonnie had not 
been in the shed since December. 1999, when she put the padlock on the building until after the 
hearing on March L 2000. At the hearing, she assumed that the hand and power tools she had 
seen the last time she was in the building, would still be there. Instead, she discovered that most 
of tools with any value had been removed or stolen. 
Enclosed is a partial list of the items that were not removed by Bonnie but were taken 
from the shop Bonnie took a video on November 8, 1999 which indicated what was in the 
building at that time. Bonnie had some still pictures that were taken of some additional 
equipment and various items before the trial. Brad Townsend saw the pictures of the equipment. 
5. Bonnie did not take the Aqua Skooter nor does she have it. Bonnie has not seen 
Scot's fishing equipment and she does not have Scot's sports cards. Bonnie gave Scot his cards 
over four years ago. If there are items missing, that neither Craig, Scot or Bonnie took out of the 
shed, a list of the missing items needs to be given to the police. 
6. Bonnie will return the winch to whomever it belongs to provided they can prove 
ownership. 
7. In order to settle this matter, Bonnie agrees to return all of the gun re-loading 
equipment on the condition that: 
A. Craig will pay her the $500.00 listed on the schedule for the gun reloading equipment 
in addition to the $5,000 for the personal property. The gun reloading equipment was listed 
separately in the property schedule and was not part of the $5,000.00 personal property amount. 
B. Craig immediately signs the three quit claim deeds to the Pleasant Grove Property to 
Bonnie. 
C. Craig obtain assignments of the Interwest Medical stock interests from Louise Harris. 
Scot Harris and Troy Harris and he then transfer his interest in the stock to Bonnie. 
D. Craig will pay Bonnie the amount owing on the judgment of $53,313.75 minus the 
line of credit amount of $28,016.00. 
E. That Craig pay Bonnie the amount of $2,604 representing the value of Craig's "Cash 
and Cash Equivalents" listed in Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree. 
F. That Craig pay Bonnie the amount of $16,042.00 representing the cash value of the 
MONY life insurance cash value at the time of the Decree of Divorce. 
Mr. Loren D. Martin 
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G. That Craig sign the necessary transfer papers to transfer the cash value of his IRA's to 
Bonnie valued at the time of the Divorce on the Dean Witter Acct. # 124-100296 of $67,133, and 
the Prudential Securities Simple IRA Acct. # OUQ-R68840-41 of $4,847.{ The Judge awarded 
Bonnie the IRA and not the *%nef after tax value. Bonnie is allowed to transfer the face value of 
the two IRA's, valued at the time of the Decree of Divorce to her without any tax consequences. 
Pursuant to the Judge's Order in the Decree, Bonnie was awarded Craig's IRAs. 
H. The value of the shelving that Bonnie took from the shed, purportedly owned by AID 
Equipment has minimal fair market value. On the company's capital asset account provided to 
Brad Townsend, the shelving in the P.G. building would have had little or no value on the 
Company's books. It is Bonnie's position that the gun reloading equipment and supplies were 
given to her by the Court as a separate asset from the $5,000 personal property listed by Craig. 
The gun reloading equipment was listed separately in the schedules and were awarded to Bonnie. 
She has previously agreed to give Dick Harris and Scott Harris any of the reloading equipment 
that was theirs. Simply stating that everything is theirs and not Craig's does not make it so. 
Bonnie will return any items belonging to third parties provided the\ can specifically identify 
each item and document ownership. 
I. Bonnie is agreeable to returning all the gun reloading equipment and supplies. Bonnie 
believes that it is fair that she keep the shelving she has in her possession to use in the building as 
an offset for the substantial difference in value for the gun reloading equipment as opposed to the 
1
 The Decree awarded all remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule A to 
Bonnie with the exception of the Commercial Property and AID Equipment and the Signetics 
Retirement which was to be divided by a QDRO. The IRA's are different than the cash value of 
the insurance policy in that Bonnie was only entitled to the asset of the insurance policy which 
was its cash surrender value. 
Pursuant to Internal Revenue Code §408(d)(6). "The transfer of an individual's interest in 
an individual retirement account or an individual retirement annuity to his spouse or former 
spouse under a divorce or separation instrument described in subparagraph (A) of section 
71(b)(2) is not to be considered a taxable transfer made by such individual notwithstanding any 
other provision of this subtitle, and such interest at the time of the transfer is to be treated as an 
individual retirement account of such spouse, and not of such individual. Thereafter such 
account or annuity for purposes of this subtitle is to be treated as maintained for the benefit of 
such spouse." 
IRC § 71(b)(2)(A) states: "(2) Divorce or separation instrument: The term divorce or 
separation instrument* means: (A) a decree of divorce or separate maintenance or a written 
instrument incident to such a decree." 
Mr. Loren D. Martin 
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value that was listed in the schedules and for the substantial value of the personal property that 
was taken by Craig and Scot in November and December, 1999. 
G. There is a large tarp that covers the 26 ft. boat that was taken from the shed. Bonnie 
would like the tarp returned. She would also like the parts to the boat return. There was a yellow 
bucket and a blue tote box with parts that went to the boat motor that were removed from the 
shed prior to March 4, 2000. Bonnie is requesting that your client fix the doors to the shed that 
have been broken by your clients forcefully entering the shed. 
H. If there are specific items that your client believes are missing that are not on the list 
of "missing items' we have provided, please let us know so we can inform the police. 
If the Quit Claim Deeds are not signed and the money that is due Bonnie is not paid by 
5:00 p.m. on Friday March 31, 2000, we will proceed with an Order to Show Cause. 
Also, be aware that Charles A. Schultz will be filing an appearance as co-counsel and will 
be assisting in the execution of the judgement. 
Very truly yours, 
J. Grant Moody 
Attorney at Law 
cc: Client 
Enclosures 
Harris v. Harris 
Listed below are the items Bonnie noticed are missing from the shed. There may be other 
items that are missins: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
New 5" Delta Grinder (still in box) 
Welding torches, gauges and hoses 
Two disk grinders 
Four drills 
Sawzall 
Three skill saws 
Miter box saw 
Belt sander 
Worm drive skill saw 
Three booster cables 
Air socket set, impact wrenches, two air guns (big and small) 
Target thrower 
Honda generator EM35005 
Jet ski 
Aqua scooter 
Cover for the Sea Ray Boat (covers the entire boat) 
Reddy heater 
Propane heater 
Gas chain saw 
Disk sander 
Battery charger 
Chain Hoist 
Trolling motor 
Two re-loaders 
Reloading equipment, some supplies 
Gun cleaning tools, equipment and cases 
Parts belonging to the Sea Ray boat motors and out drives 
TabH 
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MARTLN & NELSON 
A Professional Corporation 
Loren D. Martin (2101) 
Mail: PO Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah S4147-0590 
Street: 139 East on South Temple, Suite 400 
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Respondent. 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS 
Case No: 95-44-02034 DA 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Petitioner, CRAIG JACK HARRIS, respectfully files this MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS pursuant to this Court's ruling at 
trial. During the trial the Court stated that it would revisit the issue of valuation as well as entertain 
motions for reconsideration once an order was in place. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Petitioner filed his Complaint for divorce on September 20. 1995.1 
2. On October 19, 1998, the Court bifurcated this matter, granting the parties a divorce 
on January 26. 1999. but making the divorce effective October 19. 1998.2 
?. The issue of disposition of property was reserved for further hearine. 
1
 Complaint, dak-d September 20. 19^5 
Decree of l)w<>t\(. dated January 26. 1999. 
Id. at paragraph 2 
4. A trial on the issue of disposition of property was held on August 16, August 17, 
September 23. and October 12, 1999. 
5. During the trial on October 12. 1999. the Court ruled that it was going to get an 
order in place and once that order was in place the Court would be happy to revisit the issue of 
valuation and would be happy to hear any motions for reconsideration.4 
6. On October 12, 1999, the Court stated the following: 
THE COURT: So both of you understand. I'd be happy to hear your motions for 
reconsideration. Today's not the appropriate time. We're going to get an order in 
place and then we're happy to go ahead and revisit.5 
Then again just prior to the conclusion of the trial, the Court stated the following: 
THE COURT: Once I've entered that, Til then direct one of you to prepare 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree in conformance. And then if you've 
got motions to reconsider, then your timing would be appropriate.6 
7. An order is now in place.7 
8. On November 22. 1999, the Court signed a Supplementary Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Supplementary Decree of Divorce which documents were entered on 
November 29, 1999.8 
9. Since the trial the Respondent has so interpreted the Decree, maneuvered the 
transfer of property, and failed to comply with requirements of the Court imposed upon herself so 
as to unlawfully transfer to herself a much greater cash dollar value than directed b\ the Court at 
trial.9 
Transcript of Hearing. Volume IV. page 22. lines 10-1? and page ?9. lines 15-17. included hcreir. as "Exhibit A". 
Transcript of Hearing. Volume IV. page 22. lines 10-1 ?. included herein as "Exhibit A" 
6
 Transcript o{Hi armg Volume IV. page ?9 lines 15-P included herein as Exhibit A" 
' Supplementary Dec n c 01 Di\ oiu dated N\«\ cmber 22 1 ^9° 
Supplementary Findings of Fact and Coni hoitm^ <r Law dated No\cmbc: 22 1UUL> SuppUnu mar [t(, u< of 
Divorce, dated November 22. 1999 
9
 Affidavit of Craig Harris. 12/'2S/9° 
THE MAJOR ACTIONS OF RESPONDENT SINCE TRIAL TO UNLAWFULLY 
ADVANTAGE HERSELF IN OPPOSITION TO THE ORDER OF THE COURT ARE 
ADDRESSED AS FOLLOWS: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
This Court did not award the Respondent a dollar value of approximately 
$72,000.00, with respect to the two IRA accounts as she is claiming. 
The Supplementary Decree of Divorce awarded the Respondent the following: 
[A]ll remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule A of Petitioner's 
Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the exception of the 
Signetics retirement which is to be divided under Woodward as set forth above. 
Therefore, Respondent is awarded property with a total value of S373.790.0010 
Schedule A attached to the Supplementary Decree of Divorce places a dollar value of 
$39,589.00, on Petitioner's two IRA accounts (i.e. Dean Witter 124-100296 and Prudential 
Securities OUQ-R68840-41). The dollar value of $39,589.00, was used in the Court's calculation 
when it awarded the Respondent property with a total dollar value of S373,790.00I ]. 
This Court awarded the Respondent a dollar amount of $39,589.00, with respect to the two 
ERA accounts. Respondent is claiming that the Court actually awarded her a dollar value of 
approximately $72,000.00, with respect to the two IRA accounts, and is attempting to transfer and 
seize approximately S72.000.00, rather than the S39.589.00. awarded by the Court.:: This is not 
what the Court au arded the Respondent 
Suppicmeman Dec ice of Dt\ out paragraph u 
11
 Respondent's auard of propcn\ uith a dollar \alue o'S?~ v7M> 00 is cakulaicd h\ taking the iota! nci \aiuc on 
Schedule A o\ S9"5.2~? 00 and then subtracting irom thai number i 1 • the. Commercial Building witr a dollar 
amount of 5»425 1% 00. i2 • the Business unh ., Jollar amount of SM~.5?- 0r) jnu . ^. the Signui^ Retirement 
account with a dollar amount of S2b 754 00 
12
 Affidavit of Ctuip Harris 12/2S'99 paragraph 5 
If the Respondent is permitted to transfer and seize $72,000.00, the Respondent will 
effectively be receiving property with a total value of $406,201.00, which is not what the Court 
ordered. 
Because the Respondent is claiming that the Court awarded her a dollar value of 
approximately $72,000.00, with respect to the two IRA accounts, and the Decree of Divorce states 
that the Respondent is awarded a dollar value of $39,589.00, Petitioner is requesting that the Court 
revisit this issue. 
POINT 2 
The valuation of the real property in this case was inequitable. 
During the trial on October 12, 1999, the Court stated the following: 
THE COURT: So both of you understand, I'd be happy to hear your motions for 
reconsideration. Today's not the appropriate time. We're going to get an order in 
place and then we're happy to go ahead and revisit.13 
Then again just prior to the conclusion of the trial, the Court stated the following: 
THE COURT: Once I've entered that, I'll then direct one of you to prepare 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree in conformance. And then if you've 
got motions to reconsider, then your timing would be appropriate.14 
The Court ruled in trial that it would revisit the issue of the possible inequitable valuation of 
the real property.15 Petitioner claimed in trial that the valuation of the real property in this case 
was inconsistent. The value of the commercial building and the house located at 172 W. 9400 S.. 
Sandy. Utah, was based upon an appraisal done b\ Dave VanDremlin The respective values of 
the remaining real property were based on tax assessments. 
The Respondent was awarded all the real property with the exception of the commercial 
building and the house located at 172 W 9400 S . Sandy. Utah It is inconsistent to value the 
]
" Transcript <r Hiurui£ Volume IV pagi 22 imcs lt» I • inc luded herein a^  Exhibit A" 
14
 Transcnpf f)i Hainni; \ olumc IV pai'i '^ lines 15 ]" included herein a^  Exhibit V 
J
 * Transcnp' nf H<ci/nip Volume ]V pace 22 lines 10-P and page 39 linc^ 15-P induded hereir as "Exhibit 
A". 
commercial building and house on an appraisal and then value the remaining real property on tax 
assessments. The Court recognized the inequities of allowing one piece of real property to be 
appraised and not others, as evidenced by its ruling that it would revisit the issue once an order 
was in place.'6 
Because the value of the commercial building and house was based upon an appraisal and 
the values of the remaining real property were based on tax assessments, Petitioner is requesting 
that the Court revisit this issue and permit appraisals of the remaining real property. 
POINT 3 
The Court did not award the Respondent everything with respect to 
the furniture and personal property as she is claiming. 
The Supplementary Decree of Divorce awarded the Respondent: 
[A]ll remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule A of Petitioner's 
Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the exception of the 
Signetics retirement which is to be divided under Woodward as set forth above. 
Therefore, Respondent is awarded property with a total value of S373,790.0017 
Schedule A attached to the Supplementary Decree of Divorce places a dollar value of 
$13,395.00, on Petitioner's and Respondent's "Furniture and Personal Property." The dollar 
value of SI3,395.00, was used in the Court's calculation when it awarded the Respondent 
property with a total dollar value of S373/790.00.18 
This Court awarded the Respondent a dollar amount of SI 3,395.000. with respect to the 
furniture and personal property. Respondent is claiming that the Court actually awarded her all of 
the parties* furniture and personal property which has a dollar value of approximately S40.000.00, 
and all of Petitioner's personal belongings, even including Petitioner's own personal clothing.19 
16
 Transcript of Htannx. W»lunK !Y. pa i^- 22. i:nc> K>- ; ; and paL'c 3°. hno 15- i7. mJuJcci hcrcir, as "Exhibit 
A". 
Supplemental") Decree oi Di\^.r^- paragraph ^ 
ih
 Supra Noic 1 1. 
Affidavit of Craiy Hurris. ! 2'2h'og. paragraph fv i;». 
It was never the intention of either party that the furniture and personal property listed in the 
Schedule A include the Petitioner's personal belongings such as his golf clubs, clothes, suit cases, 
hunting clothes, fishing tackle, toothbrush, etc.20 Nor was it ever the intention of either party that 
the reference to furniture and personal property listed in the Schedule A include the parties' 
personal property such as paintings, appliances, blenders, silverware, plates, decorations, etc.:i 
The reference to Petitioner's furniture and personal property with a dollar value of 
S5,000.00, was understood by both parties to be only the furniture and appliances in Petitioner's 
apartment which he moved into after the parties' separation.22 
The reference to Respondent's furniture and personal property with a dollar value of 
$8,395.00, was an appraisal of only the furniture in the home located on Juniper St. The appraisal 
did not include the parties' paintings, appliances, blenders, silverware, plates, decorations, 
toiletries, etc.23 
However, the Respondent is claiming that all of Petitioner's personal belongings and all of 
the parties' personal property belongs to her pursuant to this Court's order.24 Respondent has 
locked Petitioner out of all the real property and is claiming ownership to everything.25 This is not 
what the Court ordered. 
The Court did not award Respondent everything but rather awarded the Respondent a 
dollar value of SI 3.395.00. which included only the furniture in the home on Juniper St.. and the 
furniture and appliances in Petitioner's apartment. 
: o
 Affidavit of Craig Harris, 
' ' Affidavit of Craig Harris. 
~~ Affidavit of Craig Harris 
' * Affidavit of Craig Hams, 
"
4
 Affidavit of Craig Hams, 
25
 Affidavit of Craig Harris. 
12C8/99. paragraph fr-10 
12/2S'99. paragraph 6-10 
12/28/99. paragraph^ 
12CS/99. paragraph 10 
J2/2S/99. paragraph 6-10 
12/2S/99. paracranhMO 
Because the Respondent is claiming that the Court awarded her everything with respect to 
furniture and personal property, and the Decree of Divorce states that the Respondent is awarded a 
dollar value of 513,395.00. Petitioner is requesting that the Court revisit this issue. 
POINT 4 
The property division does not take into consideration payments 
made by the Petitioner to the Respondent after January 26, 1999. 
This matter was bifurcated on October 19, 1998. The Decree of Divorce was signed on 
January 26, 1999, but was made effective October 19, 1998. To aid the Respondent until the 
property settlement became final, Petitioner continued to pay $950.00 per month in support to 
Respondent, Respondent's health insurance, and the interest on all the Respondent's loans 
between January 26, 1999, and November 29. 1999, the date the Supplementary Decree of 
Divorce was entered.26 
The dollar value of these payments was not considered in the property division even though 
the Respondent acknowledges receipt of these payments. The dollar value of such payments 
should be subtracted from Respondent's property award of $373,790.00. 
Because the Petitioner has made payments with a determinable dollar value to the 
Respondent after January 26, 1999, and such payments were not considered in the property 
division, Petitioner is asking that the Court revisit this issue. 
POINT 5 
In violation of the Court's Order, Respondent has refused to pay the 
mortgage and the utilities on the real property she now occupies. 
The Supplementary Decree of Divorce awarded the Respondent: 
[A]ll remaining assets of the marital estate listed in Schedule A of Petitioner's 
Exhibit 1 prepared by Norman Loebbecke Associates, with the exception of the 
Signetics retirement which is to be divided under Woodward as set forth above. 
Therefore. Respondent is awarded property with a total value of S373.790.O0:" 
:f
 Affidavit <>1 Craig Hams. ]2/2S/^u. paragraph i I 
" Supplemental-) Decree of Divorce, paragraph 9. 
The award to the Respondent included the house and lot located at 692 S. Juniper St., 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, and the building and lot located at 725 E. Orchard Drive, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah. With this award came the responsibility for the mortgage and the utilities. Respondent does 
not acknowledge this responsibility and refuses to pay the mortgage on the home located on 
Juniper St. and refuses to pay the utilities on the property located on Orchard Drive.28 
Petitioner was contacted by the bank holding the note in the middle of November, 1999, 
and informed that the mortgage was two months in arrears. Petitioner attempted to explain to the 
bank that the property had been divided pursuant to the Supplementary Decree of Divorce. The 
bank refused to cooperate stating that as long as Petitioner's name was on the note he was 
responsible. Petitioner contacted the Respondent who refused to cooperate. To preserve his 
credit, Petitioner was forced to bring the note current and then borrow 56,000.00, which he 
borrowed in his own name and secured by the property, which he placed in an account with and 
automatic payment plan. Petitioner also continues to receive the monthly utility bills for the real 
property awarded to the Respondent.29 
Respondent refuses to transfer the utilities into her name, refuses to refinance the house, 
and refuses to pay the mortgage. As a result, Petitioner's credit is being destroyed which in tum is 
jeopardizing Petitioner's business and preventing him from complying with this Court's order.30 
At a minimum the Petitioner should be credited with any amounts paid to the Respondent or on her 
behalf, against any amounts owed by Petitioner to Respondent. 
Because the Respondent refuses to pay the mortgage, refinance the home, and transfer the 
bills from Petitioner's name to Respondent's name, with respect to the real property awarded her 
by the Court. Petitioner is requesting that the Court revisit this issue. 
28
 Affidavit ci Craif: Harris. MZh'^ paragraph 12-T 
:
* Affidax it (J Craty Harris ) 2 ' 2 8 ' ^ paragraph 12-T 
30
 Affidavit oi Craii: Hams 12/2SA>9 paragraph 12-17 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court grant his motion for reconsideration and 
permit the issues referenced above to be revisited by the Court. 
Dated this 28th day of December, 1999. 
Martin & Nelson 
A Professional Corporation 
D. Martin 
Attdrney at Law 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on the 28* day of December I served the following; 
1) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND OTHER RELATED 
MATTERS, 
2) AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG J. HARRIS 12/28/99. 
upon Bonnie Harris, the Defendant and Appellee, by placing the same in the United States Mail, 
Postage pre-paid, and addressed as follows: 
J. Grant Moody 
J. Grant Moody, P.C. 
336 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
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11 and would still Bonnie $204,242. Getting tha her and under what 
2 mechanism, whether it be through cash and/or property, is really what I 
3 wanted some help with today. I've gotten very little help to this point, but. 
4 THE WITNESS: It may be helpful to go through these 
5 proposed distribution schedules and--
6 THE COURT: Anything you think would help me, I'd be glad 
7 to hear from you. 
8 THE WITNESS: Okay. Let me grab the documents that I 
91 have. 
10 THE COURT: So both of you understand, I'd be happy to 
11 hear your motions for reconsideration. Today's not the appropriate time 
12 We're going to get an order in place and then we're happy to go ahead 
13 I and revisit. But I've been through this once with Mr. Martin on another 
14 case already. I'm a little short about it because it was not a pleasant 
15 experience for me. I'm doing this again. 
16 I don't want this case going into the same situation I had on a 
17 prior case. We're going to get an order in place, then I'll revisit it. 
18 THE WITNESS: Okay. I don't know which one you want to 
19 start with. 
20 THE COURT: Either, you just tell me. 
21 THE WITNESS: Okay. If we look at Craig Harris's proposal, 
22 the second page is probably the best place to start. 
23 THE COURT- All of mine say "per Bonnie Hams." So when 
24 you say Craig-
25 THE WITNESS: That's his proposal. I'm note sure what that 
make sure tha. ,e feels secured in taking that o. natever else extra 
penalties we can put in that as an exceptional order of support. But 
something short of just a judgment which can somebody then just go out 
and execute upon that and require immediate payment. That's the 
difficulty. He doesn't have that right now. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take the matter under 
advisement. I'll issue a written decision in regards to the attorney's fees 
relating to the order to show cause, attorney's fees that each party 
submitted in regards to the overall proceedings and the award of those 
attorney's fees, the Norman/Loebbecke costs related to the late 
compliance by Mrs. Harris, as well as the Norman/Loebbecke costs as 
between the parties other than that aspect, and the division and most 
importantly then, I guess, is the division of the properties in accordance 
with the Court's previous order. 
Once I've entered that, I'll then direct one of you to prepare 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree in conformance. And then 
if you've got motions to reconsider, then your timing would be appropriate. 
Let's take these-we're dealing with complicated issues. It creates too big 
of a mess to mix them. I want to do them systematically and one at a time 
in accordance with the rules. 
All right. Well, thank you both and than you for coming to 
testify, as well. We'll be in recess. 
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1 PROCEEDINGS 
2 Partial Transcript of hearing on March L 2000 
3 3:18:27 
4 Argument before the Court by counsel 
5 3:53:29 
6 COURT: Well let me do this then. I'm going to recess and direct the parties 
7 to meet together with Mr. Townsend for the next forty-five minutes 
8 and attempt to identify the ambiguities that you see in the Order 
9 and attempt to come up with stipulated resolutions of those 
10 ambiguities. And I'm going to order you to both be in good faith in 
11 trying to resolve this. I understand that you got disputes but let's 
12 reduce the number of disputes. It's in your own interest. If you 
13 want to appeal things that the Court did let's at least limit those 
14 down to the things that are really in dispute. And if you can limit 
15 these collateral issues you're going to have a lot easier time on 
16 appeal, if nothing else, so that you can really work on the issues 
17 you've got. Now two areas that I'm seeing with your argument. 
18 What is the personal property that should be included within the 
19 court's order? Why don't you have a discussion with Mr. 
Townsend and yourselves in good faith and see if you can come to 
some resolution there. And I'm going to ask you to be specific on 
these items. Generalities are just going to postpone the dispute. 
The other one is I can see is we've got this area of adequacy in 
regard to the findings regarding alimony. Why don't the two of 
you sit down and talk about that and see if we can't put findings 
that are adequate regarding the court's position and then if you feel 
that the court was wrong appeal the court's decision on what it 
found. But let's not have counsel prepare inadequate findings and 
then claim that they are inadequate before the Court of Appeals. 
That's a problem. 
May I clarify? Well I don't know that the findings in there are 
inadequate. My concern is that the Court of Appeals may say that 
they are inadequate. 
Well, why didn't you prepare adequate findings if you think that 
they are going to say that? 
Well, because, well... 
I'm sitting here in back to back so that... 
I mean that... 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
COURT: 
MOODY: 
COURT: 
3:56:24 
Court in recess 
4:44:40 
I want to make a record of this. So I'm sitting here in back to back 
jury trials. I just finished my seventh week and I've got another 
one on Monday, going into my eighth week of consecutive jury 
trials. Our trial calendars are incredibly harsh. And I depend upon 
counsel to be officers of the court and to prepare these things and 
to be cooperative. And I guess that" what I'm asking of you here. 
There's a limit on what personal time and involvement I can give 
you beyond the in-court time that we have and I hope you're 
sympathetic to that. So I'm going to recess for forty-five minutes. 
I'm going to let you do that. Let's see what progress we can make. 
At a quarter to five I'm going to come back on and we'll put on the 
record what it is and if I can enter some rulings on what's not 
decided we'll do that. Thank you both. 
Your honor could I give you another matter... 
And I've asked Shauna to stay in her just to make sure everything 
stays orderly. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
COURT: 
MOODY: 
COURT: 
MOODY: 
COURT: 
MOODY: 
COURT: 
Mr. Harris 
COURT: 
Please, be seated. We're back on record in the Harris v. Harris 
matter we have had a break here to allow parties to see what they 
can stipulate to in terms of resolution of any perceived ambiguities. 
Mr. Moody, has there been any resolution? 
I think so. On the personal property (aside to Mr. Martin) - is that 
agreeable then? On the personal property, Mrs. Harris will take 
what personal tools that she would like to have out of the shop by 
the 15th of March. And then the Petitioner will have until that 
weekend, I believe its the 19 of March, to remove the rest of the 
possessions out of the shop. 
Ok, and that will resolve the personal property? 
Yes. And then he will agree to pay her $5000.00 for the personal 
property and he retains possession of all the personal property. 
When will the $5,000.00 be paid? 
(Inaudible) 
Probably the 19th 
I want a date 
The only I would like to say is that if the weather is horrible... 
I want a date 
1 Mr. Harris: Well then give me 15 days so that if we have bad weather. 
2 COURT: All I need is a date. 
3 Mr. Harris: 30, no I, talking. 
4 MR. MARTIN: Just give him a date when you can have everything removed. 
Mr. Harris: Excuse me — In having the material removed they're giving me four 
days. If we have a major storm I want 15 days. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
MARTIN: 
Mr. Harris: 
MOODY: 
Mrs. Harris 
COURT: 
MOODY: 
4:46:23 
COURT: 
MARTIN: 
COURT: 
Tell him that you want... Just give him a date so that he 
By the thirtieth 
(to client) Ok? 
Ok. 
Thank you for your reasonableness. Ok, then by the 30th of this 
month, March 
And if he will just contact either me or if he could contact Mrs. 
Harris just so that she can have the building unlocked when they're 
doing that because it is secured. There is a lot of stuff in there. 
Ok. Is that your agreement on the personal property. 
Yes 
All-right, and yours as well ma'am? 
1 Mrs. Harris: Yes sir. 
2 COURT: I'll approve that stipulation. Til have Mr. Moody prepare it in the 
3 form of an order. Which will amend the findings, conclusions and 
4 supplemental decree to the extent this modifies it. So to that extent 
5 the Motion for Reconsideration is granted to incorporate the 
6 parties' stipulation. Other items that have been resolved between 
7 the parties? 
g * * * 
9 End 4:58:00 
10 
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125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, : AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG HARRIS 
Petitioner, : December 13,2000 
v. : 
BONNIE HARRIS, : Case No: 95-44-02034 DA 
Respondent. : Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, CRAIG HARRIS, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the Petitioner in this matter. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the information provided and statements made herein. 
I am competent to testify and if called upon to testify regarding the information provided or 
statements made herein, would state that they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 
3. I am submitting this affidavit in support of my MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS. 
4. Mr. Brad Townsend, CPA, with the firm of Norman/Loebbecke Associates was 
appointed by the Court to identify and value property. Mr. Townsend testified at trial and 
submitted his report. 
5. Real property listed in the Townsend Report included a large, three bay, double 
garage-door, commercial-sized storage building on a lot located only yards from the our home in 
Pleasant Grove. Photographs of that lot and building are attached to the Memorandum, as part of 
"Exhibit F." 
6. Bonnie, other family members, and myself used the building for many years. 
Boats and vehicles were stored therein along with the personal property of Bonnie, my brother, my 
mother, my two sons, others and myself. We all used that building as a large, covered, secure 
storage and work space. The building also contained heavy commercial steel shelving that had 
been purchased by AID Equipment, Inc. Mr. Townsend's report listed both the building and some 
large, high-value items of personal property stored therein as marital assets. 
7. The storage building and all its contents have always been accessible to Bonnie. 
She was awarded the building and some of its specific contents that she listed as marital assets she 
wanted. The court awarded Bonnie all her personal property. Bonnie has had the storage building 
in her possession and control. Yet, never, until long after the trial did she make a claim against any 
of the unlisted personal property in that storage building. 
8. The last day of trial was October 12, 1999. 
9. Bonnie only first raised her claim against the entire contents of the storage building 
in March of 2000. Yet, the fact that she had taken all personal property from the building was 
admitted in a letter dated March 27, 2000. A copy of that letter is attached to the Memorandum as 
"Exhibit G." 
10. On December 28, 1999, I filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND 
OTHER RELATED MATTERS. A copy of that document is attached to the Memorandum as 
"Exhibit H." Hearing on that Motion came before this court on March 1, 2000. At that hearing, 
the Court received a stipulation as to the division of our personal property. 
11. During the hearing on March 1, 2000, the Court ordered a recess to permit us time 
to possibly resolve some issues. A copy of the Transcript is attached to the Memorandum as 
"Exhibit I." 
12. During the recess, the parties agreed to the manner of division of the personal 
property items in Craig's possession and items of personal property located in the storage building. 
See Affidavit of Craig Harris, 10/17/00, attached hereto as "Exhibit J." During the recess, 
discussion occurred as follows: 
a) Mr. Townsend said he had never received, nor had Bonnie ever provided, any 
inventory or description of any miscellaneous personal property items located in 
the storage building. 
b) Bonnie had not previously made any claim against that property. She had never 
made any claim that any of that property was marital property and had not 
previously provided any list or inventory of the miscellaneous personal property 
items to Mr. Townsend. 
c) The Court Order was that Craig was to pay Bonnie five thousand dollars and 
retain his personal property. The Court's Order stated that Craig and Bonnie 
were to retain all of their own items of personal property. 
d) Craig pointed out that he, his sons, his mother, his brother and Bonnie all had 
miscellaneous items of personal property then located in the storage building. 
e) Bonnie affirmed her claim that the Court Order was that she was given "all 
remaining assets" not specifically awarded to Craig. 
f) Bonnie said that she had previously told Craig that she would sell him his 
personal property (bed, clothing, washer, dryer, personal items, etc.) that he 
presently had in his apartment for five-thousand dollars ($5,000.00). 
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g) Bonnie also said that she had previously told Craig that she would sell him his 
personal property that was located "in the bullet room" of the storage building 
for five hundred dollars. Bonnie then said that she recently had a person come 
over and look at the stuff in the storage building. Bonnie then emphatically said 
that Craig was "getting a real deal" if she let him have the stuff only in the 
"bullet room" for five times five-hundred dollars. 
h) Craig argued that the Court Order had awarded Bonnie forty thousand dollars 
(purchase price) of personal property, furniture, fixtures, and furnishings in the 
home for a value of only eight thousand dollars. 
i) Bonnie said that what she needed from the storage building was some tools 
that she required to take care of the yard, including the house and the storage 
building that had been awarded to her. 
j) It was agreed that Bonnie could take what tools she might need to take care of 
the yard. She could take those items from the storage building and then Craig 
would remove everything else to clean up the building for Bonnie's use since 
the storage building had been awarded to her. 
13. The Judge came back to the bench and the following was read into the record: 
COURT: Please, be seated. We're back on record in the Harris v. Harris 
matter we have had a break here to allow parties to see what they can 
stipulate to in terms of resolution of any perceived ambiguities. Mr. 
Moody, has there been any resolution? 
MOODY: I think so. On the personal property (aside to Mr. Martin) - is that 
agreeable then? On the personal property, Mrs. Harris will take 
what personal tools that she would like to have out of the shop by 
the 15th of March. And then the Petitioner will have until that 
weekend, I believe its the 19th of March, to remove the rest of the 
possessions out of the shop. [Emphasis added.] 
COURT: Ok, and that will resolve the personal property? 
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MOODY: Yes. And then he will agree to pay her $5,000.00 for the personal 
property and he retains possession of all the personal property. 
14. The Court asked Mr. Moody to prepare the Order. The Order was signed by the 
Court and filed on April 4, 2000. Paragraph two of the Order provided that I was to pay Bonnie 
$5,000.00 for my personal property that I had in my apartment and all of my personal property 
located in the storage building. 
15. Only three days later, Bonnie took action in defiance of the Court's Order. On 
March 4, 2000, Bonnie apparently called the Pleasant Grove Police Department, claiming that the 
storage building had been forcibly entered—burglarized some time between February 16th at 9:00 
p.m. and March 4th at 2:00 p.m. A true and correct copy of the Pleasant Grove Police Department 
Report, 03-04-00, case number 269335.A46, is attached to the Memorandum as "Exhibit L." 
16. Acting under the Court Order that I could remove my personal property from the 
storage building between March 15 and March 30,1 found that the entire storage building had been 
completely cleaned out. With the exception of one fishing tackle box and contents; large, heavy 
gun safe; my son, Scott's Jeep; other Utah registered and serial numbered items; and some 
miscellaneous trash; everything else had been removed. 
17. A series of photographs of both the exterior and interior of the building as seen then 
are attached to the Memorandum as part of "Exhibit F." The photographs accurately depict the 
condition and contents of the storage building at that time. 
18. After the police arrived, Bonnie came over from the house. She admitted that she 
had taken everything. In fact, during the discussion that followed, Scott asked Bonnie why she 
had also taken everything she knew belonged to him. Bonnie responded, saying "that there were 
so many people helping her take things that she didn't know everything that was taken but that she 
had told them to just take everything." 
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19. An estimate of the value of personal property taken by Bonnie is now impossible to 
compile because no prior inventory was made. Actual value of loss may double the estimates. 
There were twenty-seven items of substantial value, estimated at $23,000.00, that Bonnie claimed 
were "missing." From the nature of her words, tone, and actions, she clearly conveyed to us that 
she was claiming there was a "burglary" so there was no way she could be responsible for the 
property. Yet, Bonnie was the only one who had the key. She was the only one who had access. 
20. I had personally observed and recalled that eighteen of the claimed "missing" items 
had been there just a few months earlier. At times I would believe that Bonnie and I were actually 
on somewhat good terms. A few months earlier, there was no indication of any contest over the 
stuff in the storage building. In any event, in addition to the "missing" items, we put together an 
estimate, from memory, of what Bonnie had admitted taking and the estimated value. A copy of 
the memory inventories and estimated values are attached hereto as "Exhibit 1." The estimate made 
was a loss from: 
a) Craig valued at $4,600.00; 
b) AID Equipment valued at $2,925.00; 
c) Dick (Craig's Brother) valued at $3,734.00; and 
d) Troy and Scott (Craig's Sons) valued at more than $8,600.00. 
21. On March 20, I informed my legal counsel that property had been removed in 
violation of the Order of the Court. I was told that a telephone call was placed to Bonnie's legal 
counsel and a letter had been sent, confirming that telephone call. 
22. It being noted that the garage doors bore the label of Martin Door Manufacturing in 
Salt Lake City, Vice President and the chief engineer for that company was contacted and agreed to 
inspect the site. A copy of his affidavit and report is attached to the Memorandum as "Exhibit F." 
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23. The SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE, a copy of which is attached to 
the Memorandum, reflects that the Court Findings were that I held interests in two retirement 
accounts: 
a) The Dean Witter 124-100296 IRA Standard, valued at $36,923.00; and 
b) The Prudential Securities UQ-R62840 Simple IRA, valued at 2,666.00. 
24. The Court's valuation date was January 26, 1999. 
25. The Order of the Court directed that Bonnie would keep her own IRA with Dean 
Witter, valued at $48,918.00. The Court then awarded Bonnie both of my IRA's, valued at a 
combined total of $39,589.00. 
26. Bonnie and I continued to speak to each other often. During November of 1999, I 
spoke with Bonnie about the transfer of my IRA's to her as Ordered. To my surprise, Bonnie told 
me that her attorney was at that moment working on papers to transfer $73,800.00 from my two 
IRA accounts, "as ordered by the court." At that time, I reminded her that the net sale value of my 
IRA accounts on the date Ordered by the Court was only $39,589.00. Later, Bonnie said that her 
attorney had told her that she could get the $73,800.00. Bonnie said, "and that's what I'm going 
to get." The conclusion I made was that Bonnie and her attorney were planning on providing false 
information to the Court about the additional Prudential IRA account that I had set up after the 
Divorce. The Prudential IRA account I set up after the divorce was Account Number UQ-100296, 
being my separate funds deposited after the divorce. I personally contacted Prudential and received 
the report of the accounts upon which I made calculations of the values of each account. A copy of 
that report is attached hereto as "Exhibit 2." 
27. AMENDED SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW were entered on April 4, 2000. That final Order again recognized January 26, 1999 as 
the valuation date of property. 
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28. During that interim time my automatic IRA retirement deposits had continued to be 
made to the first IRA account. To maintain a proper accounting for the separate funds deposited 
after January 26, 1999, I opened an additional account at Prudential, Account Number UQ-
R82581, into which my separate personal funds earned after the divorce were deposited. 
29. Subsequently, in compliance with the Court's final Order, I instructed Prudential to 
transfer Account Number UQ-R62840, the original ERA account, plus all accrued earnings from 
January 26, 1999. By that time, the original IRA account had increased in value to $4,885.00. 
That was the value that went to Bonnie when that account was transferred by Prudential to Bonnie. 
30. Bonnie had known that I had continued to make deposits to an IRA after the 
Divorce. From what Bonnie said and how she acted, I continued to believe that there may be some 
reconciliation. I told Bonnie about both IRA accounts and the money still being deposited. 
31. At a subsequent evidentiary hearing held on May 31, 2000, Mr. Charles A. 
Schultz, Bonnie's counsel, misled the Court when he accused me of fraudulently manipulating and 
attempting to conceal the Prudential IRA accounts. I have and hereby continue to flatly deny any 
such allegations. Yet, based upon Schult's allegations and intent to mislead the Judge, the Court 
directed Mr. Schultz to prepare an ORDER ON CONTEMPT. Paragraph 8 of that Order ordered 
that, 
The Prudential IRA, listed on Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, 
account # UQ-R62840, shall be provided and transferred to the Respondent, with 
the money taken out and transferred to account # UQ-R2581 returned or 
redeposited into account # UQ-R62840. 
32. The Court Order gave me twenty-one days to fully comply, setting a jail sentencing 
day of June 21, 2000 at 10:30 a.m. 
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33. I immediately took action to transfer all Prudential IRA accounts to Bonnie, 
understanding that I may be permitted to bring a proper accounting before the Court at a later date 
should Bonnie or her counsel wish to pursue the litigation yet even further. 
34. In about the middle of November, 1999, I was contacted by the bank holding the 
note on the home on Juniper Street. I was informed that the mortgage was two months in arrears. 
I attempted to explain to the bank that the property had been divided pursuant to the Supplementary 
Decree of Divorce and as a result I no longer owned the home and was no longer responsible for 
the note. Of course, the people at the bank explained that I was still obligated on the contract. 
35. I contacted Bonnie and told her that my credit was being destroyed because she 
would not pay the mortgage or the utilities. She simply ignored me and refused to cooperate. 
36. I asked Bonnie to transfer the utilities into her own name. She refused. 
37. Both prior to this final Order and after, Bonnie and her counsel refused to cooperate 
in or assist any court ordered transfer. Bonnie told me that she and her counsel were taking the 
position that I had been Ordered to transfer all property and funds and that she had not been 
ordered to help. In fact, Bonnie and her counsel refused to cooperate in any manner to facilitate the 
transfer. As an example, under IRS regulations, transfer of qualified retirement funds must be 
made to a qualified account that Bonnie had previously established. But she refused to even call 
Prudential to identify her own IRA account and ask that the money be transferred. She would not 
assist in completing transfer of property as ordered by the court. She just kept saying that I had 
been ordered to do everything without her. 
38. I even got a letter from Prudential that specifically stated that a request must be 
made by "the receiving firm, accompanied by a Divorce Decree and appropriate signatures." 
Bonnie refused to sign any papers or even request that the funds be transferred to her designated 
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IRA account. A copy of that Prudential letter, dated April 28, 2000 is attached to the Memorandum 
as "Exhibit O." 
39. Finally, in a letter dated June 5, 2000, Bonnie made it clear that I was to complete 
all transfers totally by myself or go to jail on June 21.1 believe that Bonnie and her counsel's main 
objective was to obstruct the transfer, making it impossible for me to comply with the Court's 
Order. 
40. That refusal to cooperate stood in defiance of paragraph 18 of the Court's previous 
SUPPLEMENTARY DECREE OF DIVORCE, a copy of which is attached to the Memorandum as 
"Exhibit D." That Order directed that, 
Each party is ordered to cooperate with each other in executing and delivering the 
necessary documents and property required to effectuate the real property and 
personal property division as ordered by the Court. 
41. Bonnie's refusal to cooperate was also evidenced throughout the attachments to my 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE, dated June 14, 2000, page 2, paragraph 10; a letter from 
MONY Life Insurance Company, received by fax and also dated June 14, 2000, and a letter dated 
June 8, 2000 from Bonnie's counsel. The Certificate of Compliance is attached to the 
Memorandum as "Exhibit Q." 
42. From my IRA accounts, Bonnie took much more than the $2,666.00 allocated to 
her by the Court. She actually took $4,885.00. Then by stratagem, Bonnie manipulated the Order 
of the Court, making false claims after trial, obtaining an additional $ ,292.39 over and above 
what the Court granted in the Supplementary Decree of Divorce. 
43. The Findings of the Court were also that my life insurance policy, MONY Whole 
Life 1347-24-19W, had a value of $16,042.00. The Court ordered that the policy be transferred to 
Bonnie. 
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44. Given the time between the Divorce Decree and the final Order of the Court, I had 
continued to pay premiums on that MONY life insurance policy as I had on the IRA, still thinking 
that some reconciliation may be possible. 
45. I also continued to talk to Bonnie. We discussed the life insurance policy and I told 
her that I had paid more money on the policy. 
46. The face amount of that life insurance policy was $150,000.00. 
47. The Court being informed that Bonnie lacked an insurable interest still ordered that I 
transfer ownership to Bonnie, stating that the Court had just ruled that she did have an insurable 
interest. 
48. Obtaining ownership of the policy, Bonnie told me that she had cashed in the 
policy, receiving over $21,000.00 in exchange, thereby obtaining more than $4,958.00 over and 
above the Court's order by taking all the additional cash value that I had contributed after the 
divorce. 
49. At the hearing on June 21, 2000, the Court accepted my CERTIFICATE OF 
COMPLIANCE that reflected that I no longer had any obligation to Bonnie. I had fully complied 
and completed all required transfers. 
50. Over and above the additional funds that I had deposited to the IRA and life 
insurance, Bonnie then also demanded an additional interest on all accounts and values of those 
accounts from the Divorce date until the actual date of transfer. Bonnie's demand for such 
additional interest amounted to a claim of $3,787.61. 
51. I could not see that Bonnie did anything to aid the transfer of property. But what 
she did do was to mislead the Court by false accusations. Particularly, Bonnie damaged me when 
she obtained ownership of the life insurance policy, as I am no longer insurable. That action taken 
by Bonnie did much more damage than just the extra cash value she said she received. 
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IRA Accounts: 
52. Bonnie refused to cooperate to effectuate the transfer of property. Bonnie told me 
that the Court didn't require that she do anything to assist the transfer. Bonnie said that I had been 
"ordered" to make the transfer, not her, and that I had to do exactly what the Court ordered without 
her help. 
53. I personally provided all documents to Dean Witter and Prudential that I was told 
were required to have the funds transferred. I was informed that the funds had to be transferred to 
an account that Bonnie had created. Bonnie said that she told Dean Witter but proof of that was 
never made and all information from Dean Witter did not reflect any instructions from Bonnie. 
Boat Transfer: 
54. Bonnie and I purchased the Sea Ray Motor Boat from Garth Thurgood more than 
eight (8) years ago in exchange for $17,500.00. Thurgood never asked for any more and never 
made any claim against the boat. 
55. Bonnie already had the boat in her possession. 
56. I obtained and completed the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles papers that only 
needed a police officer to drive out and check the boat and serial number. Bonnie refused to help 
in any way. She declined or refused to ask a police officer to look at the boat. 
57. What she demanded was a bill of sale not just from me but also from Thurgood. 
58. I contacted Thurgood. Indicating to me that he knew that Bonnie had required that 
Craig obtain a bill of sale from him, Thurgood said that he would only sign a bill of sale in 
exchange for an additional $1,500.00. A copy of the Thurgood Affidavit is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit R." 
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Signetics Retirement — Bonnie's 
59. The Court's Order was that the Bonnie provide me with information required to 
prepare a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, transferring one half interest in the Signetics account 
to me. 
60. As of the date of the divorce the Signetics account had a net value of $28,754.00. 
61. Bonnie has failed to provide any information required by the Court's Order. 
Return of Attorney Fees Claimed to pursue Order to Show Cause against Craig 
62. Given her total lack of cooperation to effectuate transfer as ordered by the Court I 
believe that at least a portion, if not all of the attorney fees awarded on the Contempt charge be 
refunded to me. Bonnie told me that Mr. Moody's legal fees for that matter was $1,900.00 but 
that Schultz had made a claim of $8,000.00. 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this day of December, 2000. 
Notary Public 
A LQREN0. MARTIN^, 
\ o \ Ui» East South Ttmpie Suite 4001 
Sdlt Lake City Utah 84111 
My C o i n ission Expires I 
Januc ry 27 2004 
State of Utah f 
*""*" **•••
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Notary Public 
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C!r* 
DISCRETION *V sssssssss 
MISC. RELOADING SUPPLIES 
GAS CHAIN SAW (new condttkm)_ 
12 VOLT CHAIN SAW 
120 VOLT CHAIN SAW 
10 EACH BAGS OF LEAD SHOT 
2 EACH KEGS OF *4M & H380 
Q**0 
300.00 
189 00 
13500 
140.00 
MISC. TOOLS 
17.50 EACH 
100.00 EACH 
MISC. CAMPING EQUIPMENT (PRESENTS) T&fPT») 
MISC CAMPING EQUIPMENT 
fit^C*^**^~ 
4 OR 5 EACH HAND MADE KNIVES (IN TRAILER) g,^ fry/M PRICELESS 
4 EACH BINOCULARS 
LEUPOLD SPOTTING SCOPE AND TRIPOD AND CASE 
SNOW SKIES 
1 CASE 223 AMMO 
MISC. PERSONAL ITEMS (cloths,coats,etc.) 
BULLET POLlSHER(new in box) 
-^c—-—**-
TOTAL ESTIMATED MISSING GOODS 
500.00 
400.00 
500.00 
450 00 
475.00 
250.00 
725.00 
777777 
100 00 
$4639.00 
PURCHASE 
DATE 
VARIOUS 
1985 
1993 
1999 
1994 
1999 
VARIOUS 
VARIOUS 
VARIOUS 
VARIOUS 
VARIOUS 
1990 
1986 
1999 
VARIOUS 
1999 
•77T/^ '* OAJj r*4»-r 
«*>' c
**s r*''*>k OF AJe J 
"£>\ok C&rfii<{$ b ro tUy 
1* ; 
1 
[2 
p 
4 
|5 
b—i 
J7 
J 8 
[9 
Uo 
1 T1 
1 
1 
DESCRIPTK>NS 
TENSEN TRUCK WINCH ELECT 
BLACK PUSH BAR 
12 LBS. KEG 700X POWDER NEW 
PARCEL APPROX. 6 LBS KEG 700X POWDER NEW 
H414 POWDER 8 LBS 
!
 2 EA BRICKS OF REMINGTON 209 PRIMERS 10,000 each 
1 CASE OF WINDJAMMER WADS 
| CASE OF FIGS WADS 
20 TO 25 BAG OF LEAD SHOT 25 LBS EACH 
1 366 HORNADY SHOT SHELL RELOADER 
1
 1 LARGE COIL OF 1/4" NYLON ROPE APPROX. 1000 FT. 
~^?( 
i 
sssssssss 
51200.00 
| ii 
[400.00 
| 144.00 
170.00 
j 
[PO.OO 
J 100 00 ea 
| 60.00 
J 80.00 
(l2.50 eft. 
| 390.00 
1100.00 
k ? ^ p7 
1 
j 
t Appro* ftrdu** 
>ac 1 
! 1988 
[3988 
1999 
1 1999 J 
1 1999 j 
| 1999 _J 
1 1999 
1 1999 1 
!l998 | 
! 1995 j 
3988 j 
| 4 
J | 
\ 
AID EQUIPMENT MISSING PROPERTY UST 
DESCRIPTION 
4 OR 5 TIE DOWN STRAPS 
MlSC SHELVING PARTS(on floor under boat) / / # | J w k ) 
| 6 EACH SHELVING UNITS 2,X8,X8, ASSEMBLED 
| 2 EACH SHELVING UNITS 18"X42,,X6, ASSEMBLED 
1 TOTAL MISSING GOODS 
y i M P — | ^ — — • • 
|SSSSSSS 
; 29.00 EACH 
l l 500.00 
[ 165.00 EACH 
| 145.00 EACH 
| $2925.00 
1 
f— | 
J g o r / Trou 
# 
[l 
[2 
[3 j 
[4 
js 
u 
(7 
1 s 
[9 
1 TO 
1 n 
[12 
l l 3 
114 
15 
I }6 
In 
118 
[19 
{20 
[2i 
122 
| 23 
[24 
[25 
[26 
| 27 
[ 28 
[ 29 : 
1 30 1 
DESCRIPTIONS 
Bow hunting bow / case /arrowstaoad hcadsVrelease/equalizer 
Kan fishing tackle boxes 2 eachOrBsc suppiiesO j 
My fishing tackle boxes 2 each 
BascbaHBasketball card collection 
; Hunting Kmvet 2 each (Made by me in school metal dass) 
2 eachRange Finders Mine & Troys 
Kara's dutch over cook books and spatula 
Aqua Scooter 
1 FM walkie Talkies (pair) 
j AM walkie Talkies (pair) 
[ Power Too) given to me and my brother by my Grandpa 
1 Lansky Knife Sharpening Set 
Tire Chains For my old bronco 2 (1 pair) 
2 cases of Chinese rifle bullets (approx. 3500 rounds) 
1-3/4 case 9MM pistal bullets (approx. 1750 rounds) 
' Misc. Reloading Supplies 
1 Each leather Basket ball 
; 1 each scientific calculator 
Unknown number of hand tools purchased over the years. 
Battery new for nry boat in the camper 
! 4 Wheder Winch brand new SQU in the box 
Gun Case for 4 wheeler 
2 each file knives Scot and Tron 
2 each _adle bags for 4 wheelers 1 
2 each fishing pole holders for my boat j 
SawZaV in metal case,. grven from Grandpa 1 
1 case 357 bullets 
3ea 1 lbs Cagt of RS pyrodex black powder 
Black Powder gnu cleaning and pan tackle box 
2 or 3 bncki of 22 bullet* 
! sssssssss 
\ 1200 00 
! 300 00 
800 00 
400.00 
1 Priceless 
^40 00ea 
70.00 
1400 00 
350.00 
150.00 
??? 
| 70.00 
90 00 
400.00 
1
 140 00 
i 4-800.00 
35.00 
75.00 
4-600.00 
80.00 
290 00 
125.00 
100.00 each ' 
45 00 each | 
" < 
40.00 each j 
J80 00 j 
9000 
lSOOca [ 
200 00 f 
13O0ca ] 
D_u J 
1996-2000 | 
1 * ^ 
1997-2000 j 
1992-2000 j 
1986-1990 j 
1989-1990 | 
J1996 ] 
1999 
[ 1991 _J 
1998 J 
j 1994 J 
| 1997 | 
1994 | 
1992 _ j 
1994 J 
' 1998 & 1999 | 
I 1993-2000 J 
1994 
1992-2000 j 
1999 J 
1998 1 
1998 1 
1992 j 
1997-1998 j 
J999 J 
1997 j 
1998 
1997]999 j 
1996-2000 j 
199&-S999 J 
TOTAL ESTIMATED MISSING PROPERTY | S8583 00 ] | 
Exhibit 2 
Retirement Account 
or The Period: 
.prill- April 30,2000 
Priced Securities Value 
Money Market Funds 
Cash Balance 
$14,872 32 
$246 DO 
$5,214.22 E-mail Address: 
Your Branch Manager: 
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, STE 160 
P O BOX 45180 
SALT UKE CITY UT 8414^0160 
Jofinj* dutionQpcutec.oom 
OARREU. L TROST 
Phone 801-534-0088 
PRUDENTIAL SECURITIES C/F 
MR CRAI6 J HARRIS 
AID EQUIPMENT SIMPLE IRA DTD 
S7/13/Ift 75 If 11*00 S SANDV UT 8ND70-2k33 
HiilifliilUiiiliMniiHiililfN I...M.IU.I 
*^^W^^&i?it&H¥r^ 
MATCHING CONTRIBUTION 
L-T-D MATCHING CONTRIBUTION 
SALARY DEFERRAL CONTRIBUTION 
LIFETO-DATE SALARY REDUCTION CONTRH3 
2000 
$22200 
$1.997 96 
$1.00000 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
V-V-^oo 
J. Grant Moody, (6282) 
J. GRANT MOODY, P.C. 
336 West Main St. 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-4181 
Facsimile: (801)756-3940 
Attorney for Respondent 
^ 7 ) .Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION AND OTHER 
MATTERS 
Civil No. 954402034 DA 
Judge: Ray Harding, Jr. 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on March 1,2000 on Petitioner's Motion 
for Reconsideration and Other Related Matters and the Petitioner Craig Harris was present and 
represented by Loren D. Martin, of Martin & Nelson, P.C. and the Respondent Bonnie Harris 
was present and represented by J. Grant Moody, of J. Grant Moody, P.C, and the parties having 
reached a panial stipulation as recited to the Court and the Court, having reviewed the pleadings 
and heard argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the 
following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. The Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is granted as set forth herein. 
2. The parties have agreed that the Respondent shall have until March 15,2000 to select 
and remove what personal property she desires to have from the building located on the Pleasant 
Grove lot. The Petitioner shall remove the remaining personal property he desires out of the 
building on or before March 30,2000. Any personal property left in the building after March 30, 
2000 shall be the property of the Respondent. The Petitioner shall pay $5,000.00 to the 
Respondent on or before April 4, 2000, for the personal property located in his personal 
possession and from the personal property received from the building located on the Pleasant 
Grove lot. The Respondent shall provide access to the building at the lot to the Petitioner from 
March 16, through March 30,2000 upon the Petitioner giving Respondent 24 hour notice of the 
times in which he intends on removing the property. 
3. The parties have agreed and are ordered to submit Amended Supplementary Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to reflect specific findings made by the Court at trial with 
respect to Alimony and Attorney's Fees. Said Amended Supplementary Findings are to be 
prepared by the Respondent's Attorney within 10 days from the date of this hearing. 
4. The Court clarifies it decision made at trial regarding the temporary support and debt 
service payments made by the Petitioner to the Respondent after the Decree of Divorce was 
entered and prior to trial and the entry of the Supplementary Findings and Supplementary Decree 
in this matter. The Spousal support and debt service payments made by the Petitioner to the 
Respondent after the Decree of Divorce was entered and made prior to trial were duly considered 
at trial by the Court in its decision to terminate alimony and in not awarding Respondent any 
attorney's fees, Norman/Loebbecke fees or other costs. 
5. The Petitioner is permitted to pay the amount of $28,016.00, representing the amount 
2 
owing on the Bank One line of credit Account # 4262 0264 0104 2999 secured by the Pleasant 
Grove Residence, and subtract said sum of $28,016.00 from the amount the Petitioner owes to 
the Respondent of $53,313.75 as set forth in the Supplementary Decree of Divorce, Paragraph 
DATED this / day offf/faffe 2000. 
:OURT: 
Approved as to Form: 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /V^day of March, 2000, I faxed and mailed a copy by US 
Postal Service, postage prepaid, the foregoing Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration and Other 
Related Matters to: 
Loren D. Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
P.O. Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. Grant Moony 
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05 12/00 FRI 16:15 FAX 801 ", 6819 
C Crime Repoi R e p o r t D a t e : 0 3 - 0 4 - 0 0 
PLEASANT GROVE POL1 121003 
PLEASANT GROVE P.D. 
Report ID: 269335.A46 
DR# 00P0549 
IN# 269335 
CODE - OFFENSE DESCRIPTION 
2S10 Daaufcg* P r o p e r t y - P r i v a t e 
Weapon, Force cr Means used-
Apparent Motive-
Location of Occurrence-
725 E ORCHARD 
OCC. ON: 
OR BTWN: 
EPORTED: 
Date 
02-16-00 
03-04-00 
03-04-00 
Time 
21; 00 
14:00 
SourceI F Fi*i<a 
Connecting reports-
Investigative divisions, units, persons notified-
ADDITIONAL PEOPLE INVOLVED 
CODES: S=Suspact, V=Victim, W-V!ltQeas, C-Conplainant, F-Father, M-Mother 
1 1115; f f t ^Mr 8 . CSZ: Pi* GROVE,OT 84062 AKA; . Sex; HP: testify: 12-3:6^ 43 Aget-S6 P Race: W Eth. tr 801 785-518^ WP: 
J Kama: HARRIS, SCOTT Addr: CSZ: RIVERTON TJTAH 
AKAr " 
DOB: 
Sex: M 
' HP: 
Testify: 
Race: tT 
Age: OQ 
WP: -
PROPERTY DETAIL 
r Ouan Star. Article Manufacturer Modal Color/Desc Serial* 
GARAGE DOOR 
IBR Value 
34 2C0.00 
Total Stolen Property Value: .00 
> Details are as follows: 
On the afternoon of 3-4-00 I responded to 692 Juniper for a report 
a burglary. I met with Bonnie Harris who owns a storage building at 725 
:hard. She stated that someone had broken into her garage by pushing the 
rage door in, breaking it off the track. She then stated she aid not know 
anything was missing and it did not look like there was anything missing. 
Sne later tola me a neighbor left a message on her answering 
:hine a few weeks earlier, staging she saw a blue Bronco at this location 
:e at night and it lo9ked suspicious. Bonnie stated her ex-step-son also 
; a blue Bronco and did have some property in the storage garage. 
The front of the garage did have somf blue paint transfer with a 
ill dent. It appeared someone could have hit the aoor with a vehicle, 
'ever at this time, it is unknown if anyone did make entry because nothing 
>ears to have been moved or missing. 
aied to: P# Aeamt 
?# Reporting Officer(s) 
CARSON, KEVIN 
Date/Time Reproduced 
P# Asamt. 
P046 PATROL 
Rep. Off . S i g n a t u r e 
D-v/Cllc To Wliorr. 
Jomxt t o C/A A c t i v e Other Immediate F/'U ^Pending 
.05/12/00 FRI 18:19 FAI 801 785 6819 PLEASANT GROVE POLICE ®004 
/""^ Crime Re , PLEASANT GROVE P.D. t port 
DR# 00P0549 
Report Date: 03-04-00 Report ID: 269335.A46 IN# 269335 
anti/wed. . . 
This is all the information at this time. 
TabM 
MARTIN & NELSON 
A Professional Corporation 
139 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Mission Statement. Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111-1161 Mailing Address 
To Protect The Famih ™ Telephone" (801) 538-0066 Post Office Box 11590 
Telefax (801)538-0073 Salt Lake Citv. Utah 84147-0590 
ldmlaw@utw.com 
FAX & US MAIL—URGENT 
March 22, 2000 
J. Grant Moody 
336 West Main Street 
American Fork, UT 84003 
RE: Harris v. Harris, Case No. 954402034 
Dear Mr. Moody: 
Two days ago when we spoke in the afternoon on the telephone there was substantial 
disagreement and our clients' positions appeared to be at loggerheads. I then telephoned your 
office yesterday morning, leaving a message with your secretary to see if some matters might be 
resolved. This letter is sent in what may be a last ditch effort to resolve disputes before the 
hearing tomorrow. At least before the hearing we should be able to agree as to what remains in 
dispute. Pursuing that purpose I have made the following list. Please respond as to whether you 
agree, disagree, or wish to add to the list. 
1. Craig's Life Insurance Policy. I understand that it is Bonnie's claim that the Order 
granted her more than the value of Craig's life insurance policy and retirement fund as of 
the January 1999 Order. It appears that Bonnie claims that she was granted "title" and 
the value of both items upon the date of transfer rather that as of January 1999. As 
evidence of her claim Bonnie has made demand against Mony Life Insurance for transfer 
of the incidents of ownership of the life insurance to herself. 
The policy has a face amount of $150,000.00. In my morning telephone conversation 
with you two days ago you acknowledged that Bonnie was only entitled to the cash value 
of the policy as of the date of the January 1999 Order. I am suspecting that your position 
on that still holds. However, Bonnie has apparently persisted in her claim that the 
Court's Order entitled her to own and be the beneficiary of the insurance upon Craig's 
life. In an attempt to clarify that matter I personally spoke to a Cheryl Smith at Mony 
yesterday, telephone number 315-477-4493. Ms. Smith confirmed that she is holding 
Bonnie's demand for transfer of title. 
It must be noted that Bonnie no longer has any insurable interest against Craig's life. 
Further, should he lose this policy he may not be insurable. 
Craig\s Proposed Resolution: This office has requested that Mony Life Insurance provide 
the "interpolated terminal reserve value" of the policy as of the date of the January 1999 
Order. Immediately upon receipt of that information Craig will both borrow such amount 
from the policy and deliver that amount to you as Bonnie's counsel. In the alternative 
Craig will transfer such cash amount to you. Bonnie is not entitled to hold title to an 
insurance policy on Craig's life. Bonnie is entitled to the money to be immediately 
delivered. Please note that there is no other option. The January 1999 Order may not be 
interpreted in any other way. Under long standing insurance practice and law no person 
may obtain a life insurance against the death of another in absence of a demonstrable 
"insurable interest." 
Please immediately advise of your client's decision as to how she wants the money paid. 
2. Craig's Retirement Fund, IRA: Our understanding is that we also had your assent that 
Bonnie is entitled to the value of the IRA as of the date of the January 1999 Order. 
However, since the January Order this matter has been continued through lengthy 
process. During the last year the value has naturally increased and Craig has continued to 
make contributions until the date your client would accept a full cash payment of the 
value that was part of the Court's Findings in the January 1999 Order. At no time during 
the past year has Bonnie been willing to accept any cash payment nor has there been any 
request. 
Craig's Proposed Resolution: Should Bonnie be willing to accept full cash payment of 
the value of the IRA in accordance with the January 1999 Order, Craig will deliver that 
amount to you as Bonnie's counsel. 
Please immediately advise of your client's decision as to how she wants the money paid. 
3. Items Taken from the Storage Facility: You will recall that at the last hearing Bonnie 
represented to the Court that she needed certain tools and items from the Storage Facility 
that were required to maintain the house and yard. In response to that request the Judge 
ordered that Bonnie would have until the 15th last to remove those items and that Craig 
would have from the 15th until the 30th. It is true that the Judge and your proposed order 
do exactly state the words that she may "remove what personal property she desires." 
However, that Order must be taken in context and and in compliance with the spirit and 
intent of the Court's Order. 
Both Bonnie and Scott were present when two Pleasant Grove Police Officers came to 
investigate Bonnie's report that the Storage Facility had been recently burglarized and 
Scott was informed that Bonnie had accused him. 
Scott asked Bonnie why she would take everything that she knew belonged to him. Her 
response was that there were so many people helping her take things that she didn't know 
everything that was taken but that she had told them to just take everything. Bonnie told 
Scott that she just didn't know what was taken. 
During our morning telephone conversation two days ago you said that Bonnie took all 
the things that she thought belonged to Craig. Bonnie and the person or persons helping 
her took everything—even the heavy commercial freestanding steel shelving, a large 
stack of commercial shelving parts, air compressors, bolt bins, etc. She also took all the 
personal property located in the boat and the large fifth-wheel camper. After our 
morning telephone conversation 1 personally went to view the site. The only thing of any 
value that had not been taken was the large and heavy steel gun safe kept in the back 
room. But Bonnie took everything; even the baseball card collection previously kept on 
the very top of that gun safe was taken. With the exception of one fishing tackle box and 
contents of about S300 value, the safe, Scott's Jeep and other Utah registered and serial 
numbered items—Bonnie took everything. Why? 
When I again telephoned you two days ago in the afternoon to report, you surprisingly 
acknowledged that Bonnie had taken everything and that she would not return anything 
unless Craig first provided a list. Bonnie was demanding a list of what Craig wanted 
returned and proof of ownership. Given that there had been a burglary then Bonnie 
would see what items she could possibly return. That position is not in compliance with 
the spirit and intent of the Court Order. That position is also in direct opposition to your 
own written proposed order. 
Your written proposed Order states that Craig is to pay Bonnie $5,000.00, "for the 
personal property located in his personal possession and from the personal property 
received from the building located on the Pleasant Grove lot." 
My client's position is that Bonnie has stolen property of value as to which she had 
knowledge and thereby has obtained or continues to exercise unauthorized control over 
property of another with intent to deprive another thereof. 
Craig believes that in an attempt to cover herself, Bonnie provided false information to 
the Pleasant Grove Police Department, claiming that the Storage Facility had been 
recently burglarized. Bonnie then made the specific accusation to the Police that Scott 
Harris had committed the burglary. There is no indication that Bonnie made any 
inventory or list of what was taken. 
In our conversation of the afternoon of two days ago you acknowledged that Bonnie had 
taken all items that she thought belonged to Craig. You also said that she not only took 
the large boat and the fifth-wheel camping unit but that she had taken all personal 
property items that she determined were in any manner associated with the boat and fifth-
wheel and that Bonnie would "fight us" on that point. 
Craig's Proposed Resolution: It is a criminal offense to provide false information to a law 
enforcement officer. It is also a criminal offense to knowingly and unlawfully obtain or 
exercise unauthorized control over property of another. Please refer to the criminal code 
for definitional phrases associated with "theft." 
Of course it is understood that in a domestic dispute there is rancor but that leeway given 
in domestic matters does not excuse knowing criminal misconduct. Please be advised 
that this office stands prepared to counter all of Bonnie's accusations against Scott and 
Bonnie's accusations of burglary of the Storage Facility—beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Consequently, in our telephone conversation two days ago and by this formal letter, 
demand is made that all items removed be immediately returned without reservation and 
that Bonnie inform the Pleasant Grove Police Department that any allegation she made of 
a burglary was false. Craig does not intend at this time to pursue criminal prosecution 
against Bonnie and those who aided or encouraged the crime she committed and the 
accusation Bonnie has made against his son. Hopefully, this matter can yet be more 
pleasantly resolved. 
Please immediately respond in writing as to your client's position. Hopefully this entire matter 
can be resolved before the hearing tomorrow. Can this matter be finally settled before court 
tomorrow? It is sincerely hoped that neither this letter nor any other matters need to be brought 
again before the Court. Please respond prior to 5:00 PM today. 
Sincerely, 
Lorfcn D. Martin 
Attorney at Law 
pc: Craig Harris 
Scott Harris 
TabN 
J. Grant Moody, U.S.B. #6282 
Charles A. Schultz, U.S.B. #4760 
AJtorney for Bonnie K Harris 
P.O. Box 564 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 530-5636 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, : ORDER ON CONTEMPT 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Petitioner, : 
BONNIE HARRIS, : Civil No 954402034 DA 
Respondent. 'i"iir",' Kr HMUJIM1 'I 
—oooOooo— 
The Evidentiary Hearing on the Respondent's Motion for ari Order 
to Show Cause why the Petitioner should not be held in contempt for 
violating this Court's orders set forth in the Supplemental Decree ui 
Divorc- ..-'- • November 28, 1999 and tne Order Per-Motion for 
Reconsideration and Other Matters, \ ht.-1i ei nafi. er, "t-h*=> Order c:r> Motion 
to Reconsider") dated April 4, /000 came on for regularly scheduled 
hearing on •.. , 2000, before the Honorable Judge Ray M. Harding Jr. 
at 1:30 p.m. in the Fourth District Court, Provo, Utah, room 302. The 
Petitioner was present at the Hearing and was represented by his 
counsel of record Loren Martin• The Respondent was present and 
represented by her counsel J. Grant Moody and Charles A. Schultz. 
The Respondent and Petitioner made opening statements and 
thereafter evidence was taken by the Court* The Court having heard 
and considered the opening statements, having heard and considered the 
testimony of the witness and having reviewed and considered the 
exhibits admitted into evidence at the Hearing and now being fully 
advised as to the facts finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the Petitioner willfully disobeyed the 
Court's orders with full notice and the ability to comply. 
2. The Court finds that the Petitioner's contempt is evidenced 
by his statement in court; and the Court accepts Mrs. Harris version. 
3. The Court finds the Petitioner's contempt is evidenced by 
his letter he sent which indicates his refusal to pay unless certain 
conditions of his were met* 
4. The Court finds the Petitioner's contempt is evidenced by 
his failure to comply with the Court's orders. 
-2-
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the Court's Findings of Fact and application of the 
applicable law to those facts, the Court rules as a matter of law that 
the Petitioner is in contempt of court• 
ORDER REGARDING CONTEMPT 
Based on the Court's Findings of Feu;t .-mc " ..nciurions --'i ."a* the 
Court accepts the Respondent's position on each of the items as 
outlined her Evidentiary Hearing Brief provided to the Court and, 
therefore, hereby orders, adjudges and decrees as follows: 
1, The Respondent is entitled to have the 1976 Sea Ray boat and 
trailer, listed •. Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, 
transferred to her either by title or bill of sale, it 5 t it i* cannot 
be provided. 
2, The _2,teiw*sl Medical Stock, lifted on Schedule A of the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce and evidenced by certificate number 
1025 representing 4,350 shares of Interwest Medical Stock, shall be 
provided to the Respondent purs uan u 01 oaraQ raph number 18 of the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce. 
3, The MONY life insurance account, listed on Schedule A of the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, account n\ 3 mber 1347-24-19W, shall be 
provided to the Respondent pursuant to paragraph number 18 oi the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce. 
-3-
4. The deed to the Vernal property, listed on Schedule A of the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, shall be provided to the Respondent/ 
or $5,000.00 shall be paid to her if title to the property cannot be 
given free and clear, as demonstrated by a warranty deed or title 
insurance. 
5. The $5,000.00 payment for the personal property, listed on 
Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, shall be provided to 
the Respondent pursuant to paragraph number 2 of the Order on the 
Motion to Reconsider. 
6. The remainder of the $53,313.75, as provided by the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce, paragraph number 17, in the amount of 
$15,297.75 shall be provided to the Respondent* 
•^ 7. Post judgment interest at $3,787.61 shall be paid to the 
Respondent. 
^ 8. The Prudential IRA, listed on Scheduled of the Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce, account # UQ-R62840, shall be provided and 
transferred to the Respondent, with the money taken out and 
transferred to account # UQ-R82581 returned or redeposited into 
account #UQ-R62840. 
9, Attorney's fees shall be paid to the Respondent in 
connection with these proceedings- Counsel for the Respondent shall 
submit affidavits setting forth the amount of those reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
-4-
10. The Petitioner shall have two weeks, until June 14, 20CC, tc 
purge his contempt by full compliance with all items, inducing 
payment of attorney's fees. 
11. A sentencing date is set for June 21, 2000 at 10:30 £.m. 
12 If there is full compliance the hearing can be canceled by a 
stipulation of the parties that there has been full compliance and 
that the contempt has been purged. Otherwise, the sentencing will 
occur. 
13. If full compliance has not occurred, the Court will enter a 
sentence and it will be a forthwith sentence. 
14. The Petitioner is ordered to personally i,e Litit:/. d1: '• t 
sentencing. 
Dated this day of June 2 000. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING JR. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form; 
June , 2 000. 
Loren Martin 
Attorney for Petitioner 
-5-
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^Prudent ia l 
201 Sou* Mi* 5t*fi S o ^ t t 
P.0.fei«H 
April 28, 2000 
Mi Craig Hams 
r : west 9400 south 
Sandy, UT 8407C 
Dear Mr Harris, 
As per your request, a* of March 29,2000, in your Prudential Securities account, 0UQ-
R62840, caih in the amount of $4, W3.00 has been available for transfer to new custodian. 
Transfer forms mmt bc;wbmmed by the receiving firm; accompanied by a Divorce Decrpe 
and appcopcute signatures. 
Sincerely, 
]^yr 
Dancl Trust 
Branch Manager 
Prudential Securities Incorporated 
TabP 
Charles A. Schultz 
u JL ATTORNEY AT LAW 
J » P.O. Box 654 ^ p ? 
W Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 ^ 
' Telephone (801)530-5636 * 
me 5, 2000 
oren Martin 
[artin & Nelson 
39 East South Temple 
uite 400 
alt Lake I it\, Utah K4i 
e: Contempt of Craig Harris 
>eai Mi M tin in: 
I am mailing you the proposed order on Mr. Harris' Contempt Hearing, J. Grant Moody's affidavit of 
ttorney's fees and my affidavit of costs and attorney's fees with this letter. Additionally, for clarification, I will 
utline in this letter the things Mr. Harris must do by June 14, 2000 to purge himself of his contempt. If you do 
ot agree with any of these items, please contact either J. Grant Moody or me. ¥ou can also contact Chris, 
udge Harding's law clerk, at the Fourth District Court to view the tape of the Evidentiary Hearing to verify the 
orrectness of any items in the proposed order. Chris can be contacted at 801.429.1077. 
1. Mr Harris must provide Mrs. Harris with some proof of ownership of the Sea Ra> boat and 
railer, identified on Schedule A of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, and some form of acceptable transfer of 
ownership of the boat and trailer to Mrs. Harris. If in fact boats were not titled when Mr. Harris allegedly 
purchased the boat and trailer, then ownership of the boat would have been evidenced by registration of the boat 
n Mr. Harris' name. Please provide us with the last valid registration on the boat, title to the trailer (trailers 
vere titled in 1976) and a copy of the bill of sale for the sale of the boat to Mr Harris 
2. Mr. Harris will also need to provide us with signed, notarized releases of any claim of interest 
vhatsoever in the Interwest Medical stock from Troy Harris, Scott Harris and Louise Harris. Additionally, he 
vill need to provide us with the signed and notarized documents transferring certificate #1025 and the 4,350 
>hares of Interwest Medical stock the certificate represents to Mrs Harris 
3. Mr. Harris will need to provide us with signed notarized documents transferring ownership of the 
VIONY life insurance policy to Mrs. Harris. The transfer documents must specify that ownership of the entire 
policy and all amounts in the policy are being transferred to Mrs. Harris, not just a specified dollar value. 
However, because the cash surrender value of the MONY account has decreased" due to Mr. Harris' failure to 
pay the policy premiums and Mrs. Harris has been prejudiced bv his failure and refusal to transfer ownership of 
the account in a timely manner Mr. Harris will have to pay Mrs Harris the difference in the cash surrender value 
of the MONY account on November 28, 1999 and the cash surrender value as of the date he transfers the 
account to her. The November 28, 1999 and the cash surrender value was $21,041.36. 
4. Mr. Harris will need to provide Mrs. Harris with a cashier's check in the amount of $5,000.00 for 
the Vernal property. From your representations to the Court at the May 31, 2000 hearing, it is clear Mrs. Bench 
is claiming ownership of the property and Mr. Harris has no valid deed to the property. 
5. Mr. Harris will need to provide Mrs. Harris with a cashier's check in the amount of $5,000.00 for 
the personal property in his possession and for the personal property he and his sons removed from the storage 
shed on orchard Drive. 
6. Mr. Harris will need to provide Mrs. Harris with a cashier's check in the amount of $15,297 75 
for the remainder of the $53,313,75 he owes her pursuant to the provisions of paragraph #17 of the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce. 
7. Mr. Harris will have to sign the notarized documents necessary to transfer all of the money he 
removed from the Prudential ERA, account #UQ-R62840 to account # UQ-R82581 or any other account back to 
#UQ-R62840. Thereafter, he will need to sign notarized documents necessary to transfer account #UQ-R62840 
to Mrs. Harris. 
8. Mr. Harris will need to provide Mrs. Harris with a cashier's check injhgjamountx£$3?7 87.61 
for the interest on the amounts he owes Mrs, Harris through May 31, 2000^Additionally, Mr. Harris^ill need to 
pay Mrs. Harris interest in the amount of $11.82 per day until all of tl^eiransfers and payments have been 
completed. Please keep in mind that interest is statutory and mandatory, it can not be waived, stayed or lowered, 
and it applies to the total judgment. 
9. Mr. Harris will need to pay all of Mrs. Hanps attorney's fees^ of $10,769.00 in full by Jun^H, 
2000. These fees must also be paid by a cashier's check. 
Please feel free to call either Mr. Moody of me if you n&^ag^questio^s. 
Sincerely: 
r 
Charles A. Schultz 
CAS/lbk 
cc: Bonnie Harris 
J. Grant Moody 
/ : . 
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MARTIN & NELSON 
A Professional Corporation 
Loren D.Martin (2101) 
Mail: PO Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590 
Street: 139 E. South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsmilie: (801) 538-0073 
Counsel for Mr. Harris 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COT T1^T v S T A T F OF I T AH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Respondent: 
SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE 
OF COMPI IANCE 
Case No. 95-44-02034DA 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
The Petitioner files this SUPPLEMENTAL CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE for the 
records of the Court in compliance w ifli the ( Hxlcr ot the (\uiit .it hearing held on April 4, 2000. 
1. Subsequent to filing the CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE a letter, raising a 
question as to the proof of transfer ol Ihc YVi iml real property to Bonnie Harris was received. 
2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof by reference is the original "Owner's 
Policy of Title Insurance" Policy Number 97098916, issued by United General Title Insurance 
Company. 
3. Said policy states that the insured is Bonnie K. Harris. 
4. The policy states that "Title to the estate or interest in the land is vested in: 
BONNIE K. HARRIS." 
5 The title held by Bonnie K. Harris is "fee simple." 
-- 1 ~ r o r»„ 
6. The real property described is ten (10) acres of land previously owned by Joan M. 
Bench, and is the land in question before the Court subject to the Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce in the above captioned case. 
7. The Order of the Court was that said land be transferred to Bonnie K. Harris. 
8. Said Policy of Title Insurance is in the amount of $5,000.00. That value is 
consistent with the value determined by the Court as set forth in the Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce. 
WHEREFORE, it is hereby again certified that Craig Harris has complied with the Order 
of the Court that required transfer of property. Neither this Certificate or any transfer shall 
constitute a waiver of any right to subsequently petition the Court for approval of an accounting 
and reimbursement of value transferred in excess of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce or 
appeal. 
Either party may submit the question of accounting, requesting an audit and report from 
Norman/Loebbecke Associates. The valuation date established in the Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce is January 26, 1999. It is anticipated that the parties may resolve questions of 
accounting without necessity of court intervention. 
DATED this 20th day of June 2000. 
MARTIN & NELSON, PC 
Counsel for Craig Harris 
/Ljfiren D. Martin^ 
\y Attorney at Law 
r>~— i ~^ o n~ 
Acknowledged as Received: 
•J. Grant Moody 
Counool foi Duuiiii I Ion is 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby Certify that a copy of the within SUPPLEMENTARY CERTIFICATE OF 
COMPLIANCE was hand delivered to the offices of J. Grant Moody, 36 West Main Street, 
American Fork, UT 84003 on June 20, 2000. 
y^2^ <o 
n D. Martin 
P a ere* *\ r\f ^ Paar*=»c 
OWNER'S POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE 
Issued by Policy O 
UNITED GENERAL N°- 97098916 
TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS FROM COVERAGE 
CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS, UNITED GENERAL TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Louisiana corporation, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in 
Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A, sustained or incurred 
by the insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested other than as stated therein; 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on the title; 
3. Unmarketability of the title; 
4. Lack of a right of access to and from the land. 
The Company also will pay the costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in defense of the title, as insured, 
but only to the extent provided in the Conditions and Stipulations. 
This policy shall not be valid or binding until countersigned by either a duly authorized agent or representative 
of the Company and Schedule A and B have been attached hereto. 
In Witness Whereof, United General Title Insurance Company has caused its corporate name to be hereunto 
affixed by its duly authorized officers as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A. 
UNITED GENERAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
<Z&&b~irir \ ) Presic sident 
y^pzz&A^ 
Secretary 
Countersigned. 
Authorized Officer or Agent 
} "LUSIOIN5 KKUIVl t U Y L J V A U I . 
olio wing matters arc expressly excluded from the covers^ of this policy and 
lpany will not pay loss or damage, costs, attorneys' fees o expenses which 
reason of: 
ny law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including bu. a limited to 
I and zoning laws, ordinances, or regulations) restricting, regulaui prohibiting 
ing to (i) the occupancy, use, or enjoyment of the land; (ii) th character, 
ion or location of any improvement now or hereafter erected on th*. ]and; (iii) 
ation in ownership or a change in the dimensions or area of the la; or any 
)f which the land is or was a part; or (iv) environmental protection, or U effect 
violation of these laws, ordinances or governmental regulations, except o the 
that a notice of the enforcement thereof or a notice of a defect, lie. or 
brance resulting from a violation or alleged violation affecting the land has 
zcorded in the public records at Date of Policy. 
ny governmental police power not excluded by (a) above, except to the extent 
notice of the exercise thereof or a notice of a defect, lien or encumbrance 
ng from a violation or alleged violation affecting the land has been recorded in 
blic records at Date of Policy. 
hts of eminent domain unless notice of the exercise thereof has been recorded 
public records at Date of Policy, but not excluding from coverage any taking 
has occurred prior to Date of Policy which would be binding on the rights of 
ihaser for value without knowledge. 
CONDITIONS AND 
FINITION OF TERMS. 
following terms when used in this policy mean: 
'insured": the insured named in Schedule A, and , subject to any rights or 
ses the Company would have had against the named insured, those who succeed 
; interest of the named insured by operation of law as distinguished from 
iase including, but not limited to, heirs, distributees, devisees, survivors, 
>nal representatives, next of kin, or corporate or fiduciary successors, 
'insured claimant*': an insured claiming loss or damage, 
''knowledge" or "known**: actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge or 
e which may be imputed to an insured by reason of the public records as defined 
is policy or any other records which impart constructive notice of matters 
ting the land. 
"land**: the land described or referred to in Schedule A or C, and improvements 
>ed thereto which by law constitute real property. The term "land** does not 
jde any property beyond the lines of the area described or referred to in Schedule 
r C, nor any right, title, interest, estate or easement in abutting streets, roads, 
lues, alleys, lanes, ways or waterways, but nothing herein shall modify or limit 
extent to which a right of access to and from the land is insured by this policy, 
i "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trustdeed, or other security instrument 
"public records": records established under state statutes at Date of Policy for 
purpose of imparting constructive notice of matters relating to real property to 
chasers for value and without knowledge. With respect to Section 1 (aXiv) of the 
fusions From Coverage, "public records" shall also include environmental 
tection liens filed in the records of the clerk of the United States district court for 
district in which the land is located. 
;) "unmarketability of the title": an alleged or apparent matter affecting the title 
he land, not excluded or excepted from coverage, which would entitle a purchaser 
the estate or interest described in Schedule A to be released from the obligation to 
rchase by virtue of a contractual condition requiring the delivery of marketable 
e. 
CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE AFTER CONVEYANCE OF TITLE. 
lie coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy in favor of 
insured only so long as the insured retains an estate or interest in the land, or holds 
i indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given by a purchaser from 
e insured, or only so long as the insured shall have liability by reason of covenants 
warranty made by the insured in any transfer or conveyance of the estate or interest 
[lis policy shall not continue in force in favor of any purchaser from the insured of 
ther (i) an estate or interest in the land, or (ii) an indebtedness secured by a purchase 
loney mortgage given to the insured. 
. NOTICE OF CLAIM TO BE GIVEN BY INSURED CLAIMANT. 
The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing (i) in case of any litigation 
i set forth in Section 4(a) below, (ii) in case knowledge shall come to an insured 
ereunder of any claim of title or interest which is adverse to the title to the estate or 
nterest, as insured, and which might cause loss or damage for which the Company 
nay be liable by virtue of this policy, or (iii) if title to the estate or interest, as insured, 
s rejected as unmarketable. If prompt notice shall not be given to the Company, then 
is to the insured all liability of the Company shall terminate with regaid to the matter 
x matters for which prompt notice is required; provided, however, that failure to 
notify the Company shall in no case prejudice the rights of ar insured under mis 
- i — .u. o «„,„ .Kan x* nreiudiced bv the failure and then only to the 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, auverse claims or other matters: 
(a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant; 
(b) not known to the Company, not recorded in the public records at Date of Policy, 
but known to the insured claimant and not disclosed in writing to the Company by the 
insured claimant prior to the date the insured claimant became an insured under this 
policy; 
(c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant; 
(d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy; or 
(e) resulting in loss or damage which would not have been sustained if the insured 
claimant had paid value for the estate or interest insured by this policy. 
4. Any claim, which arises out of the transaction vesting in the Insured the estate or 
interest insured by this policy, by reason of the operation of federal bankruptcy, itate 
insolvency, or similiar creditors' rights laws, that is based on: 
(a) the transaction creating the estate or interest insured by this policy being 
deemed a fraudulent conveyance or fraudulent transfer, or 
(b) the transaction creating the estate or interest insured by this policy being 
deemed a preferential transfer except where the preferential transfer results 
from the failure: 
(i) to timely record the instrument or transfer, or 
(ii) of such recordation to impart notice to purchaser for value or a 
judgement or lien creditor. 
STIPULATIONS 
4. DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION OF ACTIONS: DUTY OF INSURED 
CLAIMANT TO COOPERATE. 
(a) Upon written request by the insured and subject to the options contained in 
Section 6 of these Conditions and Stipulations, the Company, at its own cost and 
without unreasonable delay, shall provide for the defense of an insured in litigation 
in which any third party asserts a claim adverse to the title or interest as insured, but 
only as to those stated causes of action alleging a defect, lien or encumbrance or other 
matter insured against by this policy. The Company shall have the right to select 
counsel of its choice (subject to the right of the insured to object for reasonable cause) 
to represent the insured as to those stated causes of action and shall not be liable for 
and will not pay the fees of any other counsel. The Company will not pay any fees, 
costs or expenses incurred by the insured in the defense of those causes of action 
which allege matters not insured against by this policy. 
(b) The Company shall have the right, at its own cost, to institute and prosecute any 
action or proceeding or to do any other act which in its opinion may be necessary or 
desirable to establish the title to the estate or interest, as insured, or to prevent or 
reduce loss or damage to the insured. The Company may take any appropriate action 
under the terms of this policy, whether or not it shall be liable hereunder, and shall 
not thereby concede liability or waive any provision of this policy. If the Company 
shall exercise its rights under this paragraph, it shall do so diligently. 
(c) Whenever the Company shall have brought an action or interposed a defense as 
required or permitted by the provisions of this policy, the Company may pursue any 
litigation to final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction and expressly 
reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to appeal from any adverse judgment or order. 
(d) In all cases where this policy permits or requires the Company to prosecute or 
provide for the defense of any action or proceeding, the insured shall secure to the 
Company the right to so prosecute or provide defense in the action or proceeding, and 
all appeals therein, and permit the Company to use, at its option, the name of the 
insured for this purpose. Whenever requested by the Company, the insured, at the 
Company's expense, shall give the Company all reasonable aid (i) in any action or 
proceeding, securing evidence, obtaining witnesses, prosecuting or defending the 
action or proceeding, or effecting settlement, and (ii) in any other lawful act which 
in the opinion of the Company may be necessary or desirable to establish the title to 
the estate or interest as insured. If the Company is prejudiced by the failure of the 
insured to furnish the required cooperation, the Company's obligations to the insured 
under the policy shall terminate, including any liability or obligation to defend, 
prosecute, or continue any litigation, with regard to the matter or matters requiring 
such cooperation. 
5. PROOF OF LOSS OR DAMAGE. 
In addition to and after the notices required under Section 3 of these Conditions and 
Stipulations have been provided the Company, a proof of lots or damage signed and 
sworn to by the insured claimant shall be furnished to the Company within 90 days 
after the insured claimant shall ascertain the facts giving rite to the lots or damage. 
The proof of lots or damage shall describe the defect in, or lien or encumbrance on 
the title, or other matter insured against by this policy which constitutes the basis of 
lots or damage and shall state, to the extent possible, the basis of calculating the 
amount of the lots or damage. If the Company is prejudiced by the failure of the 
insured claimant to provide the required proof of loss or damage, the Company's 
obligations to the insured under the policy shall terminate, including any liability or 
obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation, with regard to the matter 
UHITED GENERAL TITLE IHSURAMC* COMPAHY 
OWNER'S POLICY 
SCHEDULE A 
Policy No.: Effective Date of Policy: Premium: Amount of Insurance: 
97098916 June 20, 2000 at 9:11 A.M. $200.00 $5,000.00 
Commitment No.: Simultaneous Issue with: Reissue of Policy: No.: Reissue 
Policy: 
00V9542U Amount of 
Insurance: Company Name: 
1. Name of Insured: 
BONNIE K. HARRIS 
2. The estate or interest in the land described in this Schedule and which is 
covered by this policy: 
FEE SIMPLE 
3 . T i t l e t o the e s t a t e or i n t e r e s t in the land i s ves ted i n : 
BONNIE K. HARRIS 
4 . The land referred t o in t h i s p o l i c y i s s i tuated i n the S ta te of Utah, 
County of UINTAH and i s described as fol lows or in Schedule C. 
The Northeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of 
Sect ion 22, Township 6 South, Range 19 East, Sa l t Lake Base 6 Meridian. 
Authorized countersignature 
Valid only i f attached to ALTA Ovraer's POLICY - (4-6-90) and Schedule B - of United General T i t l e 
Insurance Company 
ALTA Owner's Pol icy(4-6-90) 
UGT Form 352 
Prepared atx Town & Country Title, Inc. 
P.O. Box 1530 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
UNITED GENERAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
OWNER'S POLICY 
SCHEDULE B 
EXCEPTIONS FROM COVERAGE 
Policy No.: 97098916 
This policy does not Insure against loss or damage and the Company will not pay 
costs, attorney's fees or expenses which arise by reason of: 
1. The lien of the General Taxes for the year 2000 and thereafter which are 
not yet due and payable. 
2. Any lien, or right to a lien for services, labor or material heretofore or 
hereafter furnished, imposed by law and not shown by the public records. 
3. Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records. 
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, encroachments, 
easements, variations in area or content, party walls and/or any 
facts that a correct survey and/or physical inspection of he 
premises would disclose. 
5. All assessments and taxes for the year 2000 and all subsequent years. 
6. Taxes for the year 2000 and thereafter. Serial No. 07-010-0006 (1). (Taxes 
for the year 1999 in the amount of $30.75 have been paid). 
7. Said property is included within the boundaries of The Uintah Water 
Conservancy District, The Central Utah Water Conservancy District, The 
Uintah Recreation Special Service District, Uintah County District and 
The Uintah County Mosquito Abatement District assessments for which are 
collected with the general taxes. 
8. Any service, installation, connection, maintenance or construction charges 
for sewer, water, electricity, or garbage collection or disposal or other 
utilities unless shown as an existing lien by the public records. 
9. All oil, gas, mineral and pertaining easement rights or other matters 
relating thereto, whether expressed or implied. 
10. The land described in Schedule A hereof does not from on a publicly 
dedicated road. THE COMPANY DOES NOT INSURE A LEGAL RIGHT OP ACCESS 
FOR INGRESS AND EGRESS TO SAID LAND. 
11. Rights of Way for any roads, ditches, canals or transmission lines 
now existing over, under or across said land. 
12. Reservations in the Patent from the United States to Eiren Ray 
Kimball, recorded January 20, 1927 in Book 26 at page 91 of official 
records as follows: EXCEPTING and reserving also to the United 
States all oil and gas in the lands so patented, and to it, or 
persons authorized by it, the right to prospect for, mine, and 
remove such deposits from the same upon compliance with the 
conditions and subject to the provisions and limitations of the Act 
of July 12, 1914 (38 Stat.509). 
This entry is made under Section 29 of the Act of February 25, 1920 
(41 Stat. 437) and the patent is issued subject to the rights of 
prior permittees or lessees to use so much of the surface of the 
South half of the Northeast quarter of said Section Twenty-two, as 
is required for mining operations, without compensation to the 
patentee for damages resulting from proper mining operations. 
Valid only if attached to ALTA Owner's POLICY -(4-6-90) and Schedule A - of United General Title 
Insurance Company. 
ALTA Owner's Policy-(4-6-901 
CTION 22, 
1W. k' <nte 
N>\. IKJC 
80Ac. 
k' \K Uu 
o o o l 
-to Jc. / r 
<*6 
lo 
I* 
P 2 
r
*~act SO 
0004 
/0 /t*. 
0O&4 
A V O M U I L.. UJ 
TikU JSHMK 
JU^a******'* ~nJf 
N r^  S* 
oocs 
d ^ M U l_. UJrt I, c 
\ 
Conditions and^Stlpulations (Continued) 
Edition, the Insured claimant may reasonably be required to submit to examination Insurance stated in Schedule A 
r oath by any authorized representative of the Company and shall produce for 
unation, inspection and copying, at such reasonable times and places as may be 
jnited by any authorized representative of the Company, all records, books, 
crs, checks, correspondence and memoranda, whether bearing a date before or 
Date of Policy, which reasonably pertain to the loss or damage. Further, if 
ested by any authorized representative of (he Company, the insured claimant 
[ grant its permission, in writing, for any authorized representative of the 
ipany to examine, inspect and copy all records, books, ledgers, checks, 
espondence and memoranda in the custody or control of a third party, which 
onably pertain to the loss or damage. All information designated as confidential 
tie insured claimant provided to the Company pursuant to this Section shall not 
lisclosed to others unless, in the reasonable judgment of the Company, it is 
sssary in the administration of the claim. Failure of the insured claimant to submit 
examination under oath, produce other reasonably requested information or grant 
nission to secure reasonably necessary information from third parties as required 
us paragraph shall terminate any liability of the Company under this policy as to 
claim. 
OPTIONS TO PAY OR OTHERWISE SETTLE CLAIMS: TERMINATION 
LIABILITY. 
case of a claim under this policy, the Company shall have the following additional 
ions: 
) To Pay or Tender Payment of the Amount of Insurance. 
3 pay or tender payment of the amount of insurance under this policy together with 
r costs, attorneys* fees and expenses incurred by the insured claimant, which were 
horized by the Company, up to the time of payment or tender of payment and which 
Company is obligated to pay. 
pon the exercise by the Company of this option, ail liability and obligations to the 
ured under this policy, other than to make the payment required, shall terminate, 
:luding any liability or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation, 
d the policy shall be surrendered to the Company for cancellation. 
:>) To Pay or Otherwise Settle With Parties Other than the Insured or With the 
sured Claimant 
i) to pay or otherwise settle with other parties for or in the name of an insured 
limant any claim insured against under this policy, together with any costs, 
orneys* fees and expenses incurred by the insured claimant which were authorized 
' the Company up to the time of payment and which the Company is obligated to 
»y;or 
ii) to pay or otherwise settle with the insured claimant the loss or damage provided 
>r under this policy, together with any costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred 
f the insured claimant which were authorized by the Company up to the time of 
iyment and which the Company is obligated to pay. 
Upon the exercise by the Company of either of the options provided for in 
aragraphs (b)(i) or (ii), the Company's obligations to the insured under this policy 
w the claimed loss or damage, other than the payments required to be made, shall 
irminate, including any liability or obligation to defend, prosecute or continue any 
tigation. 
. DETERMINATION, EXTENT OF LIABILITY AND COINSURANCE. 
This policy is a contract of indemnity against actual monetary loss or damage 
ustained or incurred by the insured claimant who has suffered loss or damage by 
eason of matters insured against by this policy and only to the extent herein 
lescribed. 
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall not exceed the least of: 
(i) the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A; or, 
(ii) the difference between the value of the insured estate or interest as insured and 
he value of the insured estate or interest subject to the defect, lien or encumbrance 
insured against by this policy. 
(b) In the event the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A at the Date of Policy 
is less than 80 percent of the value of the insured estate or interest, or if subsequent 
to the Date of Policy an improvement is erected on the land which increases the value 
of the insured estate or interest by at least 20 percent over the Amount of Insurance 
stated in Schedule A, then this policy is subject to the following: 
(i) where no subsequent improvement has been made, as to any partial loss, the 
Company shall only pay the loss pro rata in the proportion that the amount of 
insurance at Date of Policy bears to the total value of the insured estate or interest at 
Date of Policy; or 
(ii) where a subsequent improvement has been made, as to any partial loss, the 
Company shall only pay the pro rau in the proportion that 120 percent of the Amount 
of Insurance stated in Schedule A bears to the sum of the Amount of Insurance stated 
in Schedule A and the amount expended for the improvement 
K .Kail nnt armiv to costs, attomevs* fees and 
(c) The Company will pay only those costs, attorneys' feet and expense* incurred 
in accordance with Section 4 of these Conditions and Stipulations. 
S. APPORTIONMENT. 
If the land described in Schedule A or C consists of two or more parcels which are 
not used as a single site, and loss is established affecting one or more of the parcels 
but not all, the loss shall be computed and settled on a pro rau basis as if the amount 
of insurance under this policy was divided pro rau as to the value on Date of Policy 
of each separate parcel to the whole, exclusive of any improvements made subsequent 
to Date of Policy, unless a liability or value has otherwise been agreed upon as to each 
parcel by the Company and the insured at the time of the issuance of this policy and 
shown by an express statement or by an endorsement attached to this policy. 
•; ~* »u:- «.«„ 
9. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. 
(a) If the Company establishes the title, or removes the alleged defect, lien or 
encumbrance, or cures the lack of a right of access to or from the land, or cures the 
claim of unmarkeubility of title, all as insured, in a reasonably diligent manner by any 
method, including litigation and the completion of any appeals therefrom, it shall 
have fully performed its obligations with respect to that manner and shall not be liable 
for any loss or damage caused thereby. 
(b) In the event of any litigation, including litigation by the Company or with the 
Company's consent, the Company shall have no liability for loss or damage until 
there has been a final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and 
disposition of all appeals therefrom, adverse to the title as insured. 
(c) The Company shall not be liable for loss or damage to any insured for liability 
voluntarily assumed by the insured in settling any claim or suit without the prior 
written consent of the Company. 
10. REDUCTION OF INSURANCE: REDUCTION OR TERMINATION OF 
LIABILITY: 
All payments under this policy, except payments made for costs, attorneys' fees and 
expenses, shall reduce the amount of the insurance pro Unto. 
11. LIABILITY NONCUMULATIVE. 
It is expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this policy shall be 
reduced by any amount the Company may pay under any policy insuring a mortgage 
to which exception is taken in schedule B or to which the insured has agreed, assumed, 
or taken subject, or which is hereafter executed by an insured and which is a charge 
or lien on the esute or interest described or referred to in Schedule A, and the amount 
so paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy to the insured owner. 
12. PAYMENT OF LOSS. 
(a) No payment shall be made without producing this policy for endorsement of the 
payment unless the policy has been lost or destroyed, in which case proof of loss or 
destruction shall be furnished to the satisfaction of the Company. 
(b) When liability and the extent of loss or damage has been definitely fixed in 
accordance with these Conditions and Stipulations, the loss or damage shall be 
payable within 30 days thereafter. 
13. SUBROGATION UPON PAYMENT OR SETTLEMENT. 
(a) The Company's Right of Subrogation. 
Whenever the Company shall have settled and paid a claim under this policy, all 
right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of the insured 
claimant 
The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled to all rights and remedies which 
the insured claimant would have had against any person or property in respect to the 
claim had this policy not been issued. If requested by the Company, the insured 
claimant shall transfer to the Company all rights and remedies against any person or 
property necessary in order to perfect this right of subrogation. The insured claimant 
shall permit the Company to sue, compromise or settle in the name of the insured 
claimant and to use the name of the insured claimant in any transaction or litigation 
involving these rights or remedies. 
If a payment on account of a claim does not fully cover the loss of the insured 
claimant, the Company shall be subrogated to these rights and remedies in the 
proportion which the Company's payment bears to the whole amount of the loss. 
If loss should result from any act of the insured claimant, as stated above, that act 
shall not void this policy, but the Company, in that event, shall be required to pay only 
that part of any losses insured against by this policy which shall exceed the amount, 
if any, lost to the Company by reason of the impairment by the insured claimant of 
the Company's right of subrogation. 
(b) The Company's Right Against Non-insured Obligors. 
The Company's right of subrogation against non-insured obligors shall exist and 
shall include, without limitation, the rights of the insured to indemnities, guaranties, 
other policies of insurance or bonds, notwithstanding any terms or conditions 
contained in those instruments which provide for subrogation rights by reason of this 
Unless prohibited by applicable law, either th ompany or the insured may 
demand arbitration pursuant to the Title Insurance Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association. Arbitrable matters may include, but are not limited to, any 
controversy or claim between the Company and the insured arising out of or relating 
to this policy, any service of the Company in connection with its issuance or the 
breach of a policy provision or other obligation. All arbitrable matters when the 
Amount of Insurance is $1,000,000 or less shall be arbitrated at the option of either 
the Company or the insurecL All arbitrable matters when the Amount of Insurance 
is in excess of $1,000,000 shall be arbitrated only when agreed to by both the 
Company and the insured. Arbitration pursuant to this policy and under the Rules in 
effect on the date the demand for arbitration is made or, at the option of the insured, 
the Rules in effect at Date of Policy shall be binding upon the parties. The award may 
include attorneys* fees only if the laws of the state in which the land is located permit 
a court to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party. Judgment upon the award 
rendered by the Arbitrators) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. 
The law of the situs of the land shall apply to an arbitration under the Title Insurance 
Arbitration Rules. 
A copy of the Rules may be obtained from the Company upon request 
15. LIABILITY LIMIT1 0 THIS POLICY: POLICY ENTIRE 
CONTRACT. 
(a) This policy together with all endorsements, if any, attached hereto by the 
Company is the entire policy and contract between the insured and the Company, hi 
interpreting any provision of this policy, this policy shall be construed as a whole. 
(b) Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and which 
arises out of the status of the title to the estate or interest covered hereby or by any 
action asserting such claim, shall be restricted to this policy. 
(c) No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made except by a writing; 
endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President, a Vice President 
the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validating officer or authorized signatory of 
the Company. 
16. SEVERABILITY. 
In the event any provision of the policy is held invalid or unenforceable under 
applicable law, the policy shall be deemed not to include that provision and all other 
provisions shall remain in full force and effect 
17. NOTICE, WHERE SENT. 
All notices required to be given the Company and any statement in writing required 
to be furnished the Company shall include the number of this policy and shall be 
addressed to the Company at P.O. Box 1591, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70821. 
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MARTIN & NELSON 
A Professional Corporation 
Loren D. Martin (2101) 
Mail: PO Box 11590 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84147-0590 
Street: 139 East on South Temple. Suite 400 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
Counsel for Mr. Harris 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS 
Respondent. 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah, 84601 
BILL OF SALE OF: 
ONE 1978 Sea Ray Boat 
Case No: 95-44-02034DA 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
In accordance with the Order of the above court, Craig Jack Harris hereby transfers all 
right, title and interest in and to one 1978, 26 foot, Sea Ray Motor Boat, serial number 
SERA0852A1077-260SDA758-8, including the accompanying trailer, are hereby and forthwith 
transferred in place to Bonnie Harris. Bonnie Harris provided the serial number. Mr. Harris 
warrants title to both the boat and the trailer. It is not believed that the trailer has a serial number. 
Both the Boat and Trailer are presently in possession of Bonnie Harris. 
DATED this TS day of June, 2000 
WAT 
CraiiKfack Harris 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me on the o day of June, 2000. 
Crai (Wrapt HarriQ ^ 
s-7 
Notai 
LORE^D^ARtWotary Public / 
Salt U*£ City, Utah 84111 
My Commission Extras I 
January 27 2004 • 
MARTIN & NELSON 
A Professional Corporation 
Loren D. Martin (2101) 
Mail: PO Box 11590 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84147-0590 
Street: 139 East on South Temple. Suite 400 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066: Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
Counsel for Mr. Harris 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West. Provo, Utah, 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS 
Respondent. 
BILL OF SALE OF: 
ONE 1978 Sea Ray Boat 
Case No: 95-44-02034DA 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS. 
County of Utah ) 
I, Garth Thurgood, being first duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. Approximately eight (8) years ago I sold and transferred one 1978, 26 foot, Sea 
Ray Motor Boat, serial number SERA0852A1077-260SDA758-8, including the 
accompanying trailer, to Craig Jack Harris in exchange for $17,500.00. 
2. Craig informs me that neither the boat nor the trailer have been registered since 
then. 
3. Neither Craig nor I recall any Bill or Sale or other transfer documents since then. 
4. I am informed that Craig needs a Bill of Sale. There being some question raised I 
hereby transfer all right, title and interest in and to said boat and trailer to Craig 
Harris, acknowledging receipt of $1,500.00. 
5. I am informed that the boat and trailer are presently in the possession of Bonnie 
Harris and neither Craig nor I know the serial number, if any, of the trailer. 
DATED this 5? day of June, 2000. 
Garth Thurgood/^ 
Subscribed and Sworn to before me on the 2? day of June, 2000. 
Jotary Publi 
I xkXwJ&J ^2 ^ ke °«*' w* win . 
> & \ C j ] * > ^ WyCon*,T>is8k>n Expires I 
LX L S B Q ^ January 27.2004 
mmSSmm _ ^ S t H t e Of Utah I 
J. Grant Moody, U.S.B. #6282 
Charles A. Schultz, USB. #4760 
Attorney for Bonnie K Harris 
P.O. Box 564 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 530-5636 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE MOTION Re: 
Petitioner, : ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER 
MATTERS 
BONNIE HARRIS, : 
Respondent. : Civil No. 954402034 DA 
: Judge: Ray Harding, Jr. 
—oooOooo— 
COMES NOW, the Respondent and submits the following Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of her Motion to Strike the Motion 
and Memorandum Re: Order To Show Cause And Other Related Matters, filed 
by the Petitioner. 
STA TEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Beginning at the hearing on the property distribution between 
the parties to this action this Court has consistently and continually 
ruled and explained to the petitioner that the Respondent was given the 
assets in this case and not the dollar value of those assets. 
2. In virtually every hearing before this Court subsequent to 
the hearing on the property distribution, this Court has repeatedly 
emphasized to the petitioner that the Respondent was awarded the assets 
and not the dollar value of those assets. 
3. At the June 8, 2000 hearing on the order to show cause why 
the petitioner should not be held in contempt of Court for failure and 
refusal to abide by a the amended supplemental decree of divorce 
entered in this case, this Court again, explained to the petitioner and 
to his counsel that the Respondent was awarded the assets and not the 
dollar value of those assets. 
4. At the June 8, 2000 hearing on the order to show cause why 
the petitioner should not be held in contempt of Court for his failure 
and refusal to abide by the supplemental decree of divorce, this Court 
again, explained to the petitioner and to his counsel that any alleged 
complaints the petitioner's brother and/or sons might have regarding 
any property allegedly removed from the storage shed on Orchard Drive, 
by the Respondent, could not be addressed by this Court in this 
proceeding because the only parties to this action are the petitioner 
and the Respondent. The Court again explained to the petitioner and to 
his counsel that if the brother and sons of the petitioner believed the 
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Respondent had taken personal property belonging to them from the shed 
on Orchard Drive they would have to file a separate action to recover 
any such property allegedly taken. 
5. At the June 8, 2000 hearing on the order to show cause why the 
petitioner should not be held in contempt of Court for his failure and 
refusal to abide by the amended divorce decree filed in this case, the 
petitioner presented to the Court documentary evidence and testimony 
concerning the actual values of the assets she was awarded in the 
supplemental decree of divorce. The Court accepted the petitioner's 
position on the value of the assets she was awarded in the supplemental 
decree of divorce and again reiterated that the Respondent had been 
awarded the assets and not the dollar value of those assets. 
6. The Court found the petitioner in contempt of Court at the 
June 8, 2000 hearing, and again ordered the petitioner to sign all the 
documents necessary to effectuate a transfer of the assets to the 
Respondent within two weeks of the hearing in order to purge his 
contempt. 
1. At the June 8, 2000 hearing the petitioner offered no 
evidence or testimony to rebut the values of the assets established by 
the Respondent. 
8. Subsequent to the June 8, 2000 hearing, the petitioner did 
not file a rule 59 Motion or a rule 60 b. Motion. 
9. Now the petitioner has filed a Motion Re: Order To Show Cause 
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And Other Related Matters, seeking once again to argue that the 
Respondent was awarded the value of the assets and not the assets 
themselves. 
10. In his Motion Re: Order To Show Cause And Other Related 
Matters the petitioner once again seeks to litigate the claims of his 
brother and his sons in this divorce proceeding. 
11. The petitioner has filed a Motion Re: Order To Show Cause 
And Other Related Matters, a Memorandum in support of Motion Re: Order 
To Show Cause And Other Related Matters and a notice of hearing on 
motion Re: Order To Show Cause And Other Related Matters, but the 
petitioner has never had an order to show cause issued relative to his 
Motion Re: Order To Show Cause And Other Related Matters or served any 
order to show cause all the Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PETITIONER'S MOTION IS FACTUALLY, LEGALLY AND PROCEDURALLY 
IMPROPER. THEREFORE, THE Respondent IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE PETITIONER'S 
MOTION STRICKEN AND DISREGARDED BY THIS Court 
POINT! 
THE PETITIONER IS IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTING TO RE-LITIGATE THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF MARITAL ASSETS IN VIOLATION OF THIS Court's SUPPLEMENTAL AMENDED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AWARDING THE ASSETS OF THE MARRIAGE TO THE 
Respondent. 
In the supplemental amended decree of divorce, entered in this 
matter, this Court specifically awarded the marital assets to the 
Respondent. This Court has repeatedly and continually explained to 
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both the petitioner and petitioner's counsel that the Respondent was 
awarded the marital assets and not the dollar value of those assets. 
The petitioner and his counsel, however, refuse to accept this 
fact, they continue to assert that the Respondent was awarded only the 
dollar value of the assets as specified on exhibit A to the 
supplemental decree of divorce. In spite of this Court's infinite 
patience and repeated explanations for nearly a year, the petitioner 
and his counsel are once again attempting to argue before this Court 
that the Respondent was only awarded the dollar value of the assets 
listed on Schedule A of the supplemental decree of divorce and not the 
assets themselves. 
Surely by now, this Court's patience must be exhausted with 
respect to this matter. On no less than a half a dozen occasions this 
Court has explained with exquisite detail to both the petitioner and 
his counsel that the Respondent was awarded the marital assets listed 
on Schedule A of the supplemental decree divorce, and not the dollar 
value of those assets. 
This Court has explained numerous times to both the petitioner and 
to the petitioner's counsel that the Respondent was awarded the marital 
assets listed on Schedule A of the supplemental decree of divorce and 
not the dollar value of those assets. Therefore, the petitioner and 
his counsel have no valid justification for filing a motion for order 
to show cause with respect to those assets or the value of those 
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assets. The petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and other 
matters is factually defective, legally defective and procedurally 
defective, with respect to any attempt to re-litigate the distribution 
of the marital assets and/or their value. 
The petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and other matters 
seeking to re-litigate the distribution of marital assets and the value 
of those assets is simply filed in bad faith without any basis in fact 
or law and for the purposes of harassing, vexing, annoying and 
increasing the cost of litigation to the Respondent. Therefore, the 
Respondent's motion to strike the petitioner's motion Re: order to show 
cause and related matters must be granted as a matter of law. 
PQINTII 
THE PETITIONER IS IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTING TO LITIGATE THE ALLEGED CLAIMS 
OF THE PETITIONER'S BROTHER AND HIS SONS WHO ARE NOT PARTIES TO THIS 
DIVORCE ACTION IN THIS CASE. 
The petitioner and his counsel are again asking this Court to 
litigate the alleged claims of the petitioner's brother and his sons 
with respect to personal property they claim was taken from the storage 
shed on Orchard Drive by the Respondent. This Court has repeatedly 
explained to both the petitioner and his counsel that the petitioner's 
brother and his sons are not parties to this action that this Court has 
no jurisdiction over them and cannot decide alleged claims between them 
and Respondent in this divorce case. The Court has also repeatedly and 
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exquisitely explained to both the petitioner and counsel that if the 
petitioner's brother and his sons feel they have a cause of action 
against the Respondent they must file a separate action against her. 
However, in spite of these repeated admonitions and explanations from 
the Court, the petitioner and his counsel have once again filed a 
motion with this Court seeking to litigate the alleged claims of the 
petitioner's and his sons in this case. 
The petitioner's seeking to litigate the alleged claims of his 
brother and his sons, in this divorce proceeding before this Court is 
factually, legally and procedurally improper. The petitioner has not 
had the Respondent served with an order to show cause, therefore, he 
cannot schedule a hearing on an order to show cause because no order to 
show cause been issued or served. 
The petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and other matters 
seeking to litigate the alleged claims of the petitioner's brother and 
his sons is simply filed in bad faith without any basis in fact or law 
and for the purposes of harassing, vexing, annoying and increasing the 
cost of litigation to the Respondent. Therefore, the Respondent's 
motion to strike the petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and 
related matters must be granted as a matter of law. 
POINTIII 
THE PETITIONER'S MOTION Re: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER MATTERS IS 
PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND IMPROPER. 
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Petitioner has filed a motion Re: Order To Show Cause And Other 
Related Matters, a Memorandum in support of that motion and notice of 
hearing on the motion. However, the petitioner has never had an order 
to show cause issued or served on the Respondent. Therefore, any 
hearing on the motion Re: order to show cause and other related matters 
is improper and procedural defective. 
The petitioner and his attorney have never had an order to show 
cause issued with respect to their Motion Re: Order To Show Cause And 
Other Related Matters, because they know this Court would not issue an 
order should show cause relative to matters that have already been 
determined and litigated before this Court and relative to matters 
which this Court has repeatedly told both petitioner and his counsel 
that the Court will not hear. If the petitioner desired this Court to 
reconsider its order on the marital assets to the Respondent the 
petitioner was required to either file a Rule 59 motion within 10 days 
of the supplemental decree divorce and/or a rule 60 (b) motion within 90 
days of entry of the supplemental decree of divorce. The petitioner 
did not do either of those options, therefore, he is procedural 
estopped from attempting to do so at this time. 
Likewise, if the petitioner disagreed with this Court's order on 
the order to show cause of the petitioner for his failure and refusal 
to comply with the supplemental decree of divorce, as announced by the 
Court at the June 8, 2000 hearing, the petitioner had 10 days to file a 
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Rule 59 motion with respect to the order or 90 days to file a rule 
60(b) motion with respect to that order. Again, the petitioner chose 
to do neither of those things. Therefore, he is also estopped from 
attempting to question the validity of the transfer of the assets to 
the Respondent or to question the value of the assets transferred to 
the Respondent. 
Once again, the petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and 
other matters seeking to re-litigate, a by way to of an order to show 
cause that is never been granted or served, is filed in bad faith 
without any basis in fact or law and for the purposes of harassing, 
vexing, annoying, and increasing the cost of litigation to the 
Respondent. Therefore, the Respondent's Motion to Strike the 
petitioner's Motion Re: order to show cause and related matters must be 
granted as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioner's motion Re: order to show cause and other related 
matters is factually, legally and procedurally defective. The 
petitioner is attempting to re-litigate property distribution set forth 
in his supplemental decree of the divorce and to have this Court rule 
that the Respondent was awarded the dollar value of the marital assets 
and not the marital assets, as this Court has repeatedly stated. The 
petitioner is also attempting to litigate alleged claims of his brother 
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and sons, who are not parties to this divorce action, in this case in 
spite of this Court's repeated admonitions that the petitioners' sons 
and brother are not parties to this case and Court has no jurisdiction 
over them. The petitioners also attempting to litigate and re-litigate 
these matters under the guise of an order to show cause, when no such 
order has ever been issued by this Court or served upon the Respondent. 
The petitioners motion Re: order to show cause and other related 
matters is filed for the purposes of vexing, annoying, harassing, and 
increasing cost of litigation to the Respondent. The petitioner has no 
factual, legal or procedural grounds on which he can justify his motion 
Re: ordered to show cause and other related matters. Therefore, the 
Respondent's motion to strike the petitioners motion Re: order to show 
cause And other related matters must be granted as a matter of law, and 
the Respondent should be awarded her costs and attorney's fees incurred 
in filing this Motion and responding to the spurious Motion Re: Order 
to Show Cause and Other Related Matters filed by the petitioner and his 
counsel, in bad faith with no justification in fact or law. 
Respectfully this submitted this ^ Day of December 2000. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney at Law 
-10-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the av of December I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Motion and Memorandum to the persons 
specified below by depositing a copy(s) in the United States Mail, 
Postage Prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Loren D. Martin 
MARTIN & NELSON 
139 South Temple, Suite 400 
SLC, UT 84111 
Charles Schultz 
ATH DISTRICT C O W 
j . 1 t 07 fH '01 
MARTIN & NELSON. PC 
Loren D.Martin (2101) 
Mail: PO Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590 
Street: 139 East on South Temple. Suite 400 
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Respondent. 
MOTION TO DISMISS and 
OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE (Hearing Requested) 
Case No: 95-44-02034 DA 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Petitioner 
files this MOTION TO DISMISS and OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
as follows: (Under the provisions of Rule 4-501 (3)(B), hearing is requested.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Respondent filed and mailed her MOTION TO STRIKE dated December 29,2000. 
2. Respondent's Motion made no request for hearing. 
3. Petitioner does not dispute that the Court ordered him to transfer the assets to 
Respondent as listed on "Schedule A" of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce. 
4. Petitioner does assert that the division of property envisioned by the Court at trial 
was the property as it was at that time, absent a windfall or unjust enrichment. 
5. The Court's Order on Contempt, Evidentiary Hearing, dated June of 2000, page 4, 
at paragraph 7, required Petitioner to pay "post judgment interest" of $3,787.61. The clear intent 
was to transfer all property as it existed at the date of judgment plus interest to the date paid. 
6. The record reflects that delay in transfer and final resolution of this matter has at 
least in part been caused by Respondent's appeal of the order of the court that she herself prepared 
for this Court's signature. 
7. Petitioner does contend that Respondent did violate the Orders of the Court in 
several particulars by failing to provide required information, failure to cooperate in the transfer of 
assets, taking property not included on "Schedule A,'" and by furnishing false or misleading 
information to the Court as more specifically stated in the "Statement of Facts" set forth in 
Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Mortion Re: Order to Show Cause and Other Related 
Matters that was dated, filed and personally served on December 19, 2000. Said Memorandum is 
hereby incorporated herein by reference and made a part hereof. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
Respondent's Motion to Strike does not meet the requirements of either the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure or the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Rule 4-501 (1)(A) requires that: 
All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a 
memorandum of points and authorities, appropriate affidavits, and copies of or 
citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other 
documents in support of the motion. 
Respondent's Motion to Strike cites no points or authorities, provides no affidavits, and 
provides no copies of or citations by page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or 
other documents. 
Respondent's argument just makes an attempt to shift the issues or by inference to raise 
other issues that will provide Respondent with a windfall or unjust receipt of value far in excess of 
and not in compliance with the intent of the Court. 
POINT 2 
Respondent is not entitled to engage in dilatory conduct that caused delay of this matter by which 
she then asserts a right to a windfall and unjust receipt of value in excess of the Court's orders. 
Petitioner's Motion re: Contempt sets forth the nature of misrepresentations that have been 
made to the Court by Respondent. As an example, the parties agreed and it was read into the 
record that Respondent and Petitioner had reached an agreement as to division of personal 
property. That agreement was that Petitioner would pay $5,000.00 and retain his personal 
property. Respondent repudiated that agreement after the trial. Respondent stands in contempt of 
the orders of this court for the reasons specifically delineated and set forth in Petitioner's Motion 
re: Contempt. Respondent's Motion to Strike does not meet the requirements of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure or Rule 4-501 and should be disregarded as nothing more than an attempt to respond 
improperly and confuse the issues addressed. 
Respondent's Motion to Strike is an attempt to benefit from one's own misconduct. Such a 
holding would encourage dilatory conduct and would encourage fraudulent activity, delay, and 
misrepresentation. The taking of some needed "tools" does not justify the taking of everything. 
That was not the agreement of the parties nor was it the order of this Court. The stipulation to the 
possible need that Respondent expressed for some tools to maintain the yard was in plain 
language. The parties cannot be deemed to have intended Respondent's taking of all property 
when the plain language was to the contrary. See Wingets, Include, v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 
231, 500 P.2d 1007 (1972); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Steward, 4 Utah 2d 228, 
291 P.2d 890 (1955) and Cummings v. Nelson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913). 
Using reality as a frame of reference is especially appropriate in this case. Respondent's 
dilatory and wrongful actions must not inure to her own benefit. The tort-feasor should not be 
permitted benefit from their own conduct. "The law allows a plaintiff to maximize recovery and 
thus prevent a converter from profiting from wrongful acts." See generally Alta Indus. Ltd. 
v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Utah 1993); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 926, at 538 
(1979);DanB. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 5.15, at 414 (1973). The 
courts do not have discretion to act in a capricious or arbitrary7 manner that may produce an 
inequitable or unjust result. "The word "discretion'' itself imports that the action should be taken 
with reason and in good conscience, and with an understanding of and consideration for the rights 
of the parties, for the purpose of serving the always desired objective of doing justice between 
them. Davis v. Riley, 437 P.2d 453 (Utah 1968). 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the Court dismiss the Respondent's Motion to Strike 
for failure to comply with the rules or that the Motion to Strike be denied, and grant such other and 
further relief as the Court deems just. 
DATED: January JjJi, 2001. 
MARTIN & NELSON, PC 
Counsel for Petitioner / 
ren D. Martii; 
Attorney at Law 
CERTIHCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on January 4 ^ T 2 0 0 1 , I placed in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, a copy of 
the following documents: 
1. MOTION TO DISMISS, and OBJECTION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE (Hearing Requested) 
addressed to the following: 
J. Grant Moody Charles A. Schultz 
336 West Main Street P.O. Box 564 
American Fork, UT 84003 Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
c-, 
J
*» h 
Ss ^
 0/ 
MARTIN &. NELSON. PC 
Loren D.Martin (2101) 
Mail: PO Box 11590 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84147-0590 
Street: 139 East on South Temple. Suite 400 
Sale Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
Counsel for Petitioner 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah 84601 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Respondent. 
PETITONER'S OBJECTION TO 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
MOTION RE: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS 
Case No: 95-44-02034 DA 
Judge: Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
Petitioner, Craig Jack Harris, by and through counsel, and pursuant to Rule 4-501, files 
this Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to Strike Motion Re: Order to Show Cause and 
Other Related Matters as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for a Motion to Strike as follows: 
Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading 
or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a 
party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon him, the court may 
order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
POINT 1 
PETITIONER IS NOT ATTEMPTING TO RELITIGATE THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
MARITAL ASSETS. 
The Respondent is arguing that by the Petitioner filing his Motion Re: Order to Show 
Cause and Other Related Matters, that Petitioner is somehow attempting to re-litigate the court's 
1 
distribution of the parties' marital assets. Specifically, Respondent argues that Petitioner is once 
again seeking an order from the Court that the Respondent was awarded the dollar value of the 
marital assets and not the actual asset. 
Respondent has mischaracterized the substance of Petitioner's motion. The Petitioner is 
not seeking an order from the Court that the Respondent was awarded the dollar value of the 
marital assets and not the actual asset. 
The Petitioner has accepted the fact that the trial court awarded the Respondent the actual 
assets of the marital estate and not the dollar value of those assets. Petitioner is merely seeking to 
enforce the Supplemental Decree of Divorce as ordered by the Court. 
For example, according to the supplementary decree of divorce the Respondent was 
awarded the Prudential IRA Account that had a "net value" of $2,666.00, and an account balance 
as of January 29, 1999, the agreed upon valuation date, of $4,847.00. (See Supplementary 
Decree of Divorce). 
Therefore, what the Court awarded the Respondent was the actual asset as of the January 
29, 1999, valuation date. On January 29, 1999, the asset had a value of $4,847.00. That is what 
the Court ordered and that is what the Petitioner is seeking to enforce. If this is not what the Court 
ordered then it begs the question - what does the January 29, 1999, valuation date mean? 
What the Respondent actually received was an asset with a value of $20,748.33 which is 
$15,901.33 more than the value of the asset as of the valuation date (i.e.$4,847.00) which is what 
the Court ordered. 
The Petitioner is not seeking to revisit the court's order, re-litigate the Court's order, or in 
any way is the Petitioner asking the Court to reconsider its order. What the Petitioner is seeking to 
do is enforce the Court's order. 
2 
POINT 2 
PETITIONER IS NOT ATTEMPTING TO LITIGATE THE ALLEGED CLAIMS 
OF HIS BROTHER AND SONS. 
The Petitioner is not asking this Court to "litigate the alleged claims of the petitioner's 
brother's and his sons with respect to the personal property they claim was taken from the storage 
shed on Orchard Drive by the Respondent." What the Petitioner is asking for is that the Court 
enforce its order with respect to the personal property. 
Subsequent to the trial there was disagreement between the parties on what the court 
actually ordered with respect to the personal property. Respondent claimed that all of the 
Petitioner's personal property, including the items in the storage shed was the Respondents. 
Because of the disagreement the Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Other 
Related Matters that was heard on March 1, 2000. During that hearing the court took a recess and 
gave the parties an opportunity to try and settle the matter regarding the personal property. 
The parties did reach a settlement that was read into the record by Mr. Moody, and which 
in essence stated as follows: 
On the personal property, Mrs. Harris will take what personal tools that she would 
like to have out of the shop by the 15th of March. And then the Petitioner will have 
until that weekend, I believe its the 19th of March, to remove the rest of the 
possessions out of the shop. 
Subsequently, the Respondent claimed that the property was stolen which claim was a 
fabrication. Because the property was not actually stolen but was removed from the storage unit 
by the Respondent the Petitioner is merely asking that the Respondent pick-out what tools she 
would like and return the remainder of the personal property to the Petitioner as agreed to in the 
party's stipulation. 
3 
POINT 3 
PETITIONER'S MOTION IS NOT PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND 
IMPROPER BECAUSE PETITIONER IS PERMITTED TO FILE A MOTION FOR 
AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE TO ENFORCE THE ORDERS OF THIS COURT. 
§30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated, provides that court issuing the decree has continuing 
jurisdiction over the parties divorce. 
Petitioner has filed a motion for an order to show cause to enforce the terms of the 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce which matter is properly before this Court. Procedurally, the 
means by which a party can seek enforcement of the decree of divorce is by an "order to show 
cause" or some similar petition. Merely because the Petitioner chose to bring this matter before the 
court by way of an "order to show cause" does not make Petitioner's motion procedurally defective 
and improper. 
Respondent makes an issue of the fact that the Petitioner did not obtain an actual "order to 
show cause" but rather filed his motion for an order to show cause and then sent out a notice of 
hearing. However, an actual "order to show cause" becomes necessary only when one party is 
seeking to compel another party to appear at the hearing. The benefit of an actual order to show 
cause signed by the Court is that if the non-moving party does not appear at the hearing an arrest 
warrant can be issued for contempt as provided for in §78-32-4 which states as follows: 
When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the 
court or judge a warrant of attachment may be issued to bring the person charged to 
answer, or, without a previous arrest, a warrant of commitment may, upon notice, 
or upon an order to show cause, be granted; and no warrant of commitment can be 
issued without such previous attachment to answer, or such notice or order to show 
cause. 
In this case an actual order to show cause was not necessary because the Respondent was 
already going to be at the scheduled hearing. At the hearing held on October 23, 2000, the Court 
stated that in addition to the Brad Townsend issue, it would also hear the Petitioner's issues 
regarding accounting. 
A 
As a result Petitioner prepared his motion for an order to show cause and served that 
document along with a Notice of Hearing upon Respondent's counsel. Unless Petitioner is 
seeking to have the Respondent held in contempt for not appearing at the hearing it is sufficient if 
such pleadings are served upon Respondent's counsel. 
With respect to the Respondent's final arguments regarding Rule 59, Rule 60, or 
Respondent's allegation that Petitioner is seeking to review, revisit, or re-examine the court's 
order, Petitioner is not seeking any such remedy. Petitioner is merely seeking to enforce the 
Court's order. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, Respondent's Motion to Strike Petitioner's Motion for an Order to Show Cause 
and other related matters should be denied and Petitioner's motion heard by the Court. 
DATED January 19, 2001. 
MARTIN & NELSON, PC 
Attorn 
Nelson 
f ey at Law 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of January 2001 I placed in the US Mail postage pre-
paid, a copy of the following documents: 
1) Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to Strike Motion Re Onier to Show 
Cause and Other Related Matters 
addressed to the parties as follows: 
J. Grant Moody Charles A. Schultz 
336 West Main Street P.O. Box 564 
American Fork, UT 84003 Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Shauna Beatty r 
£ 
> 
Charles A. Schultz, USB. #4760 
Attorney for Bonnie K Harris 
P.O. Box 564 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801) 530-5636 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS,. : MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO "PETITIONER'S OBJECTION TO 
Petitioner, : MOTION TO STRDXE MOTION Re: 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER 
BONNIE HARRIS, : MATTERS 
Respondent. : C i v i l No. 954402034 DA 
: Judge: Ray Harding, J r . 
—oooOooo— 
COMES NOW, the Respondent and submits t h e fo l lowing Memorandum of 
P o i n t s and A u t h o r i t i e s in Oppos i t ion i t t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s Objec t ion to 
Respondent ' s Motion to S t r i k e Motion RE: Order To Show Cause And Other 
Re la ted M a t t e r s . 
ARGUMENT 
THE PETITIONER'S OBJECTION IS NOTHING MORE THAN A PATHETIC ATTEMPT TO 
JUSTD7Y THE PETITIONER'S IMPROPER FILING OF HIS "MOTION RE: ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS" THAT WAS FTLED IN BAD FAITH, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH LAW, WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN FACT OR LAW AND IN 
VIOLATION OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
HARASSING, VEXING, NNOYING THE RESPONDENT AND INCREASING THE COSTS OF 
LITIGATION TO HER 
POINT I 
CONTRARY TO THE PETITIONER'S COUNSEL'S ASSERTIONS, THE PETITIONER IS 
ATTEMPTING TO RE-LITIGATE THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ASSETS. 
In t he p e t i t i o n e r ' s Objec t ion to Respondent ' s Motion to S t r i k e 
Motion RE: Order t o Show Cause and Other Re la ted Mat t e r s ( h e r e i n a f t e r , 
" P e t i t i o n e r ' s O b j e c t i o n " ) , t h e p e t i t i o n e r and h i s counsel c la im t h a t 
they a re not a t t emp t ing > r e - l i t i g a t e t he d i s t r i b u t i o n of the m a r i t a l 
a s s e t s . The p e t i t i o n e r and h i s counsel c la im "the petitioner has accepted the fact 
that the trial court awarded the Respondem ///»• in \ual assets of itw ima tui csiitu ttmi nat tk1 tinllti? vnitu 
of those assets." (Petitioner's objection, page 2, paragraph 3). However, in 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of petitioner's Objection, the petitioner and his 
counsel argue that what the Respondent was awarded was not the actual 
marital assets but the value of the marital assets at the time the 
marital assets were awarded to the Respondent. 
In paragraph 4, page 2, of petitioner's objection, the petitioner 
and his counsel state: 
For example, according to the supplemental decree oj divorce the Respondent was awarded the 
Prudential IRA account that had a 'net value " of $2,666.00, and account balance as of January 29, 
1999, the agreed-upon valuation date, of $4,847.00. 
In paragraph 5, page 2, of petitioner's objection, the petitioner and 
his counsel state: 
Therefore, what the court awarded the Respondent was the actual assets as oj January 29, 1999, 
valuation date. On January 29$ 1999 the asset had a value of $4,847.00. That is what the court ordered 
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and that is what the petitioner is seeking to enforce. 
In petitioner's prayer for relief in his Motion RE: Order To Show Cause 
And Other Related Matters, the petitioner prays for relief as follows: 
F. $16,292.39 for overage taken from Craig fs Prudential IRA account; 
G. $4,958.00 for overage taken from Craig's MONEY life account; 
H. S3,787.61 excess interest assessed from January 26, 1999; 
Out of one side of their mouths the petitioner and his counsel 
claim that they have accepted the fact that this Court awarded the 
Respondent the actual assets of the marital estate, and out of the 
other side of their mouth's, the petitioner and his counsel claim that 
the Court only awarded the Respondent the dollar value of the assets on 
the valuation date and demand that the Respondent return the difference 
between the actual value of the guesstimated value of the assets. The 
petitioner and his counsel cannot have it both ways. If the petitioner 
in fact agrees that the Respondent was awarded the marital assets and 
not the dollar value of the marital assets, then the petitioner and his 
counsel cannot legitimately and honestly ask this Court to require the 
Respondent to return to the petitioner any difference between the 
actual value of the marital assets and the actual value of the 
guesstimated value of those assets. 
The value of the marital assets and awarded the Respondent was 
litigated at the evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause why the 
petitioner should not be held in contempt of Court for his failure to 
comply with the supplemental decree divorce. In that hearing the 
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Respondent presented her evidence of the value of the marital assets 
she was awarded and this Court accepted the Respondent's evidence, and 
it again reiterated its holding that the Respondent was awarded the 
assets of the marital estate and not the dollar value. The Court then 
found petitioner in contempt of Court, and ordered the petitioner to 
sign all necessary documents to transfer the assets of the marital 
estate to the Respondent with all moneys taken from any of the assets 
return to those assets in order to purge his contempt. 
The very issues the petitioner and his counsel are attempting to 
re-litigate P, means of the petitioner'-. MMI.LOU Re: Order To Show Cause 
And Other Related Matters, was fully and completely litigated at the 
June 11, 2000 evidentiary hearing, and cannot the re-litigated again. 
PQINTIl 
CONTRARY TO THE PETITIONER'S AND HIS COUNSELS CLAIMS, IHE PETITIONER IS 
IN FACT IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTING TO LITIGATE THE ALLEGED CLAIMS OF THE 
PETITIONER'S BROTHER, HIS SONS AND AH) EQUIPMENT IN THIS CASE. 
Contrary, to the petitioner's and his counsel's claims, the 
petitioner and his counsel are in fact again asking this Court to 
litigate the alleged claims of the petitioner's brother and his sons, 
and even Aid Equipment with respect to property they claim was taken 
from the storage shed on Orchard Drive by the Respondent. In spite of 
this Court repeatedly explaining to both the petitioner and his counsel 
that the petitioner's brother and his sons are not parties to this 
action that this Court has no jurisdiction over them and that this 
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Court cannot rule on any alleged claims between them and Respondent in 
this divorce case, the petitioner and his counsel have again filed a 
motion with this Court again asking it to award monetary damages to the 
petitioner's brother and sons. 
The petitioner's and his counsel's statements in petitioner's 
objection that the petitioner is not asking this Court to litigate the 
claims of his brother and his sons is a deliberate, willful and 
fraudulent representation to this Court and is an insult to the 
intelligence of this Court. 
On page 21 of petitioner's Motion RE: Order To Show Cause And 
Other Related Matters, in the petitioner's prayer for relief, the 
petitioner praised as follows: 
A. $23
 y000.00 for items missing from the storage building; 
C. $2y 925.00 for A id Equipment property taken from storage building; 
D. S3,734.00 for Dick Harris' property taken from storage building; 
E. $8,600.00 for Troy and Scott Harris 'property taken from storage building; 
If the petitioner and his counsel are not seeking to litigate the 
alleged claims of the petitioner's brother his sons, Aid Equipment and 
some other unknown entity in this divorce proceeding then why does the 
petitioner's prayer for relief in petitioner's Motion Re: Order to Show 
Cause And Other Related Matters ask this Court to award $2,925.00 to 
Aid Equipment, $3,734.00 to Dick Harris and $8,600.00 to Troy and Scott 
Harris and $23,000.00 to some unidentified entity? 
The petitioner's and his counsel's assertion that the petitioner 
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is not asking this Court tc litigate the alleged claims of the 
petitioner's brother, sons and Aid Equipment is the unbelievable 
misrepresentation of fact to this Court. 
POlNTm 
CONTRARY TO THE PETITIONER'S AND HIS COUNSEL'S FALSE ASSERTIONS, THE 
PETITIONER'S MOTION Re: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND OTHER MATTERS IS 
PROCEDURALLY DEFECTIVE AND IMPROPER 
Petitioner has filed a motion Re: Order To Show Cause And Other 
Related Matters, a memorandum in support of that motion and a notice of 
hearing on that motion. However, the petitioner has never had an order 
to show cause issued or served on the Respondent. Therefore, the 
Respondent is not subject to any order to show cause, and any hearing 
on the Motion Re: Order to Show Cause Other Related Matters is improper 
and procedural defective. Contrary to the petitioner's and his 
counsel's assertions a party cannot be subject to order to show cause 
if no order to show cause has ever been issued or served. 
The petitioner and his counsel admit that they have never had an 
order to show cause issued with respect to their Motion Re: Order To 
Show Cause And Other Related Matters. (Petitioner's Objection, page 4, 
paragraph 3). Nonetheless, the petitioner and his counsel claim that 
the petitioner is entitled to the hearing on his Motion RE: Order To 
Show Cause And Other Matters because it is not actually necessary to 
have an order to show cause issued and served on the party who is 
allegedly in violation of some order of the court in order to have a 
hearing on the order show cause. Such assertion is utter nonsense and 
a deliberate misrepresentation of law on the part of the petitioner and 
his counsel. 
This Court has previously told the petitioner and his counsel that 
it would not hear any matters concerning the Respondent's alleged 
violation of any court orders unless and until an order to show cause 
was issued by the court and served on the Respondent. 
The petitioner and his counsel have not cited and cannot cite any 
authority, statutory, procedural or case law that permits a party to 
have a hearing on an order to show cause when no order to show cause 
has ever been issued or served on the alleged offending party. The 
petitioner's and his counsel's representations that actual order show 
cause was unnecessary in this case because the Respondent was already 
going to be at a scheduled hearing is a deliberate misrepresentation of 
the a law to this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioner's and his counsel's assertions that they are not 
attempting to re-litigate the distribution of the marital assets is 
deliberate, willful, knowing, and intentional misrepresentation of the 
facts to this Court. The petitioner's and his counsel's assertions 
that they are not attempting to litigate the alleged claims of the 
petitioner's brother, sons, Aid Equipment and some unspecified entity 
in this case is yet another deliberate, willful, knowing, and 
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intentional misrepresentation of facts. The petitioner's and his 
counsel's assertions that the petitioner's Motion RE: Order Show Cause 
And Other Related Matters is legally and procedurally proper is yet 
another deliberate, willful, knowing, and intentional misrepresentation 
of both the facts and the law. 
The petitioner's Motion Re: Order to Show Cause and Other Matters 
as well as the petitioner's Objection was filed by the petitioner and 
his counsel in bad faith without any basis in fact or Jaw and for the 
purposes of harassing, vexing, annoying, and increasing the cost of 
litigation to the Respondent. See the affidavits of Jeanie Langston 
and Bonnie Harris copies of which are attached to this Memorandum as 
Exhibits 1 and 2. Therefore, the petitioner's Motion Re: Order to Show 
Cause and Related Matters as well as the petitioner's Objection should 
be stricken and the Respondent should be awarded her Cause and 
attorney's fees incurred in responding to the petitioner's Motion Re: 
Order to Show Cause and Related Matters and Objection filed by the 
petitioner and his counsel in bad faith without any basis in fact or 
law and for the purposes of harassing, vexing, annoying, and increasing 
the cost of litigation to the Respondent. 
Respectfully this submitted this _ __ dav of January 2001. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney at Law 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the January 2001 I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum to the persons 
specified below by depositing a copy in the United States Mail,Postage 
Prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Loren D. Martin 
MARTIN & NELSON 
139 South Temple, Suite 400 
SLC, UT 84111 
Charles Schultz 
J Grant Moody, (6282) 
J GRANT MOODY, PC 
336 West Main Street 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
Telephone (801)756-4181 
Facsimile (801)756-3940 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COI K I' MM I AH .. ( H ' \ 1 > 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, AFFIDAVr Of | | \NNi I ^NGSTON 
Petitioner, 
BONNIE HARRIS : Civil Nu y*>44020j4 l.iA 
H e i|HtMi.lnn • Judge: Ray Harding, Jr 
STATE OF UTAH } 
SS 
COUNTY OF SEVERE } 
Jeanne Langston, being duly t'n w iwu n de;>(Kc<, and vjir, a» liilmws: 
I I, Jeanne Langston, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit. I am 
competent to testify as to these matter". \u " "."iild u »(*,"'v l-a11*.!1.,)"11 '"', *\ i 
trial of this matter. 
2. On November ! 3, i vW. I was staying with Bonnie Mai - n in Pleasant 
weekend. 
3 Bonnie and I and another friend, Sharon Maxfield, were having breakfast at the K& V 
w.t-ifaui *ni m Pleasant Grove that mon*.-r.£ '/pp-^w 9:30 -im or '0:0G Air; chen Craig 
Hams (Bonrae's X-husba:jd) came in and sat down and started talking wi 
4 Craig made the comment that he was going to go to the shed and pick up one of their four 
wheelers to take out to the motor cycle race their grandson was in. 
5. Bonnie told Craig that she had the locks changed on the shed door and that she would 
have to let him in. 
6. At that point Craig got extremely mad He stated he would break the door down 
7 Bonnie said there was no reason for that, she would be glad to let him in, Craig made 
more threats and then left the restaurant. 
8. Sharon and I were going shopping. Bonnie was going to the race track to watch her 
grandson race. However, Bonnie did not want to be left alone with Craig when he came 
to pick up the four wheeler, and she asked me to stay with her until he left. 
9 Craig and his son Scot were not far behind us getting to Bonnie's house. 
10 Craig said he had called Scot and told him to come and get his belongings out of the shed. 
11 Bonnie and I walked over to the shed to let Scot and Craig in. 
12. Craig and Scot were mad, both Scot and Craig were extremely rude and ignorant in their 
talk and actions toward Bonnie. 
13. All that Bonnie said to them was. "I am not going to fight with any of you," "1 have video 
taped everything in the shed, I have proof of what was in here, and we will have to let the 
Judge make another decision." Then Bonnie and 1 went back to her home 
14. We had not been there five minutes when Craig came to the door, Craig offered Bonnie 
$5,500 for his personal belonging and the reloading equipment. 
15. Bonnie said she felt it was worth more, that he had under evaluated everything. Craig 
was yelling and screaming threats at Bonnie, Craig ieft and returned a few minutes later 
with a different proposal $60,000 and he wouldn't mortgage the house that the Judge 
gave to Bonnie. 
Ijuniic KL.J -Nil1- *• ii i Mjt join-; i.) take his offer it was less than what the Judge had 
awarded her 
17. Craig was i ral nuinl ui J hr ivudc .norr ihieais Craig stated that if Bonnie did not take his 
offer he would keep fighting her in court until she used up all the money awarded to her. 
He said - < ' tin * I i n lltt 
18 After about Vi hour of his demands he left, because Bonnie would not give in and agree 
19 Bonnie repeatedly stated that she was not going to go agai/i ist the Judges decision. 
20. After Craig wrn? back to !f.c shed, Bonnie cal'H Mr. Moody, her ^tt^tney, and asked 
what she should do They ciscussed ai! thai had happened Mr. Moody aavised Bonnie 
to stay completely away from the shed until Cr«i? and Scot had left. 
At approx. 12:30 PM. Bonrac *aid sfr: u a.i, >\IK zrd ! s»* Ouid go *'ith SAIU/CI!. • 
22
 A s {[ef | Bonnie's home, I could see Craig and Scot were still loading things into Scot's 
UMzk •:*] ^arj hooked * toat onto Scot's truc«c. 
23. I w.'fr\ JJ;. nif" iiinil! 'I'lff afternoon (6:00 PM) and when I went back to Bonnie's she told me 
of sn .rr -^Jerit thrt had kippuwi « t h e rac? *rack. 
24 Hi unit- HI AK ui IIIIIII snr lynl mt c i tundmtt lit or 40 feet from Craig when Kara Hams, who 
is Scot's %*ife wiled up to the race track 5?h* did not ?cs Bonn:-s .-trKung there when 
sic suned " eiliiiii in i, IUIIJ I mil i( I yMii in ) A\ci I'livr SM'&I II T IIIJUI Snrruwrri IT 1 Aid 
what you said and it worked I got in." Bonnie said tha* Craig had run >o *he truck telling 
25 That same evening, Bonnie Bho let me hear Scot's message that he had left on her 
a/is-vering i *a- hu ic... *> ::i slii :es aft** 8oi:w: "iad .ii> ! ;ec ..p the : hec ar d ha; : teft foi: t:l" e • 
race he broke into the building to get his and Kara's Vft bikesf and that he had removed 
the devices Bonnie had pat in (he door and put the door lever to keep the door from 
opening 
26. The next day Bonnie, Ben McKinncy and I wa'ked over to the shed We took long bolts 
and put two in each door lever, one on each side of the main beam and bolted them to the 
doors so that nobody would be shle to move or slide the lever and get into the shed The 
doors were bolted shut at that time. 
27 Upon examining the main door, it was our beiief that it would be impossible to ever get it 
open using a credit card, it was tightly secured We left the building believing everything 
was secure 
Dated this dav of 7*lobwb .2000. 
I i ~i 
/Jeanne Langston '*' 
: / 
Subscribed and Sworn to this <^T day of $X+f~\s , 2000. 
/ Notary Public 
urn-' 
STATE OF UTAH } 
.ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH } 
Bonnie Harris being first sworn on her oath, deposes and states as follows: 
I I, Bonnie Harris, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit 
2. On November 13,1999 I was having breakfast with two of my friends Jeanie 
Langston and Sharon Maxfield. We were eating at K&V Restaurant in Pleasant Grove, when 
Craig Harris came and started talking to us 
3 Craig said he was going to the shed on Orchard Drive to get some things, including 
one of our four wheelers. 
4 I told Craig that I had changed the locks on the shed so he could not get in. Craig got 
very hostile and obnoxious he would bn*ak down the door 
5 i toid him ttat there was no need to do tnat because I would let luiri in ihe shed. 
6. Who** Jeanie and 1 g r^ back to my bou?e, Crag c*l'erj and s?iri he caUed his son Scot 
and told him to get his stuff out of the shed 
7. Je j^iie and I walked ovei to the bUcd to let Craig and Scoti *nto the jfced. 
8. Craig anc Scot were very rude and obnoxious and Jeanie and 1 left and went back to 
my house. 
9 Crsig came hscV. to h^e horse ;bout f.ve minute? Jater ami ^ffereJ o ••'? 35,500.00 for 
his personal property and reloading equipment. 
! 0 i to'cJ Gaig thai me reloading equipment was worth more than tnat and that he had 
undervalued e*f ry'hin^. 
11. Craig was veiling and screaming at me and making all sorts of threats. 
12. A lev* minuces later, Craig re^mec and ct&red mc $60,000 GO for everything and 
said that he would not mortgage the house if I &:i>:pted $t 0,000.00. 
13 I toid Craig that I would not accept his offer and that I was o l^y wing to accept what 
14 Craig got even more angry and made more threats, and he told me that if I did not 
accept his offer he would keep fighting me in court until I spent everything in attorney's fees and 
that I would end up with nothing He said he had plenty of money to pay his attorney but that I 
would have to spend everything the court gave me on attorney's fees to fight him 
Dated this -5 day of January 200 i. 
Bonnie K. Harris 
Sworn and subscribed to thi: &£ day of January 2001 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTLCQUEI
 D 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH P V 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Respondent. 
RULING 
Case No. 954402034 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter comes before the Court on the Petitioner's Order to Show Cause and 
Respondent's Motion to Strike. The Court has reviewed the file, considered the parties' 
memoranda, heard oral arguments, and being fully advised in the premises issues the following: 
RULING 
The Court notes that some of the claims raised in Petitioner's Order to Show Cause are 
spurious and will be dealt with summarily. Petitioner would only be entitled to his own personal 
property kept in the storage unit (shop) in question. Yet, in addition to a claim for $4,600.00 for 
his own personal property, Petitioner prays for $23,000.00 of "items 'missing'" and for several 
thousand dollars for property alleged to belong to third parties. Petitioner has no standing to 
claim recovery for items belonging to relatives. Respondent is correct in asserting that affected 
individuals or business entities would have to file their own claims. 
Petitioner also makes claims against the IRA accounts awarded Respondent. The 
Supplementary Decree of Divorce stated, 
The property should be valued at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered 
being January 26, 1999. 
Petitioner cannot recover the difference in value between the time Respondent actually received 
the asset awarded and the value on January 26, 1999. Petitioner attacks the Order on Contempt 
Evidentiary Hearing stating that some of what Respondent was awarded came from separate 
retirement accounts set up after the divorce. Sentencing on Contempt was June 21, 2000. The 
Order regarding Contempt was filed July 17, 2000. Petitioner's position is not well taken. The 
time to attack that Order under Rules 59 and 60(b)(l)-(3) has passed. Petitioner's Order to Show 
Cause was filed over five months after the July Order. The Court notes that even had a proper 
challenge been filed, it would likely have failed. 
Petitioner makes fairness claims to seek recovery of part of the value of the life insurance 
policy and the retirement accounts. Petitioner's claim is really one of equity. Neither party comes 
before the Court with clean hands. Petitioner has been found to be in contempt. The Court 
declines to alter the awards as they stand based on equity. 
Each side has attacked the other's Motion for procedural flaws. As neither side has 
strictly complied with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Judicial Administration, 
the Court will not decide the matter solely on procedural grounds. 
The most troubling allegation the Court must deal with is the allegation that Petitioner did 
not receive items of his own personal property awarded by the stipulated agreement. The shop 
was awarded to Respondent. Some of its contents and other items of personal property were in 
dispute. The parties' stipulation March 1, 2000 as to disputed personal property stated, 
On the personal property, Mrs. Harris will take what personal tools that she would 
like to have out of the shop by the 15th of March. And then the Petitioner will 
have until that weekend, I believe it's the 19th of March, to remove the rest of the 
possessions out of the shop. . . . And then he will agree to pay $5000.00 for the 
personal property and he retains possession of all the personal property. 
The Order signed by the Court and filed on April 4, 2000, states, 
The parties have agreed that the Respondent shall have until March 15, 2000 to 
select and remove what personal property she desires to have from the building 
located on the Pleasant Grove lot. The Petitioner shall remove the remaining 
personal property he desires out of the building on or before March 30, 2000. Any 
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personal property left in the building after March 30, 2000 shall be the property of 
the Respondent. The Petitioner shall pay $5,000.00 to the Respondent on or 
before April 4, 2000, for the personal property located in his personal possession 
and from the personal property received from the building located on the Pleasant 
Grove lot. The Respondent shall provide access to the building at the lot to the 
Petitioner from March 16, through March 30, 2000 upon the Petitioner giving 
Respondent 24 hour notice of the times in which he intends on removing the 
property. 
The language of the Order is very broad. Petitioner has failed to provide the Court with 
sufficient information to find that the Respondent did not comply with the Order. Specifically, 
the Court did not have before it a list of specific items from the shop belonging to Petitioner still 
in the possession of the Respondent and their values. Nor did Petitioner show that Respondent 
lacked the discretion under the Order to hold those items back. Petitioner did not desire another 
evidentiary hearing. The Court agrees that another hearing would be fruitless absent a limit to 
Respondent's discretion under the Order. 
The Court will not at this late date revalue the assets or reassess distribution. The Court 
notes the plethora of Orders it has had to enter since the initial Decree of Divorce. It is time to 
bring finality. Respondent's Motion to Strike is granted as to all matters except for claims for the 
Personal Property from the shed. Those personal property claims were not subject to a motion to 
strike, but failed after oral arguments. Therefore, Petitioner's Order to Show Cause is denied and 
Respondent's Motion to Strike is granted in part and denied in part. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court hereby rules as follows: 
1. Respondent's Motion to Strike is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 
2. Petitioner's Order to Show Cause is DENIED. 
3. Attorney fees are DENIED. 
Ruling Page 3 
4. Counsel for Respondent shall prepare an order consistent with the terms of this 
ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the 
Court for signature, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, 
lis / / day of DATED th b February, 2001. 
T>..I: . .~ n«~~ A 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of February, 2001, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following, 
with postage prepaid thereon. 
Charles A. Schultz, PO Box 564, Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Mark K. Nelson, PO Box 11590, Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0590 
sptity Court Clerk Deputy 
Charles A. Schultz, USB. #4760 
Attorney for Bonnie K Harris 
P.O. Box 564 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Telephone: (801)530-5636 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oooOooo— 
CRAIG JACK HARRIS, 
Petitioner, 
BONNIE HARRIS, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON "PETITIONER'S MOTION RE-
ORDER TO SHOW CA USE AND OTHER 
MA ITERS AND RESPONDENTS MOTION 
TO STRIKE MOTION Re: ORDER TO SHOW 
CA USE AND OTHER MA ITERS 
C i v i l No. 954402034 DA 
Judge: Ray Harding, J r . 
—oooOooo— 
The Respondent's Motion to Strike the petitioner's Motion Re Order 
to Show Cause and Other Related Matters and the petitioner's Motion Re 
Order to Show Cause and Other Related Matters came on for regularly 
scheduled hearing on February 14, 2001 at the hour of 9:30 a.m. The 
petitioner was represented by Mark Nelson, the Respondent was 
represented by Charles Schultz. 
The Court having heard and considered the oral arguments of the 
parties, having read and considered the memoranda and exhibits filed by 
the parties, having reviewed the file in this matter and now being 
fully advised in the premises, hereby orders, adjudges and decrees as 
follows: 
1. The Respondent's Motion to Strike is granted as to all matters 
except for the Personal Property from the shed. 
2. The petitioner's Order to Show Cause is denied with respect 
to the petitioner's claims to the personal property, all other claims 
having been stricken. 
3. Attorney's fees are denied. 
Dated this / / day of March 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
-; ^ Q . J 
NOTICE TO PETITIONER AND COUNSEL 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the 
Respondent will submit the forgoing Order to the Court for signature, upon the expiration of five days 
from the date this Notice is mailed to you, allowing 3 days for service by mail and intervening holidays, 
unless a written objection is filed with the Court and served upon the Respondent's counsel prior to that 
time. 
Dated this £ [ _ day of February 2001. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF'SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the <s L day of February I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to the person(s) specified 
below by depositing a copy(s) in the United States Mail, Postage 
Prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Loren D. Martin 
MARTIN & NELSON 
139 South Temple, Suite 400 
SLC, UT 84111 
Charles Schultz 
